

Political Monopolies in American Cities

The Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers

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Sample Chapters: Introduction, Chapter 1, Chapter 5

Introduction

In many ways, Chicago, Illinois and San Jose, California are extremely different places. Politically they represent the stark distinctions between machine and reform governments examined by generations of urban scholars. Throughout the 20th century, Chicago pulsed with life. Sordid links among a series of infamous political bosses and notorious crime lords ensured that the city never went dry, reelection came easy, and men like Al Capone became fabulously rich. Chicago housed millions of immigrants in an economy of factories and slaughter houses. The very model of a political machine, Chicago's hierarchically organized political parties were characterized by corruption, patronage armies, and decades of single party rule established by bosses and maintained by working-class constituencies.

Meanwhile, on the other edge of the nation, San Jose made its way into the world as a sleepy, agricultural community with a single square block downtown. Its most famous residents have been innovators of technology, not politicians or gangsters. In recent years San Jose has consistently been ranked among the safest and wealthiest big cities in America. Typically, reform governments, like San Jose's, have been defined only by their ideals and institutional structures: serving the good of the whole through efficient administration, dispassionate and removed from the gritty details of politics. Upper-class, middle-class, and business constituencies have been the strongest supporters of reformed systems. In this way, bosses and reformers have been placed in opposition to each other as representations of wholly different political worlds.

Yet, despite these vast differences, Chicago and San Jose share one conspicuous trait: a legacy of extraordinarily long tenure by political leaders. Richard J. Daley governed Chicago while Anthony "Dutch" Hamann managed San Jose. Both were political centralizers, leaders of

phenomenally powerful coalitions. In cities more than 2,000 miles apart, Daley and Hamann each came to office in the early 1950s and went on to preside for a quarter of a century. But in the twilight of the 1970s, the regimes these men guided were eclipsed by rising political movements. So, given the differences between machine and reform regimes, why do these places share political patterns; how could Daley and Hamann have both governed for multiple decades in cities that were so different? The answer lies in the approach to reelection employed by politicians in both places: they biased the system in favor of incumbents.

In the past, scholars have placed the boss and the manager at opposite ends of a spectrum of healthy government with machines anchoring the antidemocratic side while reformers held up the better end. This characterization has obscured our ability to understand the process by which representative democracy functions and the process by which it fails. I argue that it is not whether a government is machine or reform that determines its propensity to represent the people, but rather its success at stacking the deck in its favor. When political coalitions successfully limit the probability that they will be defeated over the long term -- when they eliminate effective competition -- they achieve a political monopoly. In these circumstances the governing coalition gains the freedom to be responsive to a narrow segment of the electorate at the expense of the broader community.

Daley and Hamann both led coalitions that pursued and secured political monopolies. These types of organizations are not as rare in American politics as one might think. In approximately thirty percent of the nation's largest cities, a single coalition has controlled all branches of government for more than a decade at some point during the 20th century. This book asks why and how coalitions establish political monopolies, it investigates the consequences monopolies have for the communities that house them, and it explores why they collapse.

There was a time when urban-politics scholarship led the discipline of political science; when theories of local systems informed our understanding of politics more generally. Today the study of cities is frequently the side effect of studying other topics – racial and ethnic politics, public administration, or economic development. For those who do focus on cities, a common theme is that cities are constrained and can do little to affect their own futures. As Douglas Rae (2003) put it “most American cities are sitting ducks, unable to move out of the way when change comes roaring at them.” (p xvii) Such a perspective suggests that the last place we should look to understand important outcomes and explain causal forces would be the city government itself. This book unabashedly disagrees with this view; it is a conscious attempt to refocus the dialogue on cities, to bring back politics, and to make predictive claims.

In the simplest terms, I argue that many reelection strategies employed at the local level break the electoral connection between constituents and representatives, leaving voters with diminished opportunity to control their elected officials. Political science research asserts that reelection seeking activity offers voters the best opportunity for a responsive and representative government (Key 1984 [1949]; Downs 1957; Mayhew 1974). Through elections citizens select and empower their representatives. Ideally, the desire to keep their jobs ensures that politicians, in pursuit of larger vote shares, serve constituents. But amassing more votes is not the only way to secure reelection. Politicians have a more appealing alternative for ensuring victory – biasing the system. In other words, politicians have incentives to take advantage of and implement structures that increase their probability of reelection regardless of the government’s performance or the quality of representation. When politicians cease to worry about reelection, they become free to pursue government policy that does not reflect constituent preferences. They acquire the ability to enrich themselves and their supporters or pursue policies that would

otherwise lead to their electoral defeat. Ironically, this behavior contributes to the coalitions' own political downfall. By limiting attention to narrow segments of the electorate and building rigid institutions to insulate their regimes from challenges, coalitions foster both the incentives and the means for the collapse of their monopolies. Over time, monopolists sow the seeds of their own destruction.

Given the presence and diversity of political monopolies at the local level in the United States, a comparative analysis of 20th century urban politics is the perfect place to begin. For each man (and they all have been men) who headed a political monopoly a different story can be told of his rise to the top. Some combination of luck, circumstance, and dogged perseverance enabled his success. The context in which these leaders lived and governed individualizes each tale, but none is entirely unique. Both machine and reform organizations presided over cities for multiple terms without significant threats to their power, both focused benefits on their supporters, and both collapsed when they could not adjust to a changing political world.

Another reason American cities offer a good focus for this investigation is that city electoral systems tend to be fairly flexible, leading to myriad variations in urban political institutions. Some cities have mayors, others have managers, and still others have both. City legislatures vary widely in size and form; some are elected by districts or wards while others are selected through at-large (citywide) systems. Because I argue that institutional changes can advantage the governing coalition, this variation offers the opportunity to study the effect of changing the rules for monopoly control.

Using this framework, I challenge a number of conclusions drawn in the literature. First, scholars have generally determined that political machines are a thing of the past, no longer necessary or possible in the modern age. By placing machine governments in a broader

framework of political monopolies I suggest that this conclusion is incorrect. While politicians may no longer be able to dump ballots in the river with impunity, they continue to employ strategies to reduce electoral competition. The need for unity, power, and centralization is as great today as it ever was.

Filmmaker Marshall Curry (2003) documented the operation of a dying but still powerful machine in Newark, New Jersey, as he traced Cory Booker's 2002 campaign to unseat the incumbent mayor in the movie *Street Fight*. Time and again the film shows police officers working to protect the five-term incumbent Sharpe James while suppressing Booker's organization. Booker's signs were removed, his supporters intimidated with threats of losing their city contracts, his headquarters burglarized, and meeting locations shuttered by city agencies. Ultimately, Booker lost the election.¹ In the same year, newly elected Thomas Suozzi, Nassau County, New York's first Democratic executive in 30 years, asked the people to "dismantle the culture of machine politics," arguing that in his administration "workers [would] be rewarded based upon their performance, not their political connections." Two years later, Suozzi plead guilty to forcing a municipal employee into political service and remained under investigation for accepting quid pro quo campaign contributions (quoted in Lambert and Domash 2004, pA1). In San Antonio, two council members were indicted for "running a corrupt political machine" in 2002 (Robbins 2004, p1B). The *New York Times* argues that New Jersey's Hudson County Democratic organization "is one of the most formidable political machines in the nation...and it is only becoming stronger" (Hernandez 2003, pA2). As long as political coalitions continue to act strategically, monopoly remains a real possibility.

Understanding the effects of political monopolies has important implications for the study of city politics and democratic practice more broadly. The story of monopoly control over

government is not the *typical* story of urban governance. Monopolies are difficult to establish and hard to maintain. Much more common are urban electoral systems that have responsive governing regimes, competitive parties, divided government, or factional politics. Yet, monopolies do govern in many different types of cities and during a variety of time periods.² Twentieth century monopolies arose during the Gilded Age in cities like Baltimore and Philadelphia, during the Progressive Era in places like Cincinnati and New York, between the two world wars in places as different as Chicago and Dallas, and in the years following the Second World War in cities like New Haven, San Antonio, and Berkeley. Further, monopolies have occurred in every region of the country during the 20th century. There is evidence of twenty-five monopolies in the Northeast, twenty-two in the South, nine in the Midwest, and eight in the West. These cities have diverse demographic profiles and have varied widely in size over time. The smallest city hosting a monopoly had only 75,797 people (Pawtucket, Rhode Island) while the largest, New York City, New York, had a population of over seven million (see tables A-2 and A-3).³

Given this variety, knowing when, why, and how monopolies dominate governance enables scholars and practitioners to evaluate the extent to which democratic institutions become compromised in the United States. Politicians in pursuit of monopoly attempt to structure electoral and governing institutions in a manner which will enhance their chances for reelection. This means that institutional changes frequently reflect political goals and compromises. Once a coalition is in power the preservation of the monopoly structures decisions on expenditures and policy. Monopolies shape who is elected and appointed to office and when power is likely to be shared. They influence which residents are likely to participate in elections and whether or not participation affects political outcomes. Monopolies provide insight into the organization of

local bureaucracies and patterns of decision making by local agencies. In order to know who governs and how cities operate, it is important to know whether or not a city is dominated by a monopoly, who the monopoly represents and who it does not. Finally, understanding monopolies gets to the heart of democracy. If we expect people to be represented through the electoral system, we must ensure that the opportunity to exercise choice exists equally for all members of the community, and that reelection is tied to the quality and performance of incumbents.

To date, there has been no general consensus on the extent to which city political systems remain competitive, representative democracies. Scholars debate the regularity with which bosses controlled cities. Some, like Munro (1933), argue that “there may be some large urban communities in the United States which have a right to call themselves unbossed, but they can be numbered on the fingers of a single hand” (p12). More recently revisionist urban historians have suggested that city machines dominated the minds of Progressive reformers more frequently than they dominated cities (Shefter 1976; Teaford 1984; McDonald 1985). Stave et al. (1988) explains, “[T]here were remarkably few ‘machines’ that controlled city-wide political offices for long periods of time, and there is remarkably little evidence that political organizations either wanted or had the resources to be uncritical respondents to the needs of the urban masses” (p300). Additionally, other than work by Bridges (1997), Davidson and Fraga (1988), and Fraga (1988) there has been little recognition that reformers operated as cohesive coalitions for an extended period of time. Many scholars have studied the effects of reform institutions (e.g. Welch and Bledsoe 1988), but have frequently seen these effects as unintended. In their introductory urban politics textbook, Ross and Levine (2001) state “The resulting reforms helped

clean up city politics and make municipal government more professional and efficient. Yet the reforms also produced unanticipated and undesirable effects” (p159).

In this work I illustrate that although rare, machine and reform regimes *did* exist. I draw on new data to show that coalitions dominated city elections, that these coalitions were goal seeking, that the outcomes they wrought were intentional, and that they generated clear patterns of governmental expenditures. The rich case-study literature on city regimes has provided an excellent foundation for understanding political monopolies and yet causal explanations tend to be ad hoc, wholly dependent on individual contexts. I seek to systematize these descriptions to determine where and when the causal relationships provide predictive and explanatory power, to uncover empirical regularities, and to generalize the findings to apply to cities in particular and to democratically elected governments more broadly. I also strive to contribute to our understanding of local political institutions and to clarify the links between practices and outcomes – explaining, for instance, exactly why patronage produced a machine and why nonpartisan elections aided reformers.

The existing literature on city electoral systems is insufficient to explain why Chicago and San Jose have such similar political histories. It is generally accepted that machines are the epitome of monopoly, reform its antithesis. Early analyses of machines were written by the municipal reformers themselves, the general consensus being that dominance by local party organizations generated corrupt and inefficient government that was supported by ignorant immigrant masses, who were bribed into loyalty (Bryce 1888; Steffens 1902). This structure opposed that of the reformers, who sought clean government run by experts and supported by a knowledgeable, decisive electorate. Machines were “condemned as the weakest link in

American democracy,” an issueless politics in which the only goal was to win votes (Stone 1996, p 446). Reformers were defined by their opposition to machines (Finegold 1995).

A second generation of scholarship sought distance from the normative claims and drew upon social-science theories to understand the operation and effect of machines. Theorists like Robert K. Merton (1957) argued that machines dominated for such extended periods of time because they offered integral social functions such as the provision of welfare, the creation of informal networks between business and government, and the centralization of power. The machines in this portrayal helped immigrants assimilate, softened the harshness of industrialization for the poor, and created stability for economic interests. Simultaneously, a new generation of scholarship on municipal reform had begun to argue that the reform movement was an effort by businessmen and the middle class to regain power in society. To achieve this goal reformers sought to disenfranchise poor, working class, and immigrant voters (Hays 1964; Holli 1969). Today, scholarship has swung back in the direction of deriding machines, highlighting the holes in the functionalist accounts (Erie 1988; DiGaetano 1988) and reinterpreting reform as a more nuanced movement (Buenker 1973; Finegold 1995; Connolly 1998, Wyman 1974). However, even in these revisionist accounts machine and reform politicians are still analyzed separately.

The existing scholarly work has much to offer students of city politics, but leaves room for new developments. The argument in *Political Monopolies* is that our understanding of city politics should be revised to reflect the underlying similarities of these organizations; machine and reform were different versions of the same political phenomenon. The quest for power and the effects of dominance are comparable across time and place. By defining regimes through the goals and strategies of political leaders, rather than by their constituencies this becomes clear.

Studying political machines and municipal reform side by side allows us to see how alike they were.

In this context it also becomes clear that the debate over the functions of machines presents a false dichotomy. Were machine politicians greedy hacks after the spoils of office or did they truly aid the suffering masses? The distinction implies that politicians should not want to win votes. But the very structure of representative democracy channels the desire for reelection into successful governance. It was only after machines *stopped* doing things to win votes that the distribution of municipal benefits became more narrowly focused. This argument helps us to be more precise about the negative and positive effects of machines.

The research in *Political Monopolies* also speaks to the body of urban politics research that has found no support for the claim that governments distribute benefits to political supporters and withhold benefits from political enemies (Mladenka 1980; Koehler and Wrightson 1987) or that elected officials have only limited influence on spending priorities (Peterson 1981, Wolman et al 1996). Evidence is presented here that dominance leads coalitions to target supporters at the expense of people outside of the governing organization. Regardless of the characteristics of the dominant regime, in each of these cities, spending declined and the distribution of benefits narrowed. Political coalitions *are* able to monopolize government, even in democracies, and choose to reward fewer constituents when they solidify control.⁴

Finally, the evidence and argument presented here speaks to debates in political science more generally. For instance, a central debate has been concerned with explaining the distribution of power within polities. In much of the work on institutions electoral systems are treated as fixed and scholars study their effects on the success of different interests. Recent work

has begun to analyze the source of institutional structure and change (Boix 1999, Boix and Stokes 2003) but, comparative work in this vein across cases and time is still rare. Without understanding the genesis of institutions we lack a complete understanding of their effects on the distribution of power and resources (see Benoit 2007 for a review). *Political Monopolies* offers a contribution to this literature by identifying factors that give rise to both institutional change and stability. It then uses this knowledge to analyze the effect of institutions on the distribution of government benefits.

Political Monopolies also contributes to our understanding of competitiveness. By identifying institutions that bias outcomes towards incumbents the book offers an alternative to relying on endogenous descriptors such as the share of seats or margin of victory won by a given party (e.g. Ranney and Kendall 1954; Koetzle 1998). Additionally, work by scholars like Zaller (1998) and Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts (2007), has argued persuasively that the source of the incumbency advantage in American politics is the high quality of incumbent candidates. Alternatively, I show that incumbents can increase their chances of winning regardless of their performance as representatives.

Further, contrary to findings by scholars like Bennett and Resnick (1990), Norrander (1989), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), and Dahl (1961) I argue that limited participation among subpopulations in a polity can have serious negative long-term consequences. When monopolies bias the system and depress turnout it not only affects elections at the local level, but has the potential to affect elections and institutions at all levels of government. For example, a resident, who is dissuaded (or prohibited) from voting for mayor, may also be disinclined (or disallowed) to cast a ballot for state or federal officials. Further, as Liazos (2006) has shown, efforts to reform local political institutions frequently led to state level policy changes with

regard to regulatory power, taxation, service provision, and home rule. As many cities won the right to enact and manage programs to provide for their populations, monopolies simultaneously limited the benefit of such programs to core members of their coalitions.

The remainder of this chapter discusses the rationale for seeking a monopoly over local government, details the research design, explains the case selection and the sources of evidence, and offers a short description of each chapter in the book.

Spoils of Urban Governance

There are a number of reasons scholars may be skeptical of the argument that political coalitions seek to monopolize local government. For one, it may seem counterintuitive for politicians to expend effort to control a political system that is severely constrained in its distributional and policy choices due to its subordinate status in the federal system and due to competition with other municipalities for population and investment.⁵

In other words, why would anyone waste time trying to capture power in a city if there are few important decisions to be made? Answering this question requires first recognizing what there is to control at the local level and who might seek to control it. Paul Peterson's (1981) famous policy typology summarizes much of what city governments do – redistribute income, engage in development, and manage the allocation of services. But these are abstract categories and might be said to apply at any level of government, so they do not illuminate the rationale behind seeking power at the city level. It is not clear that control over *local* government would be the best mechanism to promote goals in any of these arenas.

Many of the important and unique decisions that cities make have to do with space. Cities control the process of zoning; as a result local debates are frequently organized

territorially. Even in cities that choose not to zone explicitly, the regulation of land use creates patterns of development. Residents whose material interests are geographically determined have reason to be concerned with these kinds of decisions. Land-based elites like developers, property investors, and real-estate financiers, assisted by lawyers, lenders, and brokers are the most visible type of residents with geographically determined material interests (Logan and Molotch 1987). Additionally, Logan and Molotch argue that businesses dependent on growth of the city, like newspapers and utility companies, focus on land-use decisions, particularly those that encourage development. Other residents may have an interest in land-use options to the extent that their community, home, or business is affected by a decision. It is not difficult to imagine a fiercely competitive local election centered on spending city funds to promote development versus a platform that urges funds be allocated toward services; or an election where zoning for commercial versus residential construction is the focus; or one in which the location of the development is at stake.

City governments also control various regulations imposed to maintain order and keep the peace like restrictions on loitering, building codes, and liquor licenses. Local governments may be called upon to negotiate culture wars among residents in areas such as domestic-partner rights, access to abortion clinics, and school dress codes (Sharp 1999). To the extent that voters and elites have interests in these policy arenas, these individuals may be motivated to compete for local control because higher levels of government and the private market are not the locus of power.

Perhaps most importantly, cities provide services like water, garbage, sewerage, and power. They build and maintain infrastructure such as roads, bridges, ports, public transit, libraries, parks, and schools. They manage and staff police, fire, and education forces. In some

cases they spend municipal funds on health care and other welfare functions like low income housing and, frequently, on development projects like convention centers, waterfront parks, or stadiums. Every city has a unique mixture of the types and levels of services provided, and residents will have preferences regarding the ideal combination. Some preferences are driven by ability to pay for private versions of the municipal good, others are determined by the expense or tax required to supply the good, and still others are dictated by the long-term effect on growth, investment, and employment. Controlling local government translates to having the ability to determine these arrangements.

City politics has also been the locus of intense struggles over racial control and domination. Among other things, these fights have been about increasing or decreasing benefits to racially or ethnically identified groups, the protection of segregation, fights for integration, or achieving descriptive representation. Local politics, as opposed to state or federal politics, is especially important in this arena for a number of reasons. First, cities can have substantial populations of people who are nationwide minorities. Groups like the Irish, African Americans, and Latinos may have a more vested interest or a better chance at control at the local level. Cities also have the ability to control and enforce the level of segregation by virtue of their land use powers. Finally much of what cities do is allocate benefits. As Kaufmann (2004) explains, “The essential questions that dominate many, if not most, local elections focus on the priorities and allocation of local government services: who will receive how much and at the expense of whom” (p19). At times the important reference groups for these allocational decisions are defined by geography, party, or ideology; but particularly when racial conflict becomes palpable, group interests tend to be defined along racial and ethnic lines. Winning control of local

government may mean the ability to ensure a group comes out ahead or does not fall behind in these battles.

The goals pursued by machine and reform organizations fit within these possibilities. According to urban-politics scholars, reformers were primarily policy seeking while political machines are believed to have sought economic benefits through the distribution of contracts and patronage without regard to policy goals or ideology. In this view the machine sought to control local government in order to distribute patronage. But this argument confuses the goals of elites with their strategies. One must ask *why* machines wanted to distribute patronage.

It is possible that machine politicians were, in fact, policy seeking – that they sought to redistribute income using patronage.⁶ Since local governments control vast numbers of public jobs power at the city level would be a logical focus for such politicians. During the early 20th century, when machines were most powerful (Brown and Halaby 1984), public jobs frequently paid better wages than private employment. During this period in San Jose “persons in the public employ receive[d] a higher average rate of pay than any commercial or industrial group,” (Thorpe 1938, p3). Furthermore, discrimination was pervasive in the private realm and could be overcome in the public arena if a group captured the levers of government.

Some scholars (Weber 1946; Stone 1996) indicate that the underlying drive of machine politicians was winning elections to achieve power for power’s sake. But this argument does not get us any closer to understanding why machine politicians sought to win local elections and not other kinds of elections unless local elections were easier to win and keep winning. This is likely to be the case. Some local constituencies are more homogenous than state or federal constituencies, so turnover may be less frequent. Small electorates may also enable a politician to win without fame or fortune. As this work shows, local arenas, by virtue of their size and

more malleable institutional structures, are easier to bias, so serving multiple terms may be more certain at the local level. Additionally, local elections can be insulated from all but the largest national partisan tides. Finally, local elections are much less visible than national or state elections, and so perhaps easier to win (Wolfinger 1972). It may also be that it is relatively more straightforward at the local level to define a platform that appeals to a majority of the electorate. As the famous boss of Kansas City, Tom Pendergast, once said:

What's government for if it isn't to help people? They're interested only in local conditions – not about the tariff or the war debts. They've got their own problems. They want consideration for their troubles in their house, across the street or around the corner – paving, a water main, police protection, consideration for a complaint about taxes. They vote for the fellow who gives it to them. (Quoted in Larsen and Hulston 1997, p 72)

For the machine politician interested in maintaining power for power's sake, control at the local level offered an additional benefit during at least the first half of the 20th century. Due to the strength of partisan cues, winning control at the city level frequently translated into power and influence at the state and federal levels as well. Many machine politicians were dual office holders, and many were active in their state and federal party organizations. Further, at the time many machines were consolidated; big city governments were frequently more important and more powerful than state governments. They had larger budgets, greater patronage, and paid higher salaries.

Scholars have also argued that some machine politicians sought personal wealth through trading favors or by taking advantage of inside information (McDonald 1994). For this to incentivize *local* control it must be true that earning a profit from one's political position is easier

or more certain at the local level than at other levels of government. Reid and Kurth (1988) make an argument along these lines. They suggest that machine politicians sought to tax the profits of the wealthy. To do this they needed to hold power; the cheapest route to which was purchasing votes from the poor through patronage. Since many machine politicians were the product of humble origins it is possible, perhaps even likely, that local political positions represented one of the few options for socioeconomic advancement.⁷

Distilling the aims of reform organizations is equally difficult. One reason is that many different types of political movements referred to themselves as reform. My focus is the structural reformers (as opposed to social reformers) who governed in the South and West through changes in electoral institutions.⁸ Why did reformers seek to monopolize local government? According to a review of city manager government in Austin, reform proposals to change city government were “not made in a self-sacrificing spirit...their principal economic interest was the development of the city as a pleasant place in which to live” (Stone et al 1937, p4). Bridges (1997) presents extensive evidence that reformers in the Southwest sought increased development in terms of population and economic growth. Having power over local government would have been integral to the realization of this goal because cities controlled zoning, local tax rates, municipal services, and the structure of the bureaucracy.

Most scholars of the reform period have focused on a different set of goals – running cities like businesses by promoting clean and efficient forms of government. However, this only explains reformers’ focus on the local level if cities (as opposed to state and federal governments) were particularly prone to corruption, a lack of efficiency, or decaying morality. This is reasonable given that many clashes between immigrants and native-born Americans were centered on issues controlled by local level governments like prohibition, neighborhood

preservation, and schooling. However, this argument still fails to explain *why* reformers sought to place government in the hands of “better men” since few were motivated by moral salvation of immigrants.⁹ One explanation is that many business owners (small business in particular) found city government unpredictable, bloated, expensive, and extortionist at the dawn of the 20th century. The desire to create a more accommodating environment for business, prevent pork barrel politics, and promote citywide development projects encouraged reformers to seek power at the local level. Since the founding it has been the responsibility of state and local (as opposed to federal) government to spend public monies on development. Thus, reformers were not just strategic power seekers, but sought power as a means to a specific policy end. They tended to be keenly instrumental in this pursuit; many displayed an open disdain for public office, but realized nonetheless that control over government was necessary to promote the development they sought.

Efforts to reinvent government were supported by residents who sought low tax rates and high levels of services, the combination of which required efficiency. Famous reform advocate Andrew White (1890) argued, “In consideration of the fact that the city is a corporation, I would have those owning property in it properly recognized. I would leave to them, and to them alone, the election of a board of control, without whose permission no franchise should be granted and no expenditure should be made” (p 104). Reformers from the nativist tradition believed that “a crowd of illiterate peasants, freshly raked in from Irish bogs, or Bohemian mines, or Italian robber nests [were] not alive even to their own most direct interests” (White 1890, p104) and so could not be counted on to govern municipal affairs. This view of course did not reflect all of the reform platforms that were presented to voters, but it did reflect a dominant stream within the tradition.¹⁰ Commonly reformers viewed popular democracy as problematic. One San Jose

reformer explained, “If the charter required [voters] to elect a [city] manager they would most certainly make a botch of it,” (quoted in Ellsworth and Garbely 1976, p16). The result was that reformers implemented changes to the electoral structure, which effectively disenfranchised portions of the population, particularly low income and minority residents, in the name of more efficiently functioning cities.

At least one conclusion to draw from this discussion is that there are many reasons why an individual politician might seek local office. Members of monopoly coalitions need not share the same goals, only the desire to control local government. Thus, I make the simplifying assumption that politicians seek reelection. Some politicians who run for local office will see it as a stepping stone, but not monopolists. They see municipal affairs as an end in and of itself. These politicians (even reformers) do not strive to make good public policy per se except to the extent that it benefits their coalition or helps them achieve their electoral goals. When members of the coalition believe that their individual goals would be better served by a different organization or outside of government, they have an incentive to leave.

Research Design and Data

The evidence and analyses offered throughout the book draw on varied methodological traditions. I use a large number of cases to determine general patterns in city politics, rely on a subset of this data set to analyze electoral effects, and use a few selected cases to study the process of monopolization. I depend heavily on historical narrative to explain political contexts and choices, and to offer evidence of phenomena that are difficult to measure (like electoral fraud). Scholars of each methodological tradition may find aspects of my analysis objectionable. Historically oriented scholars may be frustrated by the lack of a neat chronological time line for

monopolies and the mixing of time periods in my presentation. Other readers may be bothered by the number of characters I introduce and the weakness of some of my measures. In short, there is no element of the story that is persuasive with each type of data alone. But I hope that taken as a whole the body of evidence will convince even the most skeptical audiences. A detailed description of my case selection, data collection, and research design is included in the appendix, but a summary of my choices is useful here.

Historical city-level data is notoriously difficult to collect, with the best records available for large cities. Consequently, to provide evidence for my argument, I collected data on the 244 cities that made the list of the one hundred largest cities in the United States at any decennial census between 1790 and 1990 (Gibson 1998). I chose this time span in order to ensure that my collection would cover cities that have been sustained centers of populations, as well as those that had ceased to be important by the 20th century, and those that rose to prominence only in recent decades. I collected data on these cities for the years 1900-1985. I draw on narrative, historical, and statistical analyses, using subsets of the larger data set to answer my questions.

My large- N data analysis begins in Chapter 4 with an investigation into the electoral effects of bias and coordination; the components I argue are necessary and sufficient for monopoly control. Here I determine years in which a single organization controls nominations for office, seeks to dominate government, and relies on or implements strategies of bias to win. I then show that during these years incumbents win by larger margins and are reelected at a higher rate. In this chapter I use data from four reform cities: Austin, Dallas, San Antonio, and San Jose, and five machine cities: Chicago, New York, New Haven, Kansas City, and Philadelphia. This group of nine cities represents diverse regions of the United States, and each was listed as one of the nation's fifty largest cities at some point during the 20th century. These cities differ on

important demographic characteristics, such as economic and racial makeup and total population. Finally, the cities' monopoly periods represent a variety of time spans, reducing the possibility that some unidentified trend was the actual cause for the similar political patterns during the reign of dominant coalitions.

To understand the actual process of implementing bias in Chapter 2, I present historical data collected from these nine cities using primary and secondary sources. I analyze two cases in depth, one archetypal of classic machine politics (Chicago, Illinois) and the other representing classic reform (San Jose, California). Throughout the manuscript I provide narrative evidence regarding additional machine and reform cities that followed the patterns I describe.

The broadest analyses (in Chapters 4, 5, and 6) use the entire collection of 244 cities to establish trends in the rise and fall of monopolies. I determine time periods during which a single organization appeared to have strong control over government, city-wide for at least a decade during the 20th century.¹¹ Ideally, I would have relied on my key characteristics of monopoly (bias and coordination) to define these periods. In order to do this, I would have needed detailed information about the coalitions in every city at each election, the relationships and alliances among all candidates for office and office holders, and their use of biasing mechanisms. These data are not available for such a large number of cities. Instead, I relied on the main comparative urban texts that discuss dominance. I used Mayhew's analysis in *Placing Parties in American Politics* (1986) and Erie's *Rainbow's End* (1988) to define periods of time when a city was dominated by a machine organization. Mayhew also reported on a select number of reform-dominated cities. I supplemented Mayhew's historical analysis with information on the development and dominance of reform coalitions from Bridges (1997), Davidson and Fraga (1988), and Childs (1965) for reform monopolies. In total, I determined that

sixty-six of the 244 cities were governed by a monopoly for at least one decade. I was able to determine dates for the rise and fall of the monopoly in twenty-four of the sixty-six cities (see tables A1-A3). One city, San Antonio, hosted two monopolies providing a total of twenty-five cases with clear start and end dates for the monopoly.¹² Eight of these cases are reform monopolies and seventeen are machines. To test my hypotheses regarding the effect of demographic shifts and institutional control on the emergence and collapse of monopolies, I analyze data collected from the United States Census before, during, and after the monopoly period. The analyses include information from all 244 cities.

In Chapter 5, I analyze the distributional consequences of monopolies by comparing monopoly cities to nonmonopoly cities. Not surprisingly, the data on city expenditure is also limited. Data at the subcity level that would have allowed me to show precisely which groups and neighborhoods benefited (or suffered) from the dominance of municipal monopolies was not available.¹³ For citywide financial figures I relied on the United States Census, which provides standardized measures beginning in 1945.

My analysis of spending patterns makes use of the twenty-five cases for which I could determine start and end dates of the monopoly period as well as the 178 cities that were never monopolized (see tables A3 and A1). This model allows me to treat the onset of monopoly like a quasi-experiment. The years in which the monopoly cities are not dominated as well as all years for cities that are never dominated act as the control group. Those years when a monopoly dominated are the treatment. I compare expenditure patterns during the treatment years with the patterns during control years to provide evidence that monopolies concentrated benefits on core constituents and the governing coalition.

The data that I collected are far from ideal. But they capture information from enough cities over a long enough time span to be both illuminating and helpful. Urban politics has suffered from a lack of data, making it difficult to conduct large-scale comparative research on political processes, institutions, and outcomes, particularly in historical periods. *Political Monopolies* takes a step toward cross-sectional time-series analysis of city politics.

Organization of the Book

The book is organized by the components of monopoly development: from establishing bias, to building an organization, to the electoral and distributional effects wrought by monopoly, and finally to the monopoly's decline. In each chapter, the similarities between machine and reform regimes are presented and evidence is provided that urban coalitions in different types of cities were reliant on similar political logic, yielding similar political results.

Chapter 1 presents a theory of political monopoly. I argue that politicians seek to secure reelection by eliminating their competition, thereby creating a monopoly over government. I suggest that a single group should be able to dominate the political market for an extended period of time if it is highly organized and able to implement institutional rules that advantage incumbents. Additionally, I explain the difference between my concept of political monopoly and the extensively studied political machine. I provide an overview of the types of mechanisms coalitions can use to advantage incumbents and discuss the conditions leading coalitions to select different structures. I then lay out the main argument for why political monopolies reduce the size of their coalition, narrow the beneficiaries of urban policy, and ultimately sow the seeds for their own destruction. Depending on the political, social, and economic contexts that the coalition faces, leaders will choose different strategies to accomplish dominance. Along with

differing strategies come differing success rates for monopolization. I theorize that monopolies collapse in the face of rising discontent, a loss of bias, factions in their coalitions, and resource imbalances.

Chapter Two begins the analysis of the development of monopoly by detailing the establishment of biased political structures. This chapter provides historical evidence asserting that dominant coalitions sought to tilt the electoral arena in their favor. I argue that all political systems favor some participants and skills over others and further define a biased system as one in which incumbent office holders are advantaged by limited information, barriers to entry or exit for voters or challengers, and non-neutral translation of votes to seats. For this end, I catalogue the strategies used to maintain power and reduce competition. The list of biasing mechanisms available to coalitions includes everything from gerrymandering districts to assassinating opponents. The mechanisms politicians use to tilt the system in favor of incumbents fall into three broad categories representing the points at which an electoral system might be biased: information bias, vote bias, and seat bias. I present historical evidence about how politicians in nine cities employed these strategies.

Chapter Three focuses on the second component of monopoly – the coordination of the organization. In this chapter I explain why coalitions became consolidated, the strategies that they adopted, and who became part of the coalition (and who did not). I explain the timing of organization and the strategies for maintaining loyalty in the coalition. Additionally, I argue that coalitions consolidated when they faced threats to their desired outcomes, and were successful when their opposition endured moments of weakness. Further, I describe the internal organization of successful coalitions and the electoral context in which monopolies are built. To support this argument, I use historical evidence from the nine cities mentioned above.

In Chapter Four I begin my statistical analysis. I show first that the combination of bias and organization had identifiable electoral benefits for incumbent politicians. Then, I offer a series of analyses exploring the reasons monopolies develop in some political systems but not in others. I argue that political context offers opportunities and constraints for the establishment of monopoly. A changing environment threatening a coalition's political control or policy program provides the impetus for monopoly. Thus, strategies are determined by the demographic characteristics of the community and the extent of the coalition's control over the political system. I find that machine and reform cities were characterized by different political environments and demographics. I provide evidence that machine politicians, reliant on patronage to monopolize the system, had little institutional control and dealt with relatively large poor populations. I find that reform cities, where suffrage restrictions and vote dilution were the common forms of bias, had a high degree of institutional control and smaller poor populations. Finally, I analyze the environmental factors that increase the likelihood that a coalition would establish a monopoly. I show that changes in political context that threaten coalitions' electoral prospects or policy goals instigate the rise of monopolies.

Chapter Five analyzes the effects of monopolies. I provide quantitative and qualitative support for the theory that monopoly dominance depresses turnout and leads to concentrations of benefits for specific subgroups. When elections become noncompetitive for long periods of time and political coalitions establish dominant regimes, the distribution of government benefits is altered. Coalitions focus political goods on a group of core voters and elites, while providing others little or nothing. Politicians, no longer worried about reelection, become freer to pursue government policy that does not reflect constituent preferences. In this chapter, I analyze the

beneficiaries of monopoly regimes and identify discontented community members. I find that during the monopoly period turnout and spending decline, and fewer groups are rewarded.

Chapter Six considers the causes of decline of long-reigning monopolies. I argue that dominant coalitions create a natural base for regime opponents by limiting benefits to constituents peripheral to the coalition. The timing of challenger emergence, mobilization of the discontented, and monopoly collapse are tied to losses of bias, fissures in the governing coalition, and periods of economic stress. Exogenous events and actors often feature prominently in changes to the levels of bias and economic stress, while diversity of elite goals frequently threatens organizational unity. Under duress monopolies can become responsive, co-opting the challenge or else increase their reliance on bias. The availability of resources often dictates which path monopolies choose. In this chapter I explore the makeup of opposition coalitions, analyze the factors that increase the probability of decline, and discuss the options monopolies have in responding to challenges.

Chapter Seven synthesizes the results and describes their implications for the study of elections, government responsiveness, and urban politics. I discuss the ramifications of the study for the future of urban governance given that constraints for establishing a biased regime are continually in flux. I explore the ways in which the findings presented here can inform scholarship on authoritarianism, development, state and federal politics, as well as studies of representative democracy. I conclude with recommendations for limiting the development of monopolies in the future.

Chapter 1

The Logic of Political Monopoly

Despite many meaningful differences between machine and reform cities, they share political patterns. The logic of political monopolies successfully explains these similarities. Threats to political goals inspired the development of monopolies in both types of cities. Politicians' desire to ensure reelection undermined the ability for all constitutions to be represented in both types of cities. Choices incumbent coalitions made to preserve their power ultimately led to their defeat in both types of cities. This chapter explores these arguments in detail, describes how they apply in different contexts, and makes predictions that will inform the statistical analysis in later chapters.

Political scientists argue that elections play a fundamental role in keeping representatives accountable. Reelection seeking politicians attempt to maximize votes (Downs 1957) and organize institutions to allow them to do so (Mayhew 1974). When political elites, worried about reelection, mobilize large numbers of voters, turnout is high because groups are encouraged to enter the political process (Jackman 1987). Thus, participation in governance is broad, and the government provides benefits to many different groups in the community (Morton 1987; Bueno De Mesquita et al 2003; Keiser 1997, Uhlaner 1995). Competitive elections provide an incentive for politicians to serve these goals. In short, the quest for reelection is the heart of representative democracy.

But not all elections motivate leaders in this way. Once elected, rational leaders not only have an incentive to win reelection but also have an incentive to reduce uncertainty about their future. In other words, they have an incentive to try to *guarantee* themselves reelection. What's more is that they may have the power to do so. We can expect that once a coalition wins election to office, it will take steps to increase the probability that it will retain control over

government (Cox and Katz 2007). Such safety in office has the potential to affect the quality and effectiveness of governance. Similarly, a substantial literature in economics analyzes the relationship between the safety of incumbent firms and market performance (Posner 1975, Harrington 1984).

We do not find *perfect* competition in either economic or political markets. However, exploring ideal types allows us to understand the ways in which reality deviates from these models, and can offer insight into interventions that might improve social welfare. Economists have developed a set of conditions that describe perfectly competitive markets in which products are offered for the lowest possible price in the long run. One of the most (some say *the* most) important condition is that entry into and exit from the market be free and instantaneous for both buyers and sellers. This limits the ability of firms to raise the price of products above marginal cost. Additionally, buyers and sellers must have perfect information about the quality and price of the product. In a seminal book Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) argue that the *threat* of entry can be enough to prevent firms from extracting monopoly profits. They find that such markets remain “contestable” and that in these cases even firms with large market shares are compelled to keep prices competitive. Thus, the degree to which the market remains contestable determines the degree to which we can expect social welfare to be maximized.

Analogously for political incumbents, the threat of removal may be enough to inspire responsiveness and maximization of social welfare.¹⁴ We can draw on this framework for thinking about political markets in a relative way, arranging systems along a spectrum of contestability. Contestability can be described by three indicators of bias: the degree to which constituents’ information about governmental performance or available alternatives is limited,

the degree to which the entry, exit, or behavior of candidates or voters is restricted, and the degree to which incumbents' control over government seats is insulated from their vote share.

In the (unrealizable) political market with perfect information, free entry and exit of voters and candidates, and a perfectly responsive and neutral translation of votes to seats, incumbents can only win by being responsive to voters and elites.¹⁵ This idealized version of the world represents one end of the contestability spectrum. Institutions or strategies (e.g. bias) that move the political market away from this end increase the probability of reelection for incumbents without regard to the effectiveness of representation or the quality of the candidate. Thus, the opposite end of the spectrum can be described as an uncontestable political market in which reelection of incumbents is wholly disconnected from quality of candidates and representation of voters. These biased systems reduce electoral risk for the incumbent coalition, increasing its probability of retaining power at any given level of performance.

It is important to note that coalitions at both ends of this spectrum are likely to dominate government for multiple successive terms. Hence the difference between monopolies and responsive dominant coalitions can not be empirically detected through an analysis of reelection rates alone. It requires evidence of the presence of bias. Only then is there an incentive for the coalition to concentrate municipal resources on a minority of the population. Like economic monopolies, these coalitions can earn positive profits for the members of the coalition at the expense of the broader public.¹⁶ In the absence of bias dominant coalitions can only remain in power by being responsive to the electorate and elites. Thus, it is bias that sets political monopolies apart from responsive government and leads to the possibility of extortion by political leaders.

All political systems are biased to some degree. They feature barriers to entry and exit by making it difficult for new contestants to enter and regulating who can vote, they feature voters and candidates with incomplete information, and have varying degrees of neutrality and proportionality in the allocation of seats. Yet, some electoral arenas are more biased than others, creating more or less contestable markets. A system in which incumbents routinely raise more money than challengers, while perhaps not free, is closer to competitive than one in which the incumbent jails potential opponents. The latter is an uncontestable political market. The greater the degree of bias in the system, the greater incentive there is for the coalition to respond to a narrowly defined constituency.

However, bias is not sufficient for establishment of monopoly control. Political scientists have determined that gerrymandered districts have reduced competition for congressional seats, biasing the system in favor of incumbents (see for example Cain 1985; Cox and Katz 1999). But no monopoly exists so long as no single faction gains control over the entire government. This suggests a second component to the maintenance of a political monopoly – coordination. Coordination refers to the extent to which individuals and/or groups work together to nominate, elect, and control politicians in public offices in order to influence “government policies, policy stands, projects, graft, appointive government jobs, and other valued things officials...have access to and give out” (Mayhew 1986, p4). A higher degree of coordination in the system translates to fewer groups competing for power and access to policy making. The coordination spectrum runs from totally atomistic, with each person for him or herself, to a single dominant coalition managing the political system. A high degree of coordination requires organization in both the electorate and among elites. In other words political monopolies need to assemble a regime.


The concept of an organized regime is a common theme in studies of cities (Shefter 1976; Brown and Halaby 1987; Stone 1989; McCaffery 1992). A regime can be thought of as the collaborative arrangements through which the local governments and private actors assemble the capacity to govern. We can think of the organizational components for a regime as Stone does, as the electoral coalition and the governing coalition.

The individuals (or groups) included in the electoral coalition might be determined by a range of factors including historical circumstances; economic considerations; race, class, or ethnic divisions; and compatibility with other members' preferences (Axelrod 1970 but c.f. Wright and Goldberg 1985). The highest degree of coordination would mean that all individuals in the electorate belong to the same coalition.

The governing coalition is comprised of a set of elites who control the resources necessary for maintaining power. Some elites control resources by virtue of being elected to office. Monopolies need power over a sufficient number of office holders in both the executive and legislative branches to make policy, direct the distribution of benefits, and manage the appointment of government officials. Controlling nominations and maintaining cohesiveness of elected officials are crucial components to preserving this level of coordination. The highest degree of coordination would mean that all elective office holders in the executive and legislative branches belong to the same organization. Other elites control resources exogenous to the city's political system but that are nonetheless necessary to make and implement governance decisions. These may be private actors or, in a federal system, public officials at higher levels of government. Private actors controlling important resources for governance might include business elites, labor leaders, religious leaders, or nonprofit organizations. Collectively, these elites make up the governing coalition; those people whose agreement is required for a change of

the status quo or the implementation of policy. According to regime theorists, without the cooperation of these actors, either tacit or overt, elected officials remain severely constrained in their ability to govern (Stone 1989; Hunter 1953, 1980; Keiser 1997). For this reason simply winning election to office, even winning a majority of the city council and the mayoralty, does not necessarily translate into control over city policymaking, and so does not equate to monopoly.

Thus, we can categorize political systems along two continuous dimensions: the degree of coordination and the degree of bias. A high degree of coordination and bias are jointly sufficient conditions for a single coalition to dominate government for multiple terms. Figure 1.1 shows how different systems might be categorized according to these concepts.



As Figure 1.1 indicates, monopolies and responsive regimes are both examples of single dominant coalitions, but only the former are characterized by strongly biased systems. The degree of bias in a system determines how large a proportion of the population a coalition must be responsive to in order to win reelection. The degree of coordination in the system determines how effective winners will be in implementing their preferred policies.

In arenas where multiple groups compete for power, the degree of bias in the system reflects the difference between “responsible” party government praised by 1950’s political scientists and factional politics.¹⁷ In both of these situations, divided government or turnover in office means that no one group dominates; the political market remains contestable. The term factional politics refers to systems like some of the states in V.O. Key’s one-party South, where suffrage restrictions eviscerated the Republican Party, but a lack of organization limited the dominance of any one faction of the Democratic Party (though dominance by whites *was* ensured). This category also includes factional machine-style politics, where patronage is used to organize voters and suppress opposition, but no single city-wide machine controls government. According to Brown and Halaby (1987) this was the most common form of machine-style politics to have existed in the United States. Politicians, working largely independently, engaged tactics like vote fraud or bribery, but failed to combine their efforts into a single organization that could dominate government. Powerful figures like Boston’s James Michael Curly or New York’s Robert Moses also represent this type of system in which one or a small number of leaders dominate areas of the city or portions of the city government. Similarly a powerful but uncoordinated bureaucracy as in historical Los Angeles (Erie 2004) might also lead to a factionalized system in which no centralized organization controls city policy. Finally, friends-and-neighbor politics is the kind of political system that emerges when organizations are

ephemeral; no stable coalitions exist. Friends-and-neighbor systems may be characterized by bias, advantaging some political actors over others, but they need not be.

Given that machine and reform monopolies appear in only about thirty percent of cities, it is these other patterns of coordination and competition that define the remaining seventy percent. Although this project can not speak directly to these other forms, it is likely that the factional form is most pervasive. Gilbert and Clague (1962) find that not a single city in their 24 city analysis could be described as having a truly organized and competitive system. Because a fractured political system, either one defined by factionalism or friends and neighbor politics, is characterized by a lack of control over the entire city or the entire city government, it is highly likely that voters are not provided responsive government in these scenarios either. In fact gridlock might be the overriding feature of policy making. It is also plausible that in cities where a politician or coalition has captured a geographically or functionally defined portion of the city government a similar pattern of narrowing the constituency will occur within that realm. Thus, a responsive government is not implied by the lack of monopoly, but it might be. This suggests that maintaining competition that even begins to approach the idealized structure discussed above is likely to be quite rare. However, only in the case of monopolization, where the dominant coalition achieves success through bias, should we see the governing coalition have the opportunity and incentive to be responsive to a narrow portion of the electorate at the expense of the rest of the community on a city-wide scale. While fractured systems might not be responsive to the broadest electorate, they are unlikely to have the extensive, negative consequences ascribed here to political monopolies.

Knowing that there are different ways that we might categorize political systems is helpful, but falls short of delineating where along the coordination and bias continua a city needs

to fall in order to qualify as a monopoly. Theoretically we should be able to distinguish between levels of bias and degrees of coordination, and to use both to predict the presence or absence of monopoly. To carry out such an analysis we would need precise, continuous measures of bias and coordination as well as the degree of monopolization. While this would clearly be the ideal approach, a lack of specificity in the measures available leads me to take a less elegant tack.

First, I use electoral dominance of a single coalition as an indicator of monopoly and show that at high levels of bias and coordination, the incumbents' reelection prospects improve. Then, to distinguish between monopolies and responsive regimes, I analyze changes in participation and policy outputs. If it were true that a coalition in power for a decade represented a responsive regime, declines in participation would likely be driven by those most content with the regime and we should see no systematic skew in policy output. Instead I show that where bias and coordination were present, groups peripheral to the monopoly were most likely to cease participating and government benefits to these non-members declined relative to expenditures in cities that lacked either a dominant coalition or severe bias. Thus monopolies are identified here as having a high degree of coordination and bias, which increases the incumbent coalition's probability of maintaining power, and leads to suboptimal government responsiveness. Where access to the political process was limited for some groups by bias, the result was reduced responsiveness.

This practice of identifying monopolies in part by their tactics, and in part by their effects has precedent in both economics and political-science literatures. The legal determination of a monopoly firm takes into consideration the firm's market share and its ability to set profitable prices due to barriers to entry. Similarly, urban-politics scholars have defined political machines by their electoral success, their high degree of organization, and reliance on a strategy of

rewarding supporters with material benefits in order to secure their loyalty. Erie (1988) argues that in mature machines “power was centralized in a single party boss,” they “exhibited staying power, winning several municipal elections and remaining in power for at least a decade,” and “trafficked primarily (but not exclusively) in divisible material benefits...” (p19). Brown and Halaby (1987) specify “that to qualify as a dominant machine a political organization had to have controlled the election of the municipal executive and a majority of the legislative branch for an uninterrupted series of three elections,” have been “sustained by patronage and favors,” be “headed by a boss,” and “based on identifiable grass roots organization” (p597). In sum, these authors use bias, coordination, and dominance to define a machine. Instead I show that bias and coordination lead to dominance and then, like Erie and Brown and Halaby, use the combined presence of these factors to signify monopolies. For the remainder of this book, the term “monopoly” will refer to only those dominant coalitions that achieve success through bias.

No doubt some readers will object to the hyperbole encapsulated in the term monopoly. No mayor or manager in this analysis ever governed as a dictator. Incumbents always faced challengers and voters continued to have the right to select their leaders. Violence was never used on a regular basis or a large scale to control political outcomes. Furthermore, no coalition included in this study was able to rely on biased reelection strategies alone. To the extent that monopoly means controlling the market without competition, it is indeed an overstatement in the political context. Like a competitive market, a political monopoly is an ideal type that rarely exists in the real world. For this reason it might be more appropriate to think of the coalitions under study here as relatively more like monopolists than competitive organizations. Indeed, all of the statistical analyses conducted provide evidence of *relative* differences in electoral and expenditure patterns. However, the term remains a useful analogy (if only relatively speaking);

it is employed to represent coalitions that rely on strategies that limit competition and benefit narrow segments of the community *as compared to* coalitions that rely on classic strategies of reelection. The next section takes a closer look at distinguishing strategies of bias from other election-seeking behavior.

Strategies of Reelection

I assume that all democratic politicians desire to stay in office as long as possible. They seek reelection not just in the short term but for their entire careers.¹⁸ But the road to election and reelection is paved with uncertainties. So politicians will do what they can to increase the probability of victory (Cain et al 1987). Many of these strategies form the base of the electoral connection. As Fenno (2003 [1978]) famously explained, to win office politicians develop a “Home Style” intended to build support among constituents and enhance the member’s leeway in policy making. A member’s home style encompasses the way in which he presents himself verbally and nonverbally to residents in his district. He works to establish that he is qualified to represent the people and that he empathizes and identifies with them. The member builds trust through regular contact, constituent service, by emphasizing “common denominator” issues, and through advertising his name and accomplishments. He also describes, interprets, and analyzes his activities in Washington. Fenno finds that members “know that they can not get too far away from the district” (p144) because it would spell defeat at the hands of a challenger. Through these types of interactions constituents can come to know something about their member, what happens in government, and how their representative is (or is not) representing them. In sum, Fenno argues:

[S]o long as representatives want to retain their office, the knowledge that they will later be held accountable at the polls will tend to make their representative behavior more responsive to the desires of their constituents....On the whole they expend a great deal of time and effort keeping in touch with their various constituencies back home....

[M]embers of Congress feel uncertain and vulnerable – if not today then yesterday, if not yesterday then tomorrow... (p233)

Fenno's politicians take positions, they mobilize supporters, and they provide policies favored by many of their voters. By so doing they make democracy function. However, there are a host of other strategies that can enhance incumbents' probability of victory and policy-making leeway without offering voters a representational link. These strategies might be preferable to politicians because they increase the chance that the politician will win regardless of the performance of the government. These are the structures and strategies of bias. There is, of course, no bright line differentiating these types of strategies; they lie along a continuum. A strategy which increases constituents' information about the candidate, the challenger, or the electoral or policy making process will tend to fall toward Fenno's end of the spectrum. A strategy that enhances reelection while limiting constituents' information will tend to break the representational link. Similarly, strategies or structures which decrease the opportunity for challengers to enter the political fray or make it costly for them to exit (thereby decreasing the likelihood that they will enter) will fall toward the biased end of the spectrum.

If the political systems under analysis here were authoritarian regimes we might be able to find examples of cases in which the maintenance of power were wholly based on strategies of bias. Since the focus is on democracies it is important to note that bias is never sufficient for

winning reelection; all politicians and coalitions must be responsive to some constituents at some level. Nonetheless, systems can be more or less biased, relatively speaking.

If a coalition chooses strategies of bias over or in addition to conventional tactics, it selects from among a number of strategies for engineering the monopoly. Drawing on Cox (2001), strategies for biasing outcomes may be characterized by the decision points in a democratic electoral system. The points correspond to different stages of the voting process – generating preferences with regard to government performance (information bias), translating preferences into votes (vote bias), and transforming votes into seats (seat bias).

Information bias refers to a system in which the government has a systematic advantage in translating its record of performance into citizen's preferences. State controlled media and low-information elections are mechanisms that can be used to enhance the prospects of the governing coalition regardless of the performance of the officeholders. In essence, information bias suggests an advantage for incumbents in the dissemination of information about government activity and available alternatives.

Vote bias describes a systematic advantage for the government in the way citizens' preferences are translated into votes as a result of barriers to entry or exit for voters or challengers. When a coalition uses government resources (for example, patronage employees) to promote the organization of its supporters or inhibit the organization of its opposition, it is engaging in vote bias. Mechanisms such as poll taxes, registration laws, and vote fraud can also advantage incumbents. This category includes barriers to competition that increase the costs of defeat or entry for a challenger, such as lowering officials' pay or physically intimidating candidates. If challengers are discouraged from entering the competition, the outcome will be biased toward the governing regime because voters have no other option.

The final step in the electoral process is the translation of votes into seats. The system's seat bias is determined by the degree to which the share of seats won exaggerates the share of votes won in favor of the incumbent coalition. Measures that create or increase malapportionment, gerrymandering, or reserved seats in the government's favor bias the system to increase the incumbent coalition's probability of retaining power. Seat bias has been extensively studied in the literature on apportionment and representation particularly with regard to the U.S. Congress and state legislatures (see for example Cox and Katz 2002; Gelman and King 1994). Scholars studying districted legislatures make a distinction between two different characteristics of the relationship between votes and seats – the extent of partisan bias and the degree of responsiveness (King and Browning 1987). Partisan bias refers to the difference between the seat share a party wins with some proportion of the vote and the seat share the other party would be expected to win with the same share of the vote. This is particularly easy to see when a party wins fifty percent of the vote but not fifty percent of the seats. Responsiveness refers to the sensitivity of a party's aggregate seat share to increases or decreases in the party's aggregate vote share.

Whether an incumbent coalition is advantaged by having a more responsive system or a more biased system depends on the distribution of the incumbent's supporters and opponents (Grofman et al 1997). Thus the vast majority of the literature on this topic uses the term *biased* to refer to an effect of political structures; here the term *biased* refers to the structure itself and is intended to capture both types of effects. A system is characterized by seat bias if the strategy selected increases the probability of the incumbent coalition maintaining power when votes are translated into seats.

In addition to strategies like gerrymandering and mal-apportionment, at the local level eliminating districts has been used to increase the probability of maintaining power.¹⁹ When used in combination with voting restrictions, at-large elections can offer a substantial advantage to the incumbent coalition because all seats represent the same limited electorate. This means that a single median voter is the decisive voter for the entire legislature. Whereas district elections offer representation to geographically defined areas of the city, at-large elections represent only those who are able to participate in elections. As an added benefit at-large elections reduce the hurdles of coordination for the governing coalition. Table 1.1 displays strategies that have been used to increase the probability of incumbents maintaining control of government in American cities.

Table 1.1: Biasing strategies

Information bias	Vote Bias	Seat Bias
<p>Media control (ownership, regulation)</p> <p>Suppression of voluntary associations</p> <p>Control over judicial system/prosecutors</p> <p>Low information elections (e.g., nonpartisan)</p>	<p>Vote bribery</p> <p>Obscure polling place sites</p> <p>Use of government resources to prevent opponent organization or enhance incumbent organization</p> <p>Impairment of election monitoring</p> <p>Disqualification of candidates</p> <p>Candidate requirements (signatures, thresholds)</p> <p>Low pay for office holders</p> <p>Violence keeping voters from polls or forcing vote choice</p> <p>Electoral falsification (ghost/repeat voting, inflating totals, discarding ballots)</p> <p>Registration requirements</p> <p>Suffrage restrictions (literacy tests, poll taxes, language or race requirements, citizens only)</p> <p>Assassinating/threatening/imprisoning opponents</p>	<p>Annexing in government's favor</p> <p>Gerrymandering</p> <p>Malapportionment</p> <p>Decreasing size of legislature</p> <p>At-large elections</p> <p>Increasing appointed offices</p>

Some institutional structures and strategic choices are unquestionably motivated by a desire to enhance the incumbents' probability of reelection. Electoral falsification is a clear example. But other structures and strategies may have alternative purposes, with reelection of

the governing regime a welcome, but potentially unintended, consequence. It can be difficult to know the purpose of some actions, and whether or not they will bias the system in favor of the incumbent at the outset. If, for instance, we find a political coalition has implemented registration laws or limited voting to citizens, should researchers conclude that this is an effort to bias the system? Does the same strategy equate to bias in every system? There is no universal answer to these kinds of questions; case-by-case analysis is vital to understanding the biases (intended or not) in any one electoral arena. It is especially important to understand the makeup of the electorate in order to know whether a given strategy will bias the system in favor of incumbents in a particular case.

In this analysis it does not matter what the motivation behind the enactment was if the unintended consequence always works in favor of the incumbent organization. If, for example, the state government enacts a literacy test that disenfranchises most African Americans, and the white mayor and white city council in a heavily black city are advantaged by having this population eliminated from the electorate, I refer to this system as biased even if the mayor and council did not implement the strategy and even if the state legislature makes a compelling argument that only literate residents should participate in governance. Throughout the analysis information is presented on the motivations of the coalitions when available.

In any event it is worth noting that machines tended to rely on strategies that were clearly identifiable as bias, such as requiring police officers to work as political operatives, discarding ballots, and registering dead persons, while reformers frequently relied on strategies that had a separable purpose, like annexation and nonpartisan elections. This is part of the reason that scholars have seen machine and reform as so different from one another. It is also worth noting that machine and reform organizations were not monolithic; different coalitions selected

different combinations of strategies. Which leads to the next question: How do coalitions determine which mixture of approaches to take?

Selecting Strategies of Bias and Reelection

Political coalitions are likely to prefer reelection strategies that maximize deterrence of challengers and minimize maintenance of the monopoly. Such mechanisms increase their probability of winning far into the future. But not all coalitions enjoy the conditions necessary for implementing such decisive strategies. Political coalitions operate in different social contexts that create varied costs of exclusion and hurdles for implementation. The way in which politicians can achieve their goals depends on the conditions that they face.

First, coalitions are constrained in implementing bias and selecting strategies by the extent of their institutional control and the stability of the institutions themselves.²⁰ The more control a coalition wields and the more malleable the institutions, the easier it should be for a political coalition to implement effective, non-neutral structures. Because U.S. cities are creatures of the states, biasing the system often requires either the consent of the state legislature or home rule. Without either, a coalition will be unable to alter the rules governing elections.²¹ At the very least, in order to monopolize a system, the coalition must win access to both the legislative and executive components of government. In most cities, this means winning a majority of the seats on the council and control of the chief executive's office. More promising for the implementation of bias is control of county and state governments.

On the whole, the most effective and efficient strategies require the highest degree of institutional control. In other words, the better the strategy at eliminating competition over the long run, the harder it is likely to be to implement. All strategies of bias can be characterized by

these tradeoffs. I argue that information bias tends to be easiest to implement, requiring little or no institutional control but also requiring costly, continuous long-term maintenance. Purchasing a newspaper outlet to promote the incumbent organization works so long as no other news organizations emerge. Vote bias frequently requires substantially more institutional control because constitutions tend to make voting requirements difficult to change or evade, and violations can be characterized as unfair or anti-democratic. Filling patronage posts with political appointees may require only winning the executive office, but ensuring that these employees work for the organization, pay their dues, turn out to vote, and operate the bureaucracy in the interest of the governing coalition requires tremendous oversight and policing and a high degree of administrative skill. For a coalition to engage in election fraud, it needs to control the elections board as well as election officials and the police (and sometimes the courts). Another complicated strategy for city officials would be implementing a literacy test which would require either state-level approval or changing the city charter. In keeping with the tradeoff between maintenance and ease of implementation, election fraud has a shorter life than literacy tests because it needs to be repeated at every election. Seat bias, like malapportionment or gerrymandering, also requires substantial institutional control and can be very effective at providing a long-term advantage for the governing coalition.

Secondly, in determining which biasing strategy will work best for the coalition, leaders are constrained by the characteristics of the coalition's core constituency and of its opposition. In general, coalitions in American cities have relied on two dominant strategies: (1) the use of government resources to mobilize supporters (e.g., machines) or (2) reducing the ability of opposition voters to voice dissent through suffrage restrictions and vote dilution (e.g., reformers). Aside from assassinating opponents, suffrage restriction is the most effective and efficient tool

for building monopolies as long as the group granted voting rights continues to share the preferences of the monopolists. But not all coalitions can use this strategy. In order to exclude opponents from the electorate, it is helpful if they are distinguishable by some politically exogenous but relevant characteristic such as poverty, literacy, race, or ethnicity.²²

If, for example, political divisions fall along class lines, and the coalition seeking a monopoly represents primarily wealthy residents while its opposition represents poor residents, the coalition can enact property requirements for voting. The probability of reelection increases when opposition voters are excluded from the electorate. Property requirements have the secondary benefit of guarding against potential redistribution. Suffrage restrictions are also likely to be preferred if the core constituency is dominated by interests seeking an efficient bureaucracy. In this case using government resources to mobilize support through a patronage system is both unnecessary and an inefficient use of municipal revenue.

Alternatively, if the coalition's core constituency is relatively poor it cannot use property restrictions or poll taxes to manage electoral outcomes because it would exclude its own base of support. Poor coalitions cannot exclude wealthy residents because capital is mobile, and support from some middle- and upper-class residents is necessary to govern effectively and win reelection. Instead, the coalition might seek to bias the system by using government resources to its advantage. In other words, in cities with relatively large numbers of working-class voters, one should see patronage monopolies develop. This allows the leaders of a resource-poor coalition to put municipal largess to work for their political future. The strategy can also serve to redistribute wealth in the city by providing public employment for a larger proportion of the workforce.²³ In some cases patronage jobs will also be attractive to middle-class residents. Patronage regimes have secondary benefits as well. Once a coalition gains control over the

bureaucracy, it can engage in fraudulent voting practices, selective enforcement of the laws, and discriminatory provision of city services.

In a hypothetical world in which personal income is the primary factor determining coalition membership and the electoral system is unbiased, I assume that the monopolist's core coalition will be determined by the socio-economic group representing the largest share of the population. This stylized view leads to the prediction that in cities where low socioeconomic-status residents make up a large share of the population relative to middle- or high-status individuals, coalitions will seek monopoly control through patronage and the biasing mechanisms that come with control over the bureaucracy (e.g. selective application of laws, fraudulent voting, etc.). In cities where low socioeconomic-status residents make up a smaller share of the population, coalitions will seek monopoly control through suffrage restriction and biasing mechanisms that diminish opponents' ability to voice dissent through the electoral process.²⁴

Thus, I draw on the caricatured differences between machine and reform coalitions to explore the role of context in monopoly building.²⁵ Some readers may question whether it is really possible or useful to dichotomize cities in this way. For one, there are innumerable combinations of strategies that a coalition might employ in order to solidify control. In the South as Key (1984 [1949]) and Kousser (1974) have detailed, monopolies of racial exclusion were built using strategies that eviscerated access to the political system for non-white constituents and candidates. These regimes shared some strategies with those of the reformers, but were more clearly targeted to maintain racial supremacy. Additionally, machine and reform regimes were structured differently from city to city. Inevitably, some cities will not fall neatly into one category or the other. Kansas City, one of the cases in this analysis, is classified as a machine,

but enacted a city manager charter early in the 20th century. Nonetheless there are unifying features within these categories that are useful here. All machines relied on patronage; all reform organizations employed nonpartisan, at-large elections, with city managers. The use of similar biasing mechanisms allows for an analysis of the context that gives rise to the selection of some strategies over others. The prevalence of the machine and reform monopolies make this comparison statistically possible.

Monopolies are a Response to Threats

All told, these conditions mean that political monopolies are extremely difficult to build and maintain, but certainly not impossible.²⁶ Given that monopolies are uncommon but attainable, what factors might lead to their establishment? In some cities the first step toward monopoly is the implementation of bias while others exhibit well-organized coalitions from the outset. Both components are necessary to increase the probability of winning without regard to the preferences of voters. Politicians learn these strategies through repeated interactions with each other and the voters. Coalitions may be especially inclined to undertake bias or take advantage of bias by coordinating effectively when they face threats to their desired outcomes. In particular, threats to political power and policy goals encourage leaders to organize coalitions to dominate government. Coalitions succeed in coordinating by mobilizing voters, defeating the opposition, disciplining politicians, and organizing governing coalitions.

In order to achieve a monopoly, a coalition needs a core group of supporters that favors its agenda. This core group of supporters is likely to be determined by the demographic characteristics of the community at the time the coalition rises to power. Many formulations of this core are possible. For instance, if a single ethnic or class group represents a majority of the

voters, these individuals may form a natural core constituency for the coalition. In a heterogeneous population, the core constituency must be comprised of different groups. These groups might share preferences for the distribution of municipal policies and benefits due to similar socio-economic standing, geographic location, or ideological goals.

Once biased, I predict that systems will tend to display inertia until the benefits of returning to a nonbiased arena outweigh the costs of maintenance. This means that factors like institutional control and size of the core constituency may wane over the course of the coalition's life without bringing catastrophic consequences for the monopoly. These factors are most important at the inception of the monopoly. The presence of inertia also means that coalitions can be the beneficiaries of bias implemented by past incumbents or higher levels of government even if the coalition played no immediate role in orchestrating the bias.

Effects of Monopoly

After a coalition implements a biased system and coordinates voters and elites, its probability of reelection should increase. The electoral safety generated by bias can be expected to change the focus of the governing coalition; coalition leaders should be less likely to pay attention to the electorate in general and more likely to pay attention to their core constituency and powerful regime elites (Cox 2001; Cingranello 1981; Lake and Baum 2001).

Once elected, coalitions face a scarcity of resources (benefits and policy options). Because they are driven to maximize their share of spoils (Riker 1962), coalitions should prefer to minimize the quantity of votes that they win to the smallest number that will retain their control of government. This is likely to be especially true at the local level, where restraints on government revenue and expenditure are heavy due to federal and state demands.²⁷ Since a

large electoral coalition is more expensive to maintain than a small one, the most efficient strategy for maintaining low-cost reelection is to limit the number of coalition members to a minimum winning size, thereby minimizing the number to be rewarded. Politicians might trim their coalitions by repressing turnout of unwanted groups or paying selective attention to their supporters.

Aside from affording each member a greater share of government largess, smaller coalitions are also less expensive to maintain. Reducing or stabilizing expenditure on constituents' demands increases the likelihood of balancing city budgets (Fuchs 1992). Additionally, low-turnout elections are more predictable. Political leaders have an easier time ensuring that voters will cast ballots for their candidates if there are fewer voters to consider (Pinderhughes 1987). Having fewer groups in a coalition also reduces the potential for competing demands that may splinter the coalition in the long run. However, a minimizing strategy makes future elections riskier because it lowers the hurdle for a potential challenger (Hardin 1976; Hershey 1973; Shepsle 1974). So one should only see movement toward minimum winning size when coalitions are entrenched in government and competition has been severely reduced. I predict that during the monopoly period, turnout of eligible voters should decline as coalitions trim their membership.

There is an inverse relationship between the proportion of the electorate needed to stay in office and the extent of bias in the system (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). The more biased a system, the fewer adherents the coalition needs in the electorate and the less time and energy the monopolists must spend mobilizing support. As coalitions become more secure, they can spend less time focusing on reelection and can devote more time and energy to increasing their share of the spoils of office (Key 1984 [1949]; Cox 2001).

Although the probability of reelection is increased in a biased system, it is not guaranteed. Even political coalitions that bias the system need to mobilize support from some set of sub-group(s) in the population to legitimate their government. Thus, monopolists must be attentive to *some* voters. But given that resources are limited and many policy and funding choices at the municipal level are zero sum, some groups will win and others will lose. Consequently, politicians are most likely to provide better payoffs to those groups that reliably turn out to vote for the incumbent organization (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Cox and McCubbins 1986) and those who participate in the decision-making process (Banfield 1961). Groups that turn out less predictably should tend to receive fewer benefits than the incumbent's core coalition. The core group needed by the dominant coalition to maintain political control bargains for a share of government benefits. Other constituents may join the coalition (politicians prefer to have them), but only for the most inexpensive or symbolic benefits like holidays or parades honoring the group. Thus, dominance should have consequences for the distribution of government services, policies, jobs, and contracts. Decreased competition should mean that benefits become increasingly concentrated toward regime elites and core coalition members rather than to all electoral coalition members. If this theory is accurate, we should find that all voters, even all regime supporters, do not receive benefits in these political systems.

Decline Requires an Opposition Coalition

In a competitive electoral environment, a quality challenger should enter when the winning coalition is smaller than a majority of the eligible electorate. But in biased systems, dominant organizations have the luxury of winning even when attending to a narrow coalition. Once competition is reduced, coalitions should reduce the provision of goods for the broader

public and increasingly concentrate rewards toward regime elites and core coalition members at the expense of peripheral groups. If this is the case, as a direct result of their maintenance strategies, dominant organizations will produce discontented residents. These constituents form a natural base for a challenger. This latent threat of dissatisfied constituents is most likely to be turned into real electoral losses when the coalition is unable to achieve bias or coordination as well as during periods of economic stress.

The mobilization of residents against the regime may be no small task. Groups peripheral to the political process are likely to face serious collective-action problems (see Schneider and Teske 1993 for example). Mobilization is much more likely when constituents can learn about their situation relative to others. Thus, a lack of information bias offers a context in which voters can be mobilized against the regime in power if their preferences are not being met. A lack of vote bias encourages challengers to enter the political fray and decreases the probability that the incumbent will win if an opposition is mobilized. A lack of seat bias translates into smaller shares of government control for the incumbent coalition unless they are responsive to voters' demands. This effect feeds back into the mobilization of voters and challengers who are more likely to participate when they are more likely to win.²⁸ When a governing coalition faces a strong electoral challenge, even if the opponent does not win, the threat may increase organization against incumbents at the next election.

To avoid collapse, coalitions also must maintain unity. Monopolies are frequently weakened by internal fissures. Scholars of city politics (e.g. Munoz and Henry 1986; Stone 1989; Keiser 1997) have long noted the importance of divisions in the governing coalition to the rise of an alternative coalition. Also, V.O. Key (1984 [1949]) has argued that among elites, long-term, one-party politics can lead to factional infighting. When it does, renegade monopoly

elites lead coalitions against the monopoly in pursuit of an alternative governing arrangement. Renegade elites have clear advantages over potential outside challengers because they may be able to bring some portion of the monopolist's vote base with them.²⁹ For this reason, I find that monopolies tend to see internal discipline as a higher priority than worrying about threats developing at the local level outside of their organizations. If the coalition factionalizes, one segment may be able to build an alternative power structure to govern the city. This is most likely to happen when the city has diversified, particularly when elites have diversified such that powerful members of the community have conflicting preferences with regard to the role or policies of government.

This means that changing demographics and economic structures have implications for the survival of monopolies. Demographic changes can alter the size or composition of the eligible electorate in favor of the opposition.³⁰ Additionally, threats to the city's economic health can also serve to mobilize voters and challengers. As is true in competitive systems as well as monopolies, voters may blame the incumbent organization for failure to prevent employment losses or inflation (Howell and McLean 2001) thereby focusing attention on the regime and alternative governance arrangements.

From Threats to Collapse

As protestors around the world can attest, organizing large numbers of angry people does not ensure the regime will relinquish power. A dominant coalition may be able to delay or prevent decline by increasing the level of bias or co-opting the opposition platform. In democracies increasing the level of bias is frequently not an option. If monopolists choose the path of co-optation in order to maintain control, they must adjust their concentration of benefits

to prevent challengers from entering or winning. Under these circumstances, monopolists may adopt reforms or open their systems in order to stave off collapse, transforming into responsive dominant coalitions.

However, there are a number of reasons why a regime in trouble may not be willing or able to make this kind of adjustment in the face of increased competition. As Erie (1988) has argued for machines, in many cases monopolies encounter problems of resource scarcity. Demands made by the challengers may create zero-sum conflicts with the core members of the regime's organization. These conflicts could be ideological, as in Chicago when Daley could not co-opt the rising African American opposition because its demands – integration, reduced institutional racism, etc. – were in direct conflict with the preferences of the party's white ethnic voters. To co-opt the black challenge would have meant the loss of the machine's base. Or as is more frequently the case, the conflict could be impossible to resolve because of a lack of resources or funds, e.g., increasing the supply of public housing means cutting back on police services. This should be most problematic during periods of declining resources (Erie 1988).

Perhaps the more interesting question here is why the coalition chooses not to abandon its base and shift policies toward the new voting power if it is clear that the coalition will lose. There is no simple answer to this question. One reason is that coalitions may be oriented toward the status quo and, thus, difficult to change. There can be negative repercussions associated with changing platforms given that the coalition has built a reputation for representing certain groups or policies. Further, there may be a high degree of uncertainty within the coalition over what constitutes a winning platform. Finally, the coalition may be unwilling to compromise if the leaders of the coalition have strong policy preferences that conflict with the new demands. In Chicago, for example, some scholars have argued that the white leadership of the Democratic

organization was personally opposed to meeting black demands for integration and increased benefits.

Another, perhaps more interesting, reason a dominant regime refuses to co-opt a challenge is that it is not aware of the rising opposition. In a number of the cases reviewed here, dominant organizations fall because they are insulated from public preferences by the biased system and so miscalculate the danger from their opponents. Kuran's (1991) theory of regime collapse provides an elegant explanation for this phenomenon. Individuals frustrated with the regime in power choose not to express their discontent until enough people are organized against the regime to make it worth their involvement. Before joining the opposition, this latent coalition expresses a public preference for the monopolist that conflicts with the members' private preferences. Because the monopolist has no way to gauge how large the disconnect is between the public and private preferences, mobilization of opposition may happen too quickly for the monopolist to respond successfully. This final reason is another example of how monopolists, in pursuit of long-term power, become the architects of their own demise by insulating regimes from dissent.

When the opposition does succeed, the collapse of the monopoly is frequently followed by a period of factionalism and shifting coalitions. In some cases the pursuit of political monopoly can begin anew. But it is likely that each time an entrenched regime is displaced, it becomes more difficult to replicate the same system of dominance as new laws or changing public opinion limit use of the same strategies. However, political coalitions have proven themselves true chameleons in their ability to adapt to changing circumstances. In American cities as well as governments throughout the world, we continue to see politicians, driven by the goal of

reelection, biasing the system in their favor, attending to a narrow coalition, and providing fodder for their own decline.

Chapter 5

Effects of Political Monopolies

Richard J. Daley may be the most famous mayor in twentieth-century America. He had immense power and many adoring fans. Ebullient aldermen were known to burst out in spontaneous praise of their leader during council meetings. He was nicknamed “Hizzoner.” When Daley passed away thousands of people stood in line for hours in twenty-below weather to offer him tribute. One man explained, “[A]ll these people are repaying him for remembering them like he did” (Quoted in Keegan 1976 p1). This was the same Richard J. Daley, who in 1968 handed down an order that would haunt him for the rest of his life. As Chicago hosted the Democratic National Convention, and the nation watched riots rip the city apart, Daley instructed his officers to “shoot to kill arsonists and ‘shoot to maim or cripple’ looters” (Schreiber 1968 p1).

Daley viewed the liberal anti-war movement in the same way that he viewed the civil rights movement and the War on Poverty – as an affront to his power and the stability of Chicago (Cohen and Taylor 2000). As he made clear in his famous order, he was prepared to defend his city at any cost from the success of such revolutionary elements. In large part Daley was able to maintain stability. Chicago never went bankrupt, never lost its business district or its middle class. While other rustbelt cities like Detroit hemorrhaged people and taxes, Chicago was the “city that work[ed],” (“The Mayor” p28). But for some Chicagoans, particularly poor and black Chicagoans, the city did not work quite so well. Daley governed over a period of rapid development and intense segregation. African Americans lived in overcrowded ghettos, were restricted from high-level political positions, were arrested and incarcerated at disproportionate rates, discriminated against in city hiring, and provided with lower quality city services.

San Jose's reform leaders, epitomized by the powerful city manager Dutch Hamann, can also be characterized as having led the city to greatness while leaving some neighborhoods behind. In the post-WWII era, San Jose was changing rapidly. Defense contracts and the mild climate encouraged a massive influx of migrants to the Santa Clara valley. Between 1940 and 1950, San Jose's population grew by nearly 25,000 people. When Hamann was appointed in 1950, he took office determined to build upon this growth, to make the San Jose metropolitan area "one of the...most important areas of the West Coast" (San Jose Master Plan 1958, quoted in Matthews 2003 p95). In 1969 Hamann wrote, "There is no question in my mind that San Jose will be the dominant city of Northern California before the next twenty years have passed. The growth that lies before the city will dwarf all that has gone before" (Quoted in Stanford 1970, p21).

Hamann's work was not in vain. In many ways the foundation for Silicon Valley was laid by his coalition and its bold decisions throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Matthews 2003). Yet, although growth and development were the goals of San Jose reformers, some areas of the city, particularly those that were predominately Mexican American, lacked paved roads, street lights, sewerage systems, and representation on the city council. San Jose's Latinos endured police brutality and discriminatory treatment in the justice system, the school system, and in city hiring (Pitti 2003).

In both San Jose and Chicago, the system of monopoly created by well-organized coalitions and biased systems led to a political arena that made challenging those in power difficult if not impossible. In a healthy democratic system, success in office suggests that the coalition has responded to the needs and wants of the voters. But if political institutions have been biased toward those in power, reelection of the incumbent organization does not mean that

residents have exerted control over their elected officials. Chapter 2 provided evidence that dominant coalitions in machine and reform cities tilted electoral outcomes in their favor by shaping preferences, limiting voting options, and influencing the translation of ballots into seats held by the government. Chapter 4 substantiated that bias and organization had identifiable electoral effects as well. But what, if any, consequences did monopoly have for the people living in these cities?

This chapter offers both quantitative and narrative support for the argument that during monopoly periods, the governing coalition had the opportunity and incentive to respond to narrow segments of the population. As was the case in the previous chapter, for the most part this chapter refers to periods when bias and coordination were present at high levels, and compares these to periods in which either or both factors were not present. The choice to use this dichotomous categorization is driven not by a belief that cities only come in two states, but by a lack of nuanced data that would allow for an investigation into the effects of varying degrees of monopolization. Nonetheless, the relative distinction between monopolized and non-monopolized cities remains a central theoretical contribution of this work. The thirty percent of American cities that met these admittedly high standards for monopolization did have political patterns that looked significantly different from other cities.

First, I present evidence that, once in power machine and reform regimes ceased intensive mobilization of new voters and selectively courted core supporters to turn out. At the same time the dominant coalition reduced benefits to some portions of the population and elections became uncompetitive. As a result, during the monopoly period, turnout of eligible voters declined.

Next, I investigate the effects of monopolies more broadly by examining patterns in the distribution of government benefits. I find that compared to cities in which there is no single dominant coalition advantaged by bias, monopolies focus benefits towards governing coalition elites and core coalition members, away from the broader community. In machine cities, party leadership positions, patronage jobs, government contracts, services, and urban policies were focused toward select white ethnic groups. In reform cities, middle-class whites and business constituencies filled elective and appointed offices and were provided expansive growth policies, low taxes, amenities and services in middle-class neighborhoods, and businesslike operation of government. Additionally, for both machine and reform regimes, powerful governing coalition elites were offered a disproportionate share of benefits.³¹ I find that during the monopoly period, dominant coalitions spent less overall, reduced differences between expenditure and revenue, met the demands of key coalition members, and increased spending on developmental categories at the expense of the broader public.³² Successful efforts to win reelection do, in the end, mean that fewer voters play a role in the governing process as security in office liberates coalitions from citizen demands.

Declining Participation is a Consequence of Monopoly

In order to analyze the effect of monopoly for residents I begin by looking at patterns of voter turnout during the bias period. In this section I use election data from the same nine cities analyzed in chapter 4. Five of the cities represent machine monopolies: Chicago, New York, New Haven, Kansas City, and Philadelphia. Four represent reform monopolies: San Jose, San Antonio, Austin, and Dallas. A complete explanation of the selection criteria for this sample is provided in Chapters 1 and 4. In short, these cities were selected on the basis of available data.

The dependent variable, *Turnout*, is a measure of the total number of ballots cast in a given election divided by the number of eligible voters. The number of eligible voters includes all persons of voting age (males only prior to 1920). Non-citizens are included for both theoretical and practical reasons. Increasing the citizenship rate was an important strategy for mobilizing voters in machine cities, and a number of cities offered alien suffrage during the time period. Additionally, city-level data on numbers of citizens is not available for the entire time period.

The *Bias Period* for each city serves as the main independent variable in the analysis. This variable is coded one in years when high levels of bias and coordination were present and coded zero when either condition was not met. The list of years in the bias period for each city is included in table A4. A complete description of the coding choices for this variable is offered in chapter 4 along with more detailed descriptions of additional independent variables that control for alternative explanations for changes in turnout. To account for the possibility that turnout is purely responsive to the competitiveness of elections I include the *Margin of Victory* – the percentage of the vote gained by the loser with the highest total subtracted from the percentage of the vote gained by the winner with the lowest total in each election. Also included are: the number of *Candidates* running for each seat, the number of *Incumbents* running, and the natural log of the total *Population* of each city. I add a trend variable representing the *Year* that the election was held and dummy variables representing the type of seat for which the election was held, *Manager*, *Commissioner*, or *Mayor*, with *Council* as the excluded category. Finally, a dummy variable is included indicating whether the city is classified as *Machine* or *Reform*.³³

In a simple comparison, Table 5.1 shows that for most of the cities in this study, the turnout of eligible voters in citywide, general elections was lower during the bias period.³⁴

Table 5.1: Turnout During Bias Periods

	No Bias	Bias
Chicago	50%	49%
New York	44%	34%
New Haven	44%	57%
Kansas City	34%	47%
Philadelphia	53%	45%
San Jose	32%	21%
San Antonio	17%	14%
Austin	22%	18%
Dallas	11%	8%
Albuquerque*	36%	16%

* Figures are from Bridges (1997)

This decline in turnout is statistically significant. To more rigorously test the hypothesis that turnout declined during bias periods, I regress the log odds of turnout of eligible voters ($\ln(\text{turnout}/1-\text{turnout})$) on the dummy variable for bias period and include the controls listed above.³⁵ The log-odds transformation of the dependent variable is used to achieve a normal distribution of the dependent variable and to bound predictions between zero and one. The analysis presented in Table 5.2 shows that during bias period the log odds of turnout of eligible voters in citywide elections declines by about 0.38, which equates to about six percentage points on average.³⁶

Table 5.2: The effect of bias on turnout of eligible voters

	Log-odds turnout of eligible voters			
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
Bias Period	-0.38 **	0.07	-0.23 **	0.06
Incumbents Running			0.00	0.03
Margin of Victory			-1.34 **	0.14
Candidates per Seat			0.06 **	0.02
Log Population (millions)	-0.11 **	0.03	-0.10 **	0.03
Year	0.01 **	0.00	0.01 **	0.00
Machine/Reform	1.49 **	0.14	1.38 **	0.13
Commissioner	-0.04	0.10	0.06	0.10
Mayor	0.31 *	0.12	0.25 **	0.12
Manager	0.55 **	0.12	0.67 **	0.13
Constant	-2.59 **	0.20	-2.45 **	0.18
<i>F</i>	118.26**		102.81	
<i>R</i> ²	0.51		0.62	
<i>N</i>	680		680	

Note: Standard errors are clustered by city-election.

OLS Regression: * $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$

Since the analysis in chapter 4 suggested that competition also declined during the bias period, it is possible that the relationship between dominance and turnout is spurious. The second regression in Table 5.2 shows that even controlling for incumbents running, the margin of victory, and the number of candidates per seat, turnout declines by about 4 percentage points during the bias period.³⁷ As dominant coalitions won by larger margins and increased their

incumbency advantage, fewer voters were involved. In essence, these regimes could win reelection with only a small share of the eligible electorate voting them back into office.

There are competing explanations for these declines in turnout. Residents might not vote because, as I contend, they are discouraged from participating, or alternatively because they are satisfied with the governing coalition. If the second explanation were true one would expect those most satisfied with the governing coalition to drop out more rapidly than those dissatisfied. A precinct analysis in San Jose and a ward level analysis in Chicago suggest that the proportion of people turning out to vote declined more drastically in areas populated by *non-core* coalition members.

To conduct this analysis I singled out areas in each city that were part of the core coalition and areas that were peripheral to the organization in power. The neighborhoods were selected using a combination of secondary source materials and census data. I used GIS mapping tools to define the boundaries of the neighborhoods and then assigned precincts to the correct area using polling-place addresses. In San Jose the core areas, Willow Glen and Hester Hanchett, represent extremely stable, white, middle-upper-class neighborhoods with very high proportions of homeowners. The peripheral neighborhoods, East San Jose, North College Park, and the Gardner area, correspond to residents least favored by the regime. They have remained poor and working-class neighborhoods with high numbers of nonwhite renters since the 1930s. For the analysis of Chicago, I used the heavily African American second, third, fourth, sixth, and twentieth wards to signify residents least favored by the regime and combined statistics from the working-class, Irish and Eastern European ethnic eleventh, thirteenth, and nineteenth wards for the core areas.³⁸ Table 5.3 shows the pattern of turnout over time in the two types of neighborhoods.

Table 5.3: Turnout Varies with Regime Membership

San Jose				Chicago			
Year	Peripheral Turnout	Core Turnout	Mean Margin of Victory	Year	Peripheral Turnout	Core Turnout	Mean Margin of Victory
1938	47%	46%	1%	1931	82%	95%	17%
1946	32%	36%	13%	1959	49%	76%	43%
1958	20%	26%	59%	1963	61%	78%	11%
1962	27%	36%	12%	1977	28%	60%	32%
Total Decline	-20%	-10%		Total Decline	-54%	-35%	

The data suggest that turnout of registered voters deteriorated at a higher rate in areas representing non-core coalition members. While turnout rates declined in the core areas, overall the rate remained fairly stable. In both cities these areas averaged higher turnout rates than the city as a whole. One might argue that these patterns represent the greater sensitivity of low socioeconomic status voters to changes in competition. The column noting the mean margin of victory in each election signifies that the relationship is not so straightforward. In neither city is the turnout rate particularly responsive to competitiveness. It is also suggestive that in the earliest election for both cities the peripheral neighborhood turnout rates were about equal to the rates in core neighborhoods. Once the regime collapsed, these areas again turned out at higher rates.

To rule out competing hypotheses, one would ideally test the relationship between dominance and turnout while controlling for socioeconomic status. Unfortunately, accurate data are not available at sub-city levels. I attempt to circumvent this problem using two additional analyses. First, I add controls to the turnout regressions presented above, indicating the proportion of the city that *Rents* their homes and the percentage of residents that are *Nonwhite*. These measures serve as proxies for the residents that would be most likely to drop out of the electorate due to socioeconomic factors. Table 5.4 provides the outcome of this analysis. Adding the controls strengthens the power of the bias-period variable. Independent of the size of the poor and nonwhite populations, the bias period reduces turnout.³⁹

Table 5.4: The Effect of Bias on Turnout of Eligible Voters
Controlling for City Demographics

Log-odds Turnout of Eligible Voters		
	Coefficient	Std. Error
Bias Period	-0.27 **	0.07
Incumbents Running	-0.01	0.03
Margin of Victory	-1.24 **	0.14
Candidates per Seat	0.04 **	0.02
Log Population (millions)	-0.16 **	0.03
Year	0.02 **	0.00
Machine/Reform	1.43 **	0.15
Commissioner	0.30 **	0.12
Mayor	0.49 **	0.12
Manager	0.29 **	0.13
Percent nonwhite	-2.64 **	0.32
Percent renters	-0.65	0.41
Constant	-2.54 **	0.35
F	81.56**	
R ²	0.66	
N	597	

Standard errors are clustered by city-election

OLS Regression: *p<.10 **p<.05

The second way I propose to eliminate socioeconomic effects on turnout is to analyze turnout in Chicago's fifty wards for three elections during the bias period, controlling for the demographic makeup of those wards. The analysis pools general elections for mayor from 1959, 1963, and 1971. The dependent variable is the log odds of the turnout of eligible voters. The independent variables in this regression are the percentage of residents in each ward who are of Irish, Polish, African American, or German descent.⁴⁰ I use 1960 census data for 1959,

interpolated values for 1963, and 1970 values for 1971. To uncover the relationship between regime membership and turnout, I also add a dummy variable for sub-machine boss William Dawson's controlled wards. Dawson was the machine's most prominent organizer of black votes.⁴¹ If the theory is correct, African American areas should have a negative relationship with turnout except for Dawson's wards, which should have a positive relationship.

Table 5.5: Chicago Turnout by Ward

Log-odds Turnout of Eligible Voters		
	Coefficient	Std. Error
% Irish	8.66 **	2.56
% Polish	2.11 *	1.09
% German	-0.42	2.32
Dawson	0.12	0.18
% Black	-0.13	0.33
1959	-0.17 **	0.07
1963	0.21 **	0.05
Constant	-0.26	0.19
<i>F</i>	25.39**	
<i>R</i> ²	0.297	
<i>N</i>	148	

Standard errors are clustered by ward
 OLS Regression, **p<.05, *<.10

The results in Table 5.5 suggest that regime membership was an important component in determining average rates of turnout. Although not statistically significant, as predicted, areas with high proportions of African American residents had lower turnout, except where Dawson organized voters for the machine. The highest African American concentration areas that were not organized by Dawson had 48 percent turnout.⁴² However, in Dawson's wards, with a mean

of 82 percent black residents, turnout averaged fifty-four percent. In comparison, Irish and Polish populations have a positive effect on turnout. Moving from the minimum concentration of Irish residents to the maximum increases the predicted turnout from 46 percent to 72 percent. For Polish descendants the figure goes from 47 percent to 51 percent. In heavily German areas the turnout averaged only 51 percent. This makes sense given that Germans were peripheral to the Daley machine (Erie 1988). Germans had the highest socioeconomic status of these groups, so this relatively moderate level of turnout counters a purely socioeconomic explanation. Due to problems of ecological inference, these results should only be taken as suggestive, but they do contribute to the body of evidence illustrating that dominant regimes selectively mobilize supporters and ignore or perhaps discourage others from participating in elections.

With no viable opposition, a satisfied electorate, and the goal of long-term dominance in sight, coalitions in machine and reform cities changed their focus. They became less interested in mobilizing the maximum number of voters and more interested in maintaining a coalition closer to minimum winning size. Qualitative evidence also indicates that during the bias period, machine and reform regimes selectively mobilized core coalition members and ceased efforts to register and turn out others.

Machines were famed for their unwavering efforts to naturalize, register, and mobilize newly arriving immigrants. But this behavior only accurately describes the early stage of machine building. When machines faced a tough fight for office they sought to maximize their share of votes from the eligible population, and they did so primarily by bringing new voters into an established political system with strong party allegiances. Once they achieved dominance, machines no longer fought laws that restricted certain populations from voting, and they began to ignore newly arriving immigrants, focusing instead on turning out their reliable patronage-based

coalition (Erie 1988; Pinderhughes 1987; Grimshaw 1992). The 1900 census in New York reveals that 56 percent of white immigrants were naturalized, compared to only 43 percent in 1920, the middle of the city's bias period. Between 1890 and 1920 the Jewish and Italian proportion of the New York voting age population expanded rapidly from 10 percent to 30 percent. During the same period, the share of Jewish and Italian voters rose more modestly from 2 percent to 13 percent (Erie 1988).

While machines simply stopped intensive efforts to bring people to the polls, reformers implemented institutional changes that minimized the number of voters. Measures like nonpartisan and non-concurrent elections, strict registration requirements, poll taxes, literacy tests, and minimal press coverage depressed turnout citywide (Kelley et al 1967; Lee 1960; Alford and Lee 1968; Dixon 1966). Throughout the 20th century in reform cities, the common trend was declining turnout, but reform coalitions often mobilized their core constituencies to win elections. To ensure passage of municipal bonds in support of the reformers' platform, San Jose's city manager formed high powered bond committees, held rallies, and invited celebrities to speak on behalf of his proposals and candidates. In 1961 he brought Miss America to San Jose to endorse a bond (Stanford 1970). The result of mobilizing only certain segments of the community was that in both machine and reform cities, dominant coalitions appeared to govern with near complete consensus. They faced little to no competition from elites, and voters offered sometimes close to unanimous support of their leaders.

Monopoly Results in More Narrowly Distributed Benefits

Given that monopolies encounter reduced electoral participation from certain groups, are they then able to reduce services and exclude these groups from the benefits of government? To

test this proposition, I analyze city financial patterns comparing periods of monopoly dominance to both pre and post-monopoly periods and to cities that never hosted a monopoly. This analysis includes the 244 cities ever to have been listed on the Census' 100 largest cities list (see appendix tables A1-A3).

If my theory is correct, when monopolies are in power, spending should be targeted toward governing coalition elites as well as the regimes' core constituencies at the expense of benefits that serve the broader electoral community. Support for this claim is provided through an analysis of the proportion of machine and reform city budgets spent during the monopoly period as compared to other periods on three categories of expenditure representing (1) elite demands, (2) core constituency demands, and (3) broader community demands.

This analysis relies on annual city financial data gathered from the United States Census County and City Data Book from 1940-86.⁴³ For the most part, the fiscal measures are provided every five years in the second and seventh year of a decade, and the demographic measures are provided every decade in the Census of Population and Housing. I interpolated values for intervening years for the independent variables. The dependent variables, all based on real measures, are the proportion of direct general expenditure spent on various fiscal categories that serve as proxies for the winners and losers of municipal benefits.

Admittedly, there are no precise measures of expenditures for different types of voters that work both across time and place. I rely on the available census data and arguments made in the secondary literature to select the categories of spending. *Reformers' Core* constituents were white, middle-class voters, and, thus, city spending on sanitation services – a major concern of homeowners – is used to represent their demands (Bridges 1997). The base of machine regimes was working class, white ethnic voters. The machine's most valuable benefit was a payroll job.

Consequently, the percentage of city budgets allocated to police and fire expenditures is used to capture the *Machines' Core* preferences. Since the vast majority of police and fire expenditures go toward payroll, it is reasonable to assume that increases and decreases in this measure indicate expansion and contraction of the city workforce.

One cannot use payroll expenditures directly because the proportions vary depending on the total number of functions a city must handle. Given that every city in the data set handles police and fire functions this measure operates as the best proxy for the preferences of the machine's core. Further, this measure allows one to distinguish between the different uses of payroll for a machine monopoly. As explained in chapter 2, patronage positions were used to organize the machine and bias the system in favor of the incumbent coalition. But payroll jobs were also provided as benefits for machine supporters.⁴⁴ However, police and fire positions are frequently protected by civil service. Though machines had many ways of getting around civil-service requirements, the presence of police and fire unions ensures that in many cities hiring and firing cannot be done on a solely political basis. In this analysis I seek to measure the machines' propensity to increase benefits to their core supporters, not the presence of bias. Using the proportion of the budget spent on police and fire allows me to do this.


Both types of regimes relied heavily on the business class to maintain stability and support progress in their cities. For machine and reform regimes alike, the governing coalition included interests that could finance development and campaigns for office and block proposals that they perceived as threatening; these represent the governing coalition elites. I use expenditure on roads and highways, representative of pro-development spending, to capture spending for *Governing Coalition Elites* (Peterson 1981). Finally, to measure changes in

spending on *Broader Community* goods I analyze expenditures in the categories of health and public welfare.⁴⁵

In an ideal world, I would have used the characteristics that define monopoly (organization and bias) as my primary independent variables in determining *Monopoly Period* for each of the 244 cities in the data set. Due to the severe paucity of municipal election data and the difficulty of measuring machine forms of bias across a large number of cases, there is virtually no way to do this. Instead, I rely on the rich historical research conducted by other urban scholars to determine sets of years that might be considered monopoly periods in each city and then analyze municipal benefit distribution in relation to these periods. A complete description of the process employed is provided in chapters 1 and 4. Clear start and end dates for the monopoly period were determined for twenty-five cases (listed in table A3 in the appendix). Of these twenty-five cases, seventeen are machine monopolies and eight are reform monopolies.

A simple analysis of expenditure patterns displayed in Figure 5.1 provides evidence that compared to the periods before and after dominance, machine and reform regimes spent a larger share of their budgets on governing coalition elites and core constituents during monopoly periods.

Figure 5.1: Effect of monopoly period on spending patterns



Reformers increased expenditure on sanitation by approximately six percent to serve their middle-class voters during the monopoly period. Machine regimes reduced sanitation spending during their monopoly periods but increased police and fire expenditures by an average of three percent suggesting the importance of payroll jobs for their supporters. In both types of cities, highway expenditures, supported by businesses and developers, increased during monopoly periods by an average of two percent, while spending on health and welfare declined by an average of four percent.

In order to test these findings more rigorously I regress the percentage spent in each category on a dummy variable for the monopoly period and include a variety of controls to isolate monopoly as a causal factor.⁴⁶ Other scholars have argued that fiscal capacity, functional responsibilities, bureaucratic decisions, and residents' needs are better predictors of government

spending than political factors (see Meier, Stewart and England 1991 for a review of the literature). A measure of *General Revenue* standardized to 1982 dollars is used to test the alternative hypothesis that capacity, not dominance, determines spending patterns.

Because cities are subordinate to states and the federal government, a large portion of their revenue comes from intergovernmental transfers. When subventions are tied to specific purposes, expenditure patterns may reflect priorities of higher levels of government rather than political demand. Additionally, extra income from the state or federal government may free up city funds for spending on redistributive functions. The percent of *Intergovernmental Revenue* is included to control for these possibilities. Along these same lines, a dummy variable noting whether or not the city had *Home Rule* indicates the flexibility of local officials in changing patterns of expenditure.

To account for the possibility that demographics may drive patterns in city spending I add a control for the percentage of the population that is *Nonwhite* according to the census.⁴⁷ Additionally, the size of the needy population may affect expenditure patterns. I include the proportion of the population that is home *Renters* to account for this. Another aspect of a city's need might be its size, both geographic area and total population. For instance, as a city expands and incorporates outlying areas, expenditures on new infrastructure might dominate. The regressions include measures of the city's *Land Area* in square miles, *Total Population*, and five year *Percent Change* in total population to control for this possibility. The measures of land area and total population are logged to account for a leveling-off effect at high values. Finally, I include a *Year* variable to capture linear trends in spending,⁴⁸ dummy variables for region including *South*, *West*, and *Midwest* (with *Northeast* as the excluded category), and dummy variables noting whether the city was ever monopolized by a *Machine* or *Reform* organization.⁴⁹

These last two variables allow me to determine whether or not machine and reform cities had different spending patterns from non-monopoly cities over the entire time period even when monopolies were not in power.

I present four models below, regressing the proportion of the budget spent on sanitation, police and fire, highways, and health and welfare on the variables described above. The analyses exclude cases in which it is known that a monopoly dominated at some point during the 20th century, but where I have no knowledge of the precise start and end dates for this monopoly (see table A2 in the appendix). In the regressions on core expenditures (sanitation and police and fire), the monopoly period is specific to the type of regime in question. For instance, in the model for sanitation expenditures, the monopoly period is only coded one during reform monopoly periods; it is coded zero for all other cases during all other years. This allows me to test the possibility that the focused expenditures were particular to the regime's core constituents and not an effect of monopoly in general.

For both machine and reform cities, the results in Table 5.6 suggest strong, clear patterns of expenditure. Regimes concentrate resources on governing coalition elites and core constituents at the expense of the broader public.

Table 5.6: The Effect of Monopoly on Targeted Benefits

	% DGE spent on Reform Core		%DGE spent on Machine Core		% DGE spent on Coalition elites		% DGE spent on Broader Public	
	Coefficient	Std. Err	Coefficient	Std. Err	Coefficient	Std. Err	Coefficient	Std. Err
Monopoly Period	0.061 **	0.019	0.033 **	0.013	0.022 **	0.008	-0.029 **	0.013
Fiscal Capacity								
General Revenue (millions)	-0.001	0.001	-0.004 **	0.001	0.003 **	0.001	0.008 **	0.002
Fiscal Flexibility								
% Revenue Intergovernmental	-0.031	0.036	-0.148 **	0.052	-0.062	0.041	0.116 **	0.034
Home Rule	-0.010 **	0.004	-0.013 **	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.016 **	0.006
Population Needs								
% Non White	-0.007	0.021	-0.003	0.016	-0.012	0.019	-0.070 **	0.026
% Renters	-0.179 **	0.023	-0.155 **	0.015	-0.176 **	0.024	0.206 **	0.073
Log Land Area	-0.011 **	0.005	-0.025 **	0.005	0.002	0.004	0.020 **	0.009
Log Population (millions)	0.007	0.005	0.022 **	0.005	-0.012 **	0.004	0.005	0.006
5 yr Relative Pop. Change	0.070 **	0.027	-0.116 **	0.039	0.085 **	0.027	-0.085 *	0.051
General Controls								
Year	0.001 *	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001 **	0.000
South	0.046 **	0.012	0.037 **	0.007	0.023 **	0.004	-0.027	0.030
West	0.018 **	0.008	0.102 **	0.005	0.031 **	0.007	-0.076 **	0.024
Midwest	0.041 **	0.008	0.038 **	0.004	0.054 **	0.008	-0.038 **	0.014
Machine	0.011 *	0.006	-0.016 **	0.005	-0.011	0.007	-0.041 **	0.014
Reform	-0.020	0.013	-0.021 **	0.006	-0.036 **	0.011	0.029 *	0.017
Constant	0.187 **	0.062	0.565 **	0.072	0.210 **	0.063	-0.057	0.084
Wald χ^2	2182.66**		32523.06**		2126.11**		1494.13**	
R²	0.183		0.2780		0.297		0.160	
ρ	0.315		.477		0.348		0.603⁺	
N	1158		836		1158		907	

OLS regressions **p<.05, *p<.10

⁺Model corrected for auto-correlation, Prais Winsten method

Note: Panel corrected standard errors reported

Both machine and reform monopolies spent significantly more on their core members during monopoly periods. Reformers increased expenditures by more than 6 percentage points and machines by about 3.5 percentage points for the most important constituents. The figures may seem small but represent large sums of real money. The differences between the monopoly and non-monopoly periods equate to an increase of about \$9.4 million on sanitation spending in the average reform city and about \$13.7 million on police and fire spending in the average machine city.⁵⁰ Both types of regimes also increased spending by about two percent on the developmental category of roads and highways, a priority for developers and business interests. At the same time, coalitions spent three percent less on health and welfare. Splitting the sample by monopoly type confirmed that the effect of monopoly period was statistically indistinguishable for machine versus reform regimes with regard to increased spending on roads and decreased spending on health and welfare. Additionally, monopolies reduce per capita expenditure by about \$9.20 even when controlling for revenue, a decline of about 13 percent. This reinforces McDonald's (1985) argument that contrary to the expectations of turn-of-the-century critics of machine politics, these organizations did not expand government to provide for the needs of the urban masses.⁵¹ As machine and reform regimes became safe in office, they turned their attention away from the demands of a broad electoral coalition to serve the preferences of governing coalition elites and key coalition members.

There are a number of interesting results from these analyses for students of city politics. For instance, these data support Peterson's (1981) argument that cities are significantly more likely to spend money on redistributive programs when they have bigger budgets overall and receive significant amounts of aid from higher levels of government. Additionally, having a large population in need of government services (renters in these models) appears to tie the

hands of city budget makers significantly, encouraging a reduction in spending on sanitation, police and fire, and roads in favor of health and welfare. As other scholars have found, region remains an important factor in determining spending patterns. Yet even with these controls, the monopoly period remains a significant predictor in expenditure patterns. In their quest for reelection and in service to their organizations, dominant coalitions shifted municipal expenditures toward their key constituencies.

Dominance Increased Benefits for Core Coalition Members

Qualitative evidence also suggests that when regimes successfully dominate the system they focus benefits on their core constituency and members of the governing coalition. In machine and reform cities alike, dominant coalitions rewarded key members of their coalitions with divisible benefits and policy choices. Monopolies were successful because they were attentive to their base. This is not a small point. All of the coalitions that governed over a monopoly period were reelected to office time and again. Even if the rules of the game advantaged these incumbents, they would not have survived had they not been responsive to some portion of their communities. As William Munro (1933) remarked, “[I]t is the boss who serves as the mediator between poverty and power...he is the protector of his people” (p19).⁵²

In Chicago the Irish held the mayor’s seat from 1933 until 1983, with one brief three year hiatus. Into the 1970s the Irish held between one quarter and one third of the seats on Chicago’s city council while they made up only about 2 percent of the total city population (Erie 1988).⁵³ New York’s Tim Sullivan, Irish boss of the East Side, governed over a district that was 85 percent Jewish and Italian but only five percent Irish in 1910. New Haven’s white immigrant ethnic groups, Italians, Irish, and Jews, accounted for 57 percent of the city’s registered voters in

1959 but accounted for 82 percent of elected municipal officials. Of these groups the Irish were most heavily overrepresented at 29 percent of the officials but only 11 percent of the electorate (Wolfinger 1974). Because dominant organizations in these cities controlled the nomination process as a mechanism for consolidating their monopoly, it can be seen as no accident that core coalition members were disproportionately slated for office.

White ethnic constituencies also won disproportionate shares of patronage jobs, party positions, and appointments in machine cities. Table 5.7 shows the percentage of government employees identified as Irish in three machine cities. As machines consolidated power, they employed a greater percentage of the total Irish workforce in municipal government. In 1900, Irish shares of government jobs were roughly proportional to their population proportions. By 1930, when machines dominated these three cities, Irish patronage far outstripped population shares.

Table 5.7: Irish government employment in machine cities						
	% employed in local government		% of workforce employed in local government		% of population (1st and 2nd generation)	
	1900	1930	1900	1930	1900	1930
New York	36.6	51.7	5.8	23.6	31.1	8.8
Jersey City	42.4	58.3	5.1	20.8	37.7	3.3
Albany	30.0	41.0	4.6	14.8	32.6	10.1
Average change, 1900-1930	+14%		+14.6%		-26.4%	

Some scholars have argued that patronage or “bloated public employment” is actually a form of income redistribution (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 2000, p220). However, while groups like the

Irish benefited from machines' allocations of patronage, during the bias period, machines actually employed a smaller proportion of the total population in government jobs. Analysis suggests that the proportion of residents employed in city jobs declined from 4.3% to 3.4% on average during machine monopoly periods.⁵⁴ Given this, it is unlikely that the machines were simply attempting to redistribute income to all low income and working class persons.

Aside from patronage jobs and municipal positions, core coalition members in machine cities benefited from their preferred relationship with dominant regimes in other ways as well. Union members were rewarded with large public works projects and support for labor organizing. Other coalition members, like business groups, frequently requested and were granted lax enforcement of laws governing their conduct or operations, an underassessment of taxes, and liberal business policies (Pinderhughes 1987). Pendergast's general refusal to enforce oversight of nightclubs and prohibition contributed to the birth of some of the world's greatest jazz (Ward and Burns 2000). New Haven's Mayor Lee's first foray into redevelopment was a massive overhaul of the city's parks and recreations programs – projects all to be heavily used by the lower-class residents of the city. He fixed up decrepit athletic fields, built playgrounds and an athletic center, a new clubhouse on the municipal golf course, and a new lawn-bowling clubhouse. In Pittsburgh the Lawrence organization rewarded African Americans with a fair employment practices ordinance and top-level appointments in the administration.

Machines also supported policies important to their voters. In New York, the Tammany commission that investigated the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire proposed fifty new laws to protect wages and working conditions for women and children, a boon to their factory-working constituents (Erie 1988). In Albany, where core coalition members were middle class, the machine provided efficient city services, low taxes, and underassessment for homeowners. Such

policies came to be adopted by other machine cities as well, especially as their core constituents became home owners. Daley's city "that worked" met the demands of this constituency. He focused on street repairs and beautification, garbage collection and snow removal, low property taxes and preservation of property values.

An important qualification stated in chapter 3 is that machines were careful not to exclude groups of residents from their coalitions outright. This is evident in their allocation of benefits to non-core members. Throughout the monopoly period, machines were skilled at providing symbolic benefits that cost few resources. New York's Boss Sullivan, while keeping Jews and Italians out of elected office and coveted patronage positions, provided food baskets, coal, and sometimes rent money to the new immigrants. He sponsored legislation to make Columbus Day a holiday, took to wearing a yarmulke, and nominated Jews and Italians for minor party posts. Similarly, Kansas City's Boss Pendergast opened political clubs that provided a social outlet for residents who could not afford or were excluded from the city's country clubs. In New Haven the mayor visited at least two schools a week, talking with teachers and reading to the children. In every machine city, bosses provided picnics and ballgames, attended weddings, wakes, and funerals, opened citizen complaint offices, and provided small favors to community members, all as inexpensive efforts to maintain the voters' good will without having to share the most valuable benefit – patronage. These strategies to win reelection were popular and responsive to portions of the community. As was mentioned in chapter 1, none of these leaders could afford to rest on bias alone. They worked for reelection as all politicians do, by cultivating a reliable constituency.

Though reform coalitions did not rely on patronage for building their regimes, key elected and appointed municipal positions *were* focused toward core members. Well into the

1980s the overwhelming majority of those who served on San Jose's boards and commissions were part of an old elite network. Political jobs were dominated by a circle of white, middle-class men connected through the city's Catholic boy's high school and Catholic college. Two of San Jose's oldest, whitest, and wealthiest neighborhoods were home to nearly every city council member throughout the entire reform period of 1945-1977 (Christensen 1997).

Reformers attended to their core from the beginning of their regimes, focusing on middle-class white constituents. They offered low, stable tax rates, efficient homeowner services, and clean government. An analysis of library building during San Jose's reform period exemplifies the beneficiaries of reform dominance. Between 1944 and 1962, the most powerful years of the reform administration, four libraries were built. All were nestled within the two neighborhoods that produced all of the city's reform politicians (San Jose Public Library 2003). Similarly, in Austin, all five branch libraries were built in neighborhoods providing wide margins to reformers during the bias period. In San Antonio during the monopoly period, libraries in African American neighborhoods and low income housing projects were closed. The first new branch to be built since 1930 opened in a newly annexed, affluent Anglo community. Phoenix's reform government conducted a study to determine sites for new libraries that would be most advantageous to their electoral fortunes (Bridges 1997).

Aside from gaining new libraries, middle-class migrants to the West also benefited from reform governments' responsiveness to residential developers. By granting unhindered access to surrounding open space, reform governments provided a plethora of moderately priced, suburban, single family homes with large plots and beautiful natural surroundings.⁵⁵ Reform governments also increased attention on homeowner services. In return, for many years these homeowners loyally supported reform coalitions at the ballot box. However, there were costs to

this style of development that would ultimately chip away at reformer's power. Residents faced traffic congestion, environmental degradation, and high costs of living. The loss of agricultural land and the elimination of the orchard industry were encouraged by Hamann and other reform leaders, who offered to rezone agricultural parcels to increase the value of the land for sale (Matthews 2003 p101). This provided a larger sale price to the growers and made more land available for development. That growth had externalities does not minimize the fact the coalitions were providing a substantial benefit to homeowners by lowering the cost of homes and increasing attention to homeowner services.

Dominance Increased Benefits for Governing Coalition Elites

The biggest winners from reform governments were the elite developers, who were so powerful that city planning was often driven wholly by their preferences. In all of these cities, the historical period with the most pronounced development and rapid growth was the monopoly period. This was no accident – the leaders of these regimes were visionaries with long term plans for their cities, making developers key members of the coalitions. One San Jose developer explained that during the reformers' reign he was the “closest thing to a power broker that the city had ever had” (Davidson Interview 2003).⁵⁶ Annexation decisions were based on requests submitted by developers – not on cost to existing residents or the city's ability to provide services to the new areas. Sewer lines were planned by sticking pins in a map when developers requested a connection and built when enough pins seemed to justify a new line (Trounstine and Christensen 1982). Reform coalitions also subsidized development with public funds. Developers saved about \$700 per lot in San Jose compared to neighboring Milpitas due to public funds offered for construction costs, less stringent construction requirements, and low rates on

service extensions to the developments in San Jose (Stanford 1970). In Austin when developers paid for street building and utility connections they were repaid five times the expenditure for ten years or until the developer's costs were totally recouped with interest. Developers, city administrators, and businesses profited tremendously from these policies. In Phoenix a 1961 article reported that the new millionaires of the city were primarily housing developers (Martin 1961).

In machine cities, too, governing coalition elites and city officials benefited personally from dominance. Machines in Chicago, New York, New Haven, Pittsburgh and Albany fashioned powerful governing coalitions of developers, bankers, and unions. They used redevelopment, slum clearance and corporate development to maintain support from these elites. In Philadelphia the Republican machine assisted utilities like the United Gas Company and the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company in establishing economic monopolies (McCaffery 1992). Three brothers connected to the Philadelphia machine, George, Edwin, and William Vare, collected nearly thirty million dollars in city contracts (Committee of Seventy). Many members of the governing coalition, particularly the political organizers, precinct leaders and ward bosses, received public jobs. Forthall (1946) found that 70 percent of precinct captains in Chicago held public jobs during the mid-1920s. Other members of the coalition benefited from public contracts or partnerships and inside information. In Kansas City Pendergast's concrete company poured "every cubic inch of material needed for the massive public works programs he relentlessly sponsored for his city" (Ward and Burns 2000, p196). Tammany's Boss Plunkitt was famous for his views on "honest graft." In his words, "If my worst enemy was given the job of writin' my epitaph when I'm gone, he couldn't do more than write 'George W. Plunkitt. He Seen His Opportunities, and He Took 'Em.'" (Riordan 1994, p6).

Machines brokered deals through which businesses provided benefits to politicians, like jobs for constituents, winter coal, or cash, in exchange for favorable policy decisions regarding business operations. In Kansas City for example, Pendergast received a large cash payoff in exchange for orchestrating the appointment of a superintendent of insurance, who agreed to allow an increase in insurance rates. One journalist wrote of the sheriff's position in Chicago, "Knowledgeable people had a rule of thumb at that time that if a sheriff couldn't step out of office four years later with a clear \$1,000,000 in his pocket, he just wasn't trying" (quoted in Cohen and Taylor 2000, p74). So, for many machine elites dominating the political system and minimizing challenges to the machine's power translated into personal wealth and status

Peripheral Groups Suffered During Monopoly Periods

While governing coalition elites and core coalition members won benefits from dominant coalitions, other members of the community suffered when public expenditures declined during periods of dominance. The lack of competition generated by the consolidation of the monopoly eliminated the power of peripheral groups to bargain for increased benefits and representation. In machine and reform cities alike, dominant coalitions faced competing demands from poor minority residents seeking integration, better school funding, a halt to police brutality and discrimination, appointment to high-level political positions, and public investment in jobs, housing, and welfare. Simultaneously, middle-class whites and business constituents preferred low-tax, service-oriented policies, and sought continued segregation in housing and education.

During the monopoly period in Chicago (and elsewhere), these conflicts were decided in favor of whites, the machine's core constituency. Using public funds, Chicago's Housing Authority became a veritable model for ghetto building; enforcing segregation, poverty and

racism. In 1957 Chicago's *Daily Defender*, the nation's leading black newspaper editorialized, "[I]t seems strange that segregation bars are being lowered in the deep South, while in Chicago we are raising them higher!" ("Our Segregated City" p11). Daley, like many mayors, expressed strong support for public housing programs; advocating assistance to people in need. In 1958, Daley traveled to Washington to convince the federal government to allow Chicago to build "low, walk-up structures that would provide apartments for large families, contain small apartments on the first floor for elderly persons, and represent a type of construction that might eventually be sold to private owners" (Buck 1958, p23)

Over time, because of the paucity of funding, the concentration of people, and the enforcement of segregation, housing developments became terrifying places to live, trapping people in prisons filled with violence and drugs. But there was no incentive for the machine to provide solutions because it did not face electoral threats and so it remained insulated from the reality of the ghetto. Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the machine benefited from maintaining the public-housing system because of the large numbers of patronage jobs it offered (Cohen and Taylor 2000). Continued racial violence at the edges of the ghetto and a close election in 1963 convinced Daley to pull away from efforts to promote integration in service to his white base.

Another example of machines choosing policies that placed the demands of their core supporters over peripheral groups was in the realm of school funding. In many machine cities, a large proportion of the core constituency sent their children to parochial schools (Erie 1988). This frequently made school funding a low priority. During the monopoly period, machines in this data set reduced school expenditures by nearly six percentage points.⁵⁷ In Chicago the segregation of schools became a major target of black outrage. Led by the Coordinating Council

of Community Organizations, the African American community launched an effort in the early 1960s to remove the public school superintendent, Benjamin Willis, for failing to take steps to integrate the city's schools. This culminated in two large scale boycotts by black students, a number of rallies, marches on city hall, and scathing editorials in the *Daily Defender*. The first citywide desegregation plan was issued almost twenty years later in 1980.

Machine's controlled the distribution of benefits carefully. In some cities machines established Byzantine bureaucracies to ensure that only core members would receive municipal benefits. In New Haven acquiring delivery of some services like tree pruning or waste disposal required attaining a series of permits from offices open at irregular, infrequent times. Such a system makes it possible for the bureaucracy to have a large amount of discretion in providing services and places the onus for pursuing government benefits on the residents.

There is also substantial support for the argument that machines were highly concerned with who was awarded public jobs (see Wolfinger 1974; Stave et al 1988). The reliance on patronage jobs as a source of municipal benefits may have had an effect on the administration of city services. There is a large literature on public bureaucracies that shows that staffing bureaus with a high proportion of political appointees makes agencies more responsive to elected officials but at the cost of less expertise (Lewis 2006). There is some evidence that the pattern is similar at the local level (see Stein 1991 for example). Munro (1933) argues, "Misgovernment, in all its iniquities [*sic*], falls most heavily on the poor and on the underprivileged." He explains further, "It is they who have to put up with the dangers and the inconvenience of slipshod building laws, lax health regulations, inefficient inspection of food and milk, uncleaned streets, overcrowded school buildings, and unsupervised playgrounds" (p20). Thus, the dominant

coalitions' reliance on patronage may have been the source of additional negative outcomes for residents who were peripheral to the monopoly.

In many cities urban renewal represented the provision of benefits to core coalition members and governing coalition elites at the expense of peripheral groups. For every new building that was erected, a slum was cleared, displacing more than a million residents over the course of the federal program (Anderson 1964). These decisions were not made independent of the racial and ethnic makeup of neighborhoods (Hirsch 1983). Although money for urban renewal came from the federal government, the implementation of the programs and the designation of sites of low-income housing projects were handled by local governments. In Chicago the city council gave neighborhoods the right to “veto the construction of public housing within their borders” (Schill and Wachter 1995, p1295). The result was an extreme concentration of high-rise public housing projects in heavily black neighborhoods. In New Haven alone, Wolfinger (1974) estimates 7,000 households and 25,000 residents were moved to make way for urban renewal. While millions of dollars were spent pursuing redevelopment the poorest residents in machine cities became poorer. New Haven spent over \$200 million in public funds on renewal programs but by the 1970s had become the fourth poorest city in the country. By 1989, the infant mortality rate rivaled third-world countries in some neighborhoods, and the citywide average was the second highest in the nation.

This is not to say that leaders like New Haven's Mayor Dick Lee sought to exacerbate poverty in their cities. On the contrary, Dick Lee was wholeheartedly committed to saving New Haven from its long downward spiral (Rae 2003). However, in many places, the way in which urban-renewal programs were carried out created advantages for some and disadvantages for others because politics and policy remained closed to segments of the population. For example,

in New Haven, Mayor Lee's administration organized Citizen Action Committees to advise the redevelopment process, provide opportunities for citizen input, and to generate support for governmental decisions, but Dahl (1961) argues that "except for a few trivial instances the CAC never directly initiated, opposed, vetoed or altered any proposal brought before them by the mayor and his Development Administrator" (p131). Throughout the 1950s the urban renewal program governed by New Haven's Democratic machine relied on maps that had been developed decades earlier to determine which areas of the city to raze and replace. The maps that they used ranked neighborhoods from best to worst. Rae (2003) has argued that the hierarchy was "based as much on bigotry as land or buildings" (p281). By designating predominately African American neighborhoods as slums and/or as risky investments and then demolishing the community, the government instituted a self-fulfilling prophecy for these areas.

In Chicago black anger against the machine built throughout Daley's years in office as the monopoly continually slighted the African American community. Issues of police brutality were actively avoided by the Democratic organization. According to the *Daily Defender*, "[T]he Chicago police force is composed largely of men who do not even bother to hide their racial bias, so strong is their hatred of the Negro. And, it is not unlikely that this anti-Negro feeling is a reflection of the people at the top" ("Our Segregated City" 1957 p11). In 1960 of 200 lieutenants on the police force not one was black ("Where A Negro Is Needed" 1960 pA10).

When an important Black Panther leader, Fred Hampton, was shot by Chicago policemen assigned to protect Daley's candidate for State Attorney, a prominent African American Congressman, Ralph Metcalfe, felt he could no longer support the Daley machine. Metcalfe openly broke with Daley, and when he next faced reelection Daley slated a high profile white cabinet member to run against Metcalfe in the primary. Although Metcalfe won, Daley's

decision was both meant and taken as a direct assault on Chicago and Illinois's African American communities. To inflame the issue further, after Metcalfe's death in office, a white machine loyalist was selected as his replacement. Similarly, when Daley's death required that the city council appoint an acting mayor, they passed over the African American president pro tem of the city council (Preston 1982). Throughout the monopoly period in Chicago and elsewhere, blacks demanded and were denied appointments to municipal positions. "Mr. Mayor we would like to point out," the *Daily Defender* said, "that in comparison with other cities...Chicago is sadly lacking in the utilization of its finest and most well-qualifies [*sic*] Negro citizens in responsible positions in your administration" (1956, p9). By 1970 blacks made up forty percent of Chicago's population, but only twenty percent of the municipal workforce. As of 1974 Latinos made up only 1.7% of the full time city payroll (Belenchia 1982).

Prior to the consolidation of the monopoly, and even during the early years of the machine's rise to power, Chicago's Democratic politicians had reached out to the black community. For example, Mayor Ed Kelly built a sizable black following by empowering submachine boss William Dawson, granting him control over the policy racket, appointing blacks to municipal posts, slating black candidates, and targeting blacks for government aid. He defended integrated public housing and schools and banned the movie *Birth of a Nation*.

Similarly, in New York before the monopoly consolidated, Tammany's bosses expanded vote totals by promising benefits to Jews and Italians. During the 1910s and 1920s, the rising Hague organization in Jersey City actively courted and won the allegiance of new immigrants by converting the city hospital into a medical center and providing free health care to the city's poor. Between 1900 and 1920, competitive party pressures in Albany led politicians to mobilize newer ethnic immigrants from southern and eastern Europe by providing them with jobs and

economic relief. Thus, it was only after consolidation of the monopoly that machines narrowed their focus.

Reform Periphery

Constituents on the periphery of reform monopolies also suffered while regimes were in power. Because reformers had spent much energy and many resources on separating politics from government, dissent was eliminated in the very structure of the cities' institutions. By unifying the executive and legislative branches of government and making council seats at-large, all of those in power were beholden to the same constituency. Such a structure made it appear as though the cities were homogenous and unified, but many cities with reform governments had large populations of residents who did not always share reform views. Intense debates erupted over the placement of public works, the location of new roads and freeways, the provision of parks, libraries, and schools, and the role of labor unions in municipal government.

While reform coalitions maintained agendas that promoted growth and development, benefiting business and middle-class whites, they ignored the social needs of many residents and neglected the city's burgeoning physical problems (Abbott 1987). One of the clearest examples of this pattern is seen in Southwestern annexation policies. As cities like San Jose annexed new communities at the behest of developers, poorer communities closer to the center were not provided with basic municipal services. The Latino neighborhood known as the Mayfair District in San Jose flooded in 1952 creating a significant public health threat (Matthews 2003). The same creek overflowed its banks again in 1955, 1958 and 1962. The year that the monopoly collapsed, 1979, the water district finally filed an application to protect the nearly 4,000 homes and businesses in the area from further damage.⁵⁸ In the early 1970s, residents of Alviso, a

heavily Latino area, blocked a bridge demanding that crossers pay a toll to pay for needed repairs that the city of San Jose had refused to provide (Allen-Taylor 1998).

Austin's 1969 Model Cities program first focused on paving and drainage in center city neighborhoods. Yet, the predominately African American west side of Austin did not have paved streets in some areas until 1979 (Orum 1987). Meanwhile, city government provided sewerage, streets, and utilities for all of the new developments. In Albuquerque developers were required to set aside four percent of new developments for park land. By 1960 the middle class and affluent neighborhoods boasted fifty small parks and green areas whereas the poor Valley communities had no public parks unconnected to schools. Some poor and working-class sections of Phoenix lacked municipal water and sewers because they were never annexed. As a result they only had running water between midnight and 5 a.m. The busy annexation mill in San Antonio doubled the city's size between 1940 and 1950 but leapfrogged over older, poorer, and more heavily Latino neighborhoods. During these years reformers promised Latino leaders that they would build drainage projects in return for support in bond elections. The bonds passed and the money was allocated, but the projects were never built (Johnson, Booth, and Harris 1983). As late as the 1980s, Mexican American communities in San Antonio and Albuquerque were beset by flooding due to inadequate drainage systems.

Reform coalitions were strategic in their choices to annex and develop. The policies were meant to benefit governing coalition elites and core members in the coalition. Rapid growth precluded development of a public transit system, which would have been highly valuable to low-income residents. New homes and jobs that the reform coalitions brought to their cities did not go to minority residents (Guilhufe 1979). In many places the newly annexed or developed subdivisions were not open to persons of color. According to a study conducted in

post WWII San Jose, “[A]ll of the subdivisions opened within the last five or six years have written restrictions barring property from occupancy or use by all non-Caucasians except those who are working as domestics in the area” (Quoted in Pitti 2003, p88). In the 1960s when San Jose was the fastest growing city in the nation, Mexican Americans concentrated on the East Side affectionately called one barrio Sal Si Puedes, “Get out if you can.” It was here that Cesar Chavez began his career organizing the Chicano movement (Pitti 2003 p91). In 2005, Buena Vista, a poorly developed, seedy area, surrounded on all sides by San Jose, was still not annexed by the city. In San Antonio, the Good Government League directed development money to the suburbs, away from older areas that were increasingly strained by the arrival of new low-income immigrants (Johnson, Booth, and Harris 1983).

Many reform governments chose not to build low-income housing, even when federal funds were offered and demand was great. By 1977 the Santa Clara County housing task force declared that about forty percent of households were in need of housing assistance. A report by the California Builders Association found that increasing developer profits (not increased labor or land costs) contributed most to the skyrocketing home prices between 1967 and 1977. The lack of affordable housing in San Jose meant that low-income residents were often forced to move outside city bounds first to Alviso and later to Gilroy or Morgan Hill.

Those Latinos who stayed in San Jose lobbied for low-cost housing, improved services, an end to discriminatory housing practices, and better, integrated schools on the East Side. A report of schools endangered by inadequate protection against earthquakes showed that all seventeen schools in serious risk were located in Mexican American communities on the East Side. Latino communities deteriorated relative to white neighborhoods throughout the monopoly period, and segregation worsened (Alesch and Levine 1973). The city responded to these

demands primarily with symbolic gestures creating a Human Relations Board and a program to track the race and ethnicity of city employees. According to Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984), San Jose's Model Cities program had a very small budget and was largely used to "insulate city hall from minority demands, to minimize opposition...and to divert minority discontent away from city hall toward the leaders of the programs" (p217-218). In 1971 San Jose police stopped a black IBM research chemist for a traffic violation and shot him when he attempted to run away. Outraged residents protested in front of city hall and filled council meetings demanding action (Christensen 1997). But the governing coalition had no incentive to be responsive to minority demands. The institutions that it had created and the culture of non participation that it cultivated kept reformers safely in office.

Inequities in school funding were another legacy of the monopoly period in many reform cities. Until 1953, California law mandated that school district boundaries be coterminous with city boundaries. If a city annexed territory the school district in the existing territory would be dismantled. As a result school administrators frequently opposed annexations. At the request of San Jose's assembly representative, the legislature changed the law to disconnect school and city boundaries. The legacy of this change has been extreme fragmentation of San Jose's school systems, and vast inequalities in the school tax bases among the city's different neighborhoods (see Matthews 2003 for a detailed account).

There is evidence that diverse views existed in reform cities throughout the monopoly period. In Austin, during the early 1960s, African Americans joined with sympathetic whites to protest the policies of segregation in the city. They met with city council members, developed ordinances, and offered legal advice to city leaders about how integration could be achieved. At multiple council meetings, the group presented its case. At one meeting in late March 1963, the

head of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People “launched into a wordy tirade against prejudice and discrimination,” reading passages from John Howard Griffin’s *Black Like Me* (Orum 1987 p259-160). One by one, leaders of the movement came forward to speak, maintaining a filibuster for two full weeks. It is not a tenable position that the city government was unaware of the demands and dissatisfaction of Austin’s minority community.

After a disastrous flood in East San Jose in 1952, a newly consolidated Mexican American political group, the Community Service Organization (CSO), began a massive voter-registration drive among Latino residents. In that year alone, 4,000 new voters were registered (Pitti 2003, p167). The response of the white elite makes it clear that they noticed the mobilization. On election day city leaders dispatched an increased number of poll watchers to Mexican neighborhoods. At one site four voters were turned away for failing the literacy test. Immediately, CSO sent representatives to the polling place and proved that the challenged voters could in fact read and write English (Pitti 2003).

Later in the 1960s and 1970s, San Jose residents began to question untrammelled growth, argue for increased debate on planning and growth policy, and ask that the city require any new development to “constitute a ‘net benefit’ to the entire community rather than promoting growth for its own sake” (a San Jose citizens committee report, “Goals for San Jose,” quoted in Stanford 1970 p31). During this period San Jose lost out on the race to secure defense spending because the city had failed to develop adequate infrastructure to support the military’s needs (Schoennauer interview 2003). In a 1973 Rand Corporation Study, researchers interviewed residents to determine what kind of living environment they preferred. Interviewees were provided with fifty options that they proceeded to rank from most to least desirable. The choices

ranged from things like “a place where people of different races and different ethnic groups can live together—where their children can learn to understand each other” to “a trailer park that is well protected, with small plots, lots of community recreation, little shops within its boundaries” (Christen 1973, p6). Other choices highlighted the importance of the environment, high incomes, or public transportation. The authors of the study found so much variation in the responses that they were unable to draw definite conclusions about the community’s preferences. They did find that Anglo and Mexican American residents shared many of the same preferences, but one key difference stood out. Anglos were more concerned about environmental protection while Mexican Americans found a good bus system of utmost importance.⁵⁹ The authors also determined that the differences between the preferences of Anglo residents and Mexican American residents were much less stark than the dissimilarities between the city planners and the residents as a whole. Despite the diverse views among community members and elites, dominant coalitions governing in biased electoral arenas responded to a narrowly defined constituency.

As in the case of machines, during periods prior to the consolidation of reform monopolies, politicians sought support from a broader public. During the 1930s, Austin’s city council made improvements to the city hospital, opened a new public swimming pool, and launched an intensive drive against syphilis. The city hired a “paid Negro director in charge of recreation for his own people,” established a “Negro advisory committee,” (Stone et al 1937 p7) and built a black library and black parks. In the late 1930s, Austin built three public housing projects with federal dollars, one for blacks, one for Mexican Americans, and one for whites (Orum 1987). In 1949, an additional project for African Americans was built on the East Side.

Of course, Austin was still an extremely segregated city – a deliberate creation by white leaders. However, these leaders *did* assert that a segregated community could be equal. Austin city planners sought to enforce segregation by enhancing city services in only one of the African American neighborhoods, encouraging blacks to vacate other parts of the city. According to the zoning report:

It is our recommendation that the nearest approach to the solution of the race segregation problem will be the recommendation of this district as a Negro district; and that all the facilities and conveniences be provided the Negroes in this district, as an incentive to draw the Negro population to this area. This will eliminate the necessity of duplication of white and black schools, white and black parks, and other duplicate facilities for this area....We further recommend that the Negro schools in this area be provided with ample and adequate playground space and facilities similar to the white schools of the city. (Quoted in Orum 1987 p175)

Similarly, a zoning report in Dallas explained that the “plan that is prepared should provide districts for negroes and Mexicans, giving them the same facilities as whites, that is, wide paved streets, standard size lots, and all of the public utilities. In this way, there will be no slums or blighted districts....” (Quoted in Orum 1987 p175).

Neither Dallas nor Austin succeeded at creating separate and equal facilities. Because of their excluded status and the lack of electoral competition, communities of color had no power to bargain for benefits. They had virtually no descriptive (much less substantive) representatives in elected and appointed positions. In 1971 Latinos made up only 5.5% of San Jose’s police and fire forces but composed twenty-two percent of the population according to the 1970 census. In 1978 the city was threatened with a loss of federal General Revenue funds for the inadequate

hiring of Latinos (Browning et al 1984). This lack of services provided to peripheral groups was in distinct contrast to other periods of these cities' histories where peripheral residents were incorporated into political coalitions that faced risky elections and offered shares of municipal benefits.

Conclusion

In both machine and reform cities, securing dominance made governing coalitions less attentive to the broader public. When the electoral system became uncompetitive, groups outside of the monopoly coalition could not easily contest the hand that they were dealt. Biased systems allowed dominant organizations to reduce the size of their electoral coalitions, conserve resources, and reward key players. During the monopoly period, turnout declined as dominant regimes demobilized voters peripheral to their coalitions. Secure in power, monopolies directed benefits of municipal government toward core members and powerful governing coalition elites while peripheral groups suffered. In nearly all of the cases analyzed here those peripheral to the coalition were persons of color. In the reform cities suffrage restrictions and vote dilution strategies ensured that black, Latino, and Asian Americans were limited from participating in the political process. The same outcome resulted in machine cities as an effect of the organization's maintenance strategy – responsiveness to the preferences of the monopoly's core supporters. Those outside of the coalition were provided symbolic benefits, ignored, and at times attacked by the monopolist in power.

¹ Although Booker lost in 2002 it was the most serious challenge James had faced in over a decade. Four years later Booker won the mayoralty after James pulled out of the race at the last minute. James' stated reason for retiring was that he opposed dual office holding and wanted to focus on his position as state senator. Given that James had held both offices for seven years and given that he declined to run for reelection to the state senate the following year, it is a strong possibility that the strength of Booker's threat inspired him not to seek a sixth term.

² A monopoly is defined as a single coalition maintaining control over government for at least a decade by using strategies of bias.

³ These figures are for 1940 for Pawtucket and 1932 for New York.

⁴ Some scholars consider this a positive outcome. Reducing attention to the public may mean that politicians are freed from pandering and can focus on making "good" public policy. I operate under the assumption that a political system that is attentive to the preferences of a majority of the population is part of the definition of a healthy democracy.

⁵ A note must be added here regarding the use of the term *monopoly*. Some readers will immediately have thought of work by Peterson (1981) and Tiebout (1956) which asserts that all cities are forced to compete because capital and populations are mobile. Thus, one might imagine that this book is an attempt to argue with this point. As will be explained in the coming chapters, political monopoly refers to a lack of competition within a city; not a lack of competition with other cities. The competitive regional environment identified by Peterson and Tiebout may constrain all cities, but the political system within a given city may nonetheless be monopolized by a single coalition.

⁶ See Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2000) for a similar argument.

⁷ Erie (1988) argues that reliance on the public sector for economic advancement kept Irish Americans in the lower rungs of the middle class for longer than other white ethnic groups. This suggests that the belief that machines represented immigrants' best opportunity for increasing socioeconomic status was mistaken.

⁸ This distinction is from Holli (1969). See Connolly (1998) and Finegold (1995) for discussion of the diversity among reform movements. My focus on structural reform ignores the traditions of the Progressive Reformers, who sought corporate regulation and labor protections, and municipal populists, who sought reform in service to the poor and immigrant classes. Further, I am less concerned here with the intellectual foundations of reform than with the ways in which it became implemented in city politics.

⁹ For examples of reformers advocating for governance by "better men" see Bridges (1997, p110-113)

¹⁰ Finegold (1995) argues that reform movements in Chicago, Cleveland, and New York frequently drew support from immigrant and working class voters, who viewed the machine as oppressive and reform platforms as extremely progressive. However, in many of the cases he analyzes, Finegold finds that the programs and policies developed by experts in the reform tradition were implemented in much more narrow and cost-effective terms at the behest of business elites in these coalitions.

¹¹ Most of the sources that I relied upon for determining cities with histories of dominance were published before 1990 and focused on earlier time periods. For this reason, if a city's monopoly period began after 1980, it is not captured in my data set.

¹² I was able to determine clear dates for the emergence of a monopoly in an additional five cities (but could not determine the end date of the monopoly in these cities). Of the thirty cases in which I know the start date for the monopoly period, nine of the cases can be classified as reform and twenty-one as machine.

¹³ For example, I attempted to collect data on the location of sewerage overflows in San Jose for the 20th century. While the city has records of the overflows, they are filed using a data system that notes the pipe number not the location of the pipe. The Department of Sanitation informed me that they had no map of the pipe numbers and that collecting the data would require requesting each record by pipe number. I did not pursue this option.

¹⁴ There is a growing literature that argues that responsiveness to voters can produce less effective governance than non-responsiveness. See for instance Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001) who argue that politicians will sometimes "pander" to public opinion; disregarding private knowledge that following public opinion will lead to suboptimal outcomes. Their theory suggests that this is most likely to happen in close races and when the pandering is likely to go undetected. So it could be that an uncontested market (because it increases incumbent safety) increases the probability of bad outcomes in the long run. The evidence in later chapters shows that certain subpopulations did suffer during monopoly periods. I consider this to be a problematic outcome.

¹⁵ See Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2000) for evidence that vulnerable incumbents focus on creating links to voters. Downs (1957) argues that an incumbent party that always chooses policy based on the majority's preferences can still lose to a challenger under a specific set of conditions, most importantly when the electorate

lacks strong consensus and the challenger does not commit to a specific policy until after the government acts. Even still he concludes, “Thus majority rule does not always prevail on specific issues, but it usually does in a two-party system whenever the majority strongly favors a certain policy,” (74).

¹⁶ The analogy between economic and political monopolies breaks down quickly after these basic similarities. The economic study of monopoly is well developed, and I do not draw on this literature here. The association I make relies on this very basic popular/journalistic understanding of monopoly.

¹⁷ For a discussion of responsible parties see “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties,” *American Political Science Review*, vol 44, No. 3, part 2, Supplement, September 1950.

¹⁸ Some politicians will not be interested in seeking reelection over the long term for any number of reasons. This is likely to be true particularly if they are interested in specific policy outcomes that can be achieved by influencing other officeholders. I am not explaining the behavior of this subset of politicians.

¹⁹ A substantial literature has shown that at-large elections are deleterious to minorities. See for example Davidson and Korbel (1981), Engstrom and McDonald (1981), or Polinard et al (1994)

²⁰ In the instance that the monopolist has a super-encompassing interest in the private economy, it will also be constrained by effects of policies on the economy (McGuire and Olson 1996).

²¹ Cities are not sovereign governments unless they are granted independence by the state legislature. Most large cities have some degree of home rule, giving them control over taxation and revenue collection, expenditure, zoning, electoral rules, structure of governing institutions, etc.

²² Suffrage restrictions are increasingly effective the more they rely on immutable characteristics. For example, the white primary in the South was more restrictive than literacy tests because while people of color could not change their skin, they could learn to read (this of course ignores the unequal application of the test for blacks and whites).

²³ Political machines were not successful at building patronage monopolies until they won large shares of resources, like jobs, from the state and federal governments, suggesting that they were unwilling or unable to tax their own residents heavily enough to provide the necessary jobs without external funds (Erie 1988).

²⁴ A more precise prediction is that the level of inequality should dictate the extent to which the monopoly is a redistributive regime. This parallels the prediction generated by the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model that inegalitarian societies should be more redistributive. There is a large body of empirical research that has found that the inverse is true – societies with less income inequality are more likely to have substantial redistribution policies. Of course, if redistribution leads to less inequality over time this result is not surprising. Iversen and Soskice (2006) show that institutional structures have a strong effect on the redistributive programs of government irrespective of the relative proportions of socio-economic classes. By analyzing the demographic makeup of communities when monopolists first take control of cities, I endogenize this relationship. Monopolists structure government to prevent or promote redistribution, which may lead to differences in inequality over time.

²⁵ A number of scholars have found that southwestern and reform dominated cities lacked the large number of foreign-born immigrants and the identifiable working class present in machine cities. See for example Knoke (1982); Briges and Kronick (1999); and Gordon (1968)

²⁶ see Miller 1982 for a similar argument focusing on political machines.

²⁷ Scholars have offered both theoretical (Groseclose and Snyder 1996; Frohlich 1975) and empirical (Hinckley 1972) evidence in opposition to Riker’s theory by primarily focusing on the federal level. These works tend to evaluate situations in which the building of coalitions is a repeated game and thus argue that maintaining oversized coalitions is less costly in the long run. If competition ceases to have a meaningful effect on the behavior of politicians, the incentive to reduce the size of the coalition may remain. Further, since the constraints on budgeting are heavier at the local level, it is unclear whether or not these models would predict similar oversized coalitions in cities.

²⁸ For a formal derivation of these predictions, see Ginkel and Smith 1999.

²⁹ Carlos and Kruse (1996) make a similar argument regarding economic monopolies.

³⁰ It is also possible that voters may shift their preferences in such a way that the regime cannot or will not respond to their new demands. This is theoretically similar to the demographic shift – it just requires no new people to threaten the regime.

³¹ See chapter 3 for a description of the governing coalition elites in each case

³² City expenditures are the best proxy available for measuring transfers. Many, if not most, coalitions’ resource and transfer exchanges are not recorded transactions or at least not identifiable as such. Politicians do what they can to provide vague explanations of their actual machinations in office. In the case studies, I attempt to determine what

the demands of various sectors of the population and study the dominant coalition's responsiveness to these needs. I find that as security increases coalitions meet fewer demands. While the measure is rough, the results are robust.

³³ Adding a control for the type of election (primary, general, or primary with no run-off) did not change the conclusions.

³⁴ A number of scholars writing about Kansas City have suggested that the extent of electoral fraud was so great during the period of the machine's reign that it is difficult to draw any substantial conclusions about the level of turnout. For New Haven the dates of the collapse of the machine are difficult to determine. I have selected 1969 as the decline date; this is the year in which the city was redistricted and African Americans won seats on the council for the first time. According to my guidelines this represents the loss of a monopoly because the coalition in power lost both bias and control over the legislative branch. However, the city remained in the control of a weakened Democratic organization led by a very popular Italian mayor after this date. Turnout could have been suppressed because competition was low. Extending the bias period to 1989, when the city's first black mayor was elected, results in a different pattern – lower turnout during the bias period.

³⁵ Only final elections for citywide offices are included in this regression. Data on the number of eligible voters or registered voters in individual districts was not available. This does not eliminate any election year for any city, but does have the effect of removing council races for reform cities after the end of the bias period.

³⁶ Predicted values of turnout are 0.22 when bias period is set to zero and 0.16 when set to one; all other variables set at means. An interaction term for monopoly type and bias period is positive and significant suggesting that machines actually see a significant increase in turnout when a monopoly is in power. This effect is wholly due to the cases of New Haven and Kansas City, which have unique properties as explained above. When these cases are excluded the effect is negative and the coefficient is not significant. To compare the magnitude of the effect for machine versus reform cities more clearly I split the sample by regime type. The effect of the bias period is slightly larger (though not significantly so) for reform cities. This is an interesting side note on the effect of different biasing strategies and structures of dominance. Machines had weaker mechanisms for biasing the system and a hierarchical party structure that translated into a broader coalition and higher turnout than reformers enjoyed.

³⁷ Predicted values are 0.21 when bias period is set to zero and 0.17 when set to one; all other variables set at means.

³⁸ See Chapter 3 for more detail on the coding of these neighborhoods.

³⁹ The number of cases reduces due to missing data.

⁴⁰ These data were collected and generously provided by Robert Lineberry.

⁴¹ Though Dawson died in 1970, his wards should still have been important to the machine base in the 1971 election.

⁴² All statistics are predicted values of the untransformed dependent variable. The variable of interest is set at minimum and maximum values. All other variables are set at their means, except Dawson's wards are set at zero.

⁴³ No standardized data are available earlier than 1940. See the data appendix for a complete discussion of the collection.

⁴⁴ For a similar argument about patronage at the state level see Moynihan and Wilson (1964)

⁴⁵ The category of education was not included because it is hard to know what to expect in patterns of education spending. In the South and West, education is not handled by city government during the analyzed period. Additionally, education may be seen as a service to homeowners or to working class residents who cannot afford private school. See Pinderhughes (1987) for a description of the difficulty in analyzing education policies in Chicago.

⁴⁶ I also reproduced this analysis using a factor analysis of margin of victory and incumbent success rate as an alternative definition of dominance. The patterns are identical though less significant in some cases due in part to a large reduction in observations (election data is only available for nine cities). Additionally, I tested a number of different methods to deal with the problem that the dependent variable is a proportion bounded by zero and one. For instance, I tested a logit transformation and running tobit analysis. The alternatives produce nearly identical outcomes, but each has problems. The logit transformation eliminates meaningful zeroes, and the tobit analysis made handling autocorrelation and panel dependence much more complicated. For ease of interpretation, the OLS regressions are presented.

⁴⁷ Because the census did not ask about Latino identity until the 1970s this measure likely excludes Latinos from the figure, an important consideration that might weaken the conclusions for the Western and Southwestern cities in the analysis. However, changes in the size of the Latino population are highly correlated with changes in the size of the total population and changes in the size of the low-income population, which is included here as the proportion of renters.

⁴⁸ I also tested the analysis using year-fixed effects. The results are similar in all cases.

⁴⁹ In the case of San Antonio, the city is coded as a machine city 1900-1939 and as a reform city 1940-1986.

⁵⁰ The average direct expenditure for reform cities in 1982 dollars is 154,647,700, and predicted values for the percent spent on sanitation are 9.4% when the reform bias is set at 0 and 15.5% when it is set at 1. For machine cities (without New York) the average direct general expenditure for the time period is 393,609,000, and predicted values for the percent spent on police and fire are 19.8% when machine bias is set at 0 and 23.3% when it is set at 1.

⁵¹ Results are from a regression of direct general expenditure per capita in 1982 dollars on the monopoly period and including all controls listed above.

⁵² This point is analogous to the price setting power of a monopoly firm. While monopolists have power over price or output they remain constrained by the market demand curve.

⁵³ See Erie (1988) for aldermanic figures and the 1970 United States census for city population figures.

⁵⁴ Results are from an OLS regression using the same method and controls as in the spending analyses above.

⁵⁵ Hise (1997) makes a similar argument about the development of Los Angeles. He finds that what most observers had viewed as unintended suburban sprawl was actually planned development meant to promote home-owning opportunities.

⁵⁶ Davidson went on to explain that he did not want this job, so he “started backin’-off”

⁵⁷ Analysis uses all controls discussed above.

⁵⁸ The project was completed in 2006 (Santa Clara Valley Water District, Lower Silver Creek Flood Protection Project, handout. Accessed on-line, September 12, 2006 www.valleywater.org/media/pdf/watershed_monthly_progress_report_pdf/11-03%20-%20Silver3.271Handout.pdf).

⁵⁹ This is not something that the study points out. I drew this conclusion by analyzing the top ten concepts preferred by each set of respondents. The list was exactly the same for both groups except for one concept. Anglo respondents chose the concept “a community involved in recycling, taking care of the land, not wasting things, living close together in a natural ‘non-plastic’ way” among their top ten while Mexican Americans selected “a suburb or subdivision with convenient access to highways, its own bus service to the city, specifically designed for people with children” instead.