Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven Turnout in City Politics

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There is a widespread concern that imbalances in voter turnout across race and class have led to biased outcomes in American democracy. Yet empirical tests have generally found that the unrepresentative nature of the electorate has little effect on who wins and loses elections. We challenge this finding by arguing that existing research minimizes the chances of finding bias because it focuses largely on national elections where turnout is relatively high and where minority groups are generally too small a percentage of the population to sway elections. By focusing on city elections we find that lower turnout leads to substantial reductions in the representation of Latinos and Asian Americans on city councils and in the mayor’s office. For African Americans district elections and off-cycle local elections are more important barriers to representation.

At its core democracy rests on the vote. The vote is the primary tool for citizens to control their government. Through the vote citizens communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs and make important decisions about who to elect to office. Nevertheless, most Americans do not vote when given the opportunity. At best roughly half of eligible voters vote in national contests. At worst, fewer than 10% of adults vote in local elections (Bridges 1997; Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002). Even more importantly, those who do turn out to vote look very different from those who do not. Study after study of American elections has found that individuals with ample resources vote much more regularly than those with few resources—the poor, racial, and ethnic minorities and the less educated (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

The skewed nature of the vote raises real concerns about how well the interests of different groups are served in democracy. As Key noted decades ago, “The blunt truth is that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote” (1949, 99). The fear is that individuals and groups who do not participate in the voting process will be overlooked and their concerns ignored (Bennet and Resnick 1990; Martin 2003;
Piven and Cloward 1988). Policies will be biased, outcomes unfair, and in the end American democracy will represent the interests of the privileged few over the broader concerns of the masses (Mills 1956; Schattschneider 1970). And all of this may get worse as turnout declines.

But are these fears founded? Conventional wisdom suggests that they are. In almost any political campaign actors on all sides repeatedly cite turnout as one of the most critical factors in determining the outcome of the election. After any close contest, candidates and commentators are likely to agree that “turnout emerged as a decisive factor in [the] elections” (Bumiller and Nagourney 2002). The notion that the electorate will tilt to the left if the electorate expands has, in fact, been one of the core principles behind Democratic party efforts to make the vote more accessible and Republican efforts to oppose any such changes.

However universal this view may be among political practitioners, empirical evidence generally suggests that fears of a skewed electorate leading to biased outcomes are largely unfounded. Research on recent American elections has usually found that in the end turnout is not a problem for American democracy (but see Hill and Leighley 1992). First, empirical studies have tended to show that the preferences of nonvoters do not differ markedly from the preferences of voters (e.g., Bennett and Resnick 1990; Gant and Lyons 1993; Norrander 1989; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Even Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, who lament the distortion created by the unrepresentativeness of nonvoting forms of political participation, nevertheless conclude that “Voters are relatively representative of the public” (1995, 512). Indeed, according to Ellcessor and Leighley, “one of the least contested conclusions in the study of political behavior is that voters’ political attitudes and policy positions are fairly representative of nonvoters” (2001, 127). In other words, voters and nonvoters may look very different but they do not think all that differently.

More importantly, there is little evidence to suggest that increasing or decreasing turnout would change who wins and loses. Although some studies have found that increasing turnout might alter the margin of victory slightly in some contests, the findings are often highly variable and the effects are never large (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; DeNardo 1980; Erickson 1995; Nagel and McNulty 1996; Shields and Goidel 1997). There is even a prolonged debate over whether marginal benefits would accrue to Democrats or Republicans if turnout expanded (DeNardo 1980; Nagel and McNulty 1996; Petrocik 1987; Tucker and Vedlitz 1986). Most importantly, none of the elections examined would have ended with a different victor. “Simply put,” say Highton and Wolfinger, “outcomes would not change if everyone voted” (2001, 179). It follows that we need not be all that troubled by America’s low turnout and its skewed electorate.

1 Cross-national comparisons have, however, found that turnout can significantly affect the prospects of left-leaning or workers’ parties (Pacek and Radcliff 1995). It is also clear that at times in American history, the disenfranchisement of groups like African Americans has led to highly discriminatory policies (Handley and Grofman 1994; Parker 1990).
Why Turnout Might Still Matter

In this paper, we challenge this conclusion. We argue that the nonimpact of a skewed electorate stems in part from the narrow focus of the existing empirical research. Nearly every study that looks at the effect of voter turnout on electoral outcomes focuses on the national electorate in presidential and Congressional elections. This narrow focus reduces the possibility of finding bias for two reasons.

First, simple logic dictates that the possible extent of any skew produced by uneven turnout decreases as overall turnout levels increase. As detailed in Tingsten’s (1937) “law of dispersion,” the chances of skew are inversely proportional to overall electoral participation. If almost everybody turns out, there can be very little skew. If, however, only a small fraction of the population turns out, skew can be severe. Thus, if we are interested in revealing just how much turnout matters, we should not confine our research to national elections where turnout is relatively high. Bias could certainly exist at the national level where only about half of all eligible voters turn out but it could be that much worse at the local level where turnout averages half or less than half that of national elections (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002; Karnig and Walter 1983).

Second, by looking at the national electorate as a whole one ignores substantial variation in group size across geographic boundaries and almost necessarily diminishes the role that small minority groups can play. In national contests, only a few very large groups can have a significant effect on the outcome of the vote. Asian Americans, for example, are the third largest racial and ethnic minority group but they make up well under 4% of the total national population. Whether or not they vote is almost immaterial to the outcomes of national contests.

The same is not true for smaller geographic localities. Because people are distributed unevenly across geographic boundaries, groups that are small minorities and largely insignificant at the national level can be major players within many states, districts, or cities. This is especially true for race and ethnicity but segregation by income, education, and other measures of well-being also occurs. African Americans, for example, make up about a third of the population in New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago and almost two-thirds of the population in New Orleans, Atlanta, and Washington. In fact, segregation by race and ethnicity is the rule rather than the exception. Although the national population is only 12% African American, 12% Latino, and 4% Asian American, data from a recent nationwide survey (the American Citizen Participation Study) indicate that the average Latino lives in a city that is 39% Hispanic, the average African American in a city that is 35% black, and the average Asian American in a city that is 7% Asian American.

Exceptions are Nagel and McNulty’s (1996) research on gubernatorial elections; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Anderson’s (1995) study of turnout across states; and a number of accounts of local elections (e.g., Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Pinderhughes 1994; Wright 2000).
Thus, if we are concerned about the effects of a skew in the electorate we need to look not just at the national electorate as a whole but at a series of smaller political units where the effect of different groups could begin to weigh in. Only by examining each of these smaller units separately will we begin to get a second, perhaps more revealing look at the effects of uneven turnout on voting outcomes. Unfortunately, although there are strong reasons to suspect that turnout is critical at the local level, there is, to date, little empirical evidence addressing this question. Leighley (2001) and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) briefly report on participation rates for different racial, ethnic, and demographic groups in local elections but there appears to be no research that looks systematically across cities at the consequences of a skewed electorate at the local level. Thus the question of whether or not turnout matters remains largely unanswered.

In this paper we show that the narrow focus on national contests has produced misleading or at least incomplete conclusions about the consequences of an unrepresentative electorate. By shifting the focus of attention to local contests, we find that turnout matters. Changes in the percentage of voters who turn out can and do alter mayoral election outcomes and racial representation on city councils. For Latinos and Asian Americans, lower turnout results in less equitable racial and ethnic representation on city councils and less success in the mayor’s office. For African Americans, by contrast, reform of local electoral institutions appears to be the best tool for expanding political representation.

Data and Methods

To determine if turnout affects winners and losers, we focus on the two most prominent sets of offices at the local level: the mayoralty and the city council. In each case, we assess how uneven turnout across racial and ethnic groups affects winners and losers.

Although most past studies of uneven turnout have focused on how differences in turnout between Democrats and Republicans affect partisan outcomes (e.g., Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; DeNardo 1980; Tucker and Vedlitz 1986), we shift the focus to race and ethnicity because we believe that this is where the effects of any existing skew in turnout are most likely to be felt. First, turnout is skewed much more by race than by party. Democrats and Republicans turn out at roughly equal levels in both national and local politics, and thus we should not expect turnout to greatly alter the balance of power between the two parties at either the local or national levels (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). But race

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3 Studies that disaggregate electoral results by each individual Senate or House election at least partially address this problem. Black and Black (1987) and others also demonstrated how relatively large minority populations at the state level (e.g., 20–25%) can affect electoral outcomes if they turn out and vote cohesively.

4 Several urban scholars do, however, note the importance of group mobilization for political incorporation (Bridges 1997; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Dahl 1961; Erie 1988). This is especially true for accounts of the civil rights movement (Lee 2002; Parker 1990).
and ethnicity are an entirely different story. At the local level whites outvote Latinos and Asian Americans by almost two to one, and they surpass African American voting rates by significant margins (Leighley 2001; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Second, racial and ethnic segregation across municipal boundaries is probably more severe than segregation by any other demographic or political factor (Oliver 2001). Thus even small racial and ethnic minorities make up substantial segments of the population in many cities. For both of these reasons, there is at least a very real possibility that racial and ethnic minority voters and racial and ethnic minority candidates will be adversely affected by uneven turnout at the local level.

To assess the effects of uneven turnout by race and ethnicity on mayoral and city council elections, we utilize two very different data sets. First, in the case of mayoral elections, we run a series of simulations focusing on how uneven turnout affects outcomes in the most recent mayoral elections in the nation’s 10 largest cities. For each of these mayoral elections, we gauge the effects of uneven turnout by comparing the actual outcome with estimates of what would have happened if members of all racial and ethnic groups voted at the same rate.

To calculate the simulated vote for a candidate given equal turnout, we only need the racial and ethnic makeup of the voting age citizen population of each city and estimates of the voting preferences of each racial and ethnic group in each contest. The 1990 and 2000 Census provide data on the racial and ethnic make-up of each city (Census Bureau 2002a, 2002b). To get the voting preferences of each racial and ethnic group we rely primarily on exit polls which are available in most of the cities. For one city (San Diego), we run ecological inference (EI) using the actual vote by precinct and the racial/ethnic demographics of each precinct to acquire our estimates (see King 1997 for a description of the EI methodology). For the last three cities, (Philadelphia, Phoenix, and San Antonio), we were able to identify several precincts that contained residents who were predominantly of one race/ethnicity and derive estimates of the vote by race using the homogeneous precinct analysis method outlined by Loewen and Grofman (1989, 602–603). While we admit that this is an ad hoc mixture of data and methods, we believe that these are the best sources for our purposes. For all of

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5 Since the Census does not produce estimates of the citizen voting age population by race and ethnicity for each urban area, we substitute statewide estimates of the proportion of the adult population of each racial and ethnic group that is noncitizen.

6 This method involves a two stage process. In an example where we have only black and white voters in a city, we first get a preliminary estimate of the black vote by averaging the overall vote in all of the precincts that are predominantly black. We then do the same for the white vote. In the second stage, we use our preliminary estimate of the white vote and a measure of the size of the white population in each predominantly black precinct to estimate and subtract out the white vote in each predominantly black precinct. The remainder or leftover votes in all of the predominantly black precincts are added together and averaged to arrive at our final estimate of the black vote. The process is then repeated in predominantly white precincts. Technically, one can continue to reiterate, using each new estimate of the white/black vote to obtain slightly more accurate estimates of the black/white vote but in practice further iterations produced virtually no change in the estimates.
the simulated estimates other than those derived from homogeneous precinct analysis, we calculate confidence intervals around our simulated vote tallies so that we can determine whether changes in outcomes are statistically significant or not. It is also worth noting that in several of the cities, we simulated outcomes using more than one type of analysis (e.g., EI vs. Exit Polls vs. precinct analysis) and found that the results were nearly identical.

For each simulation, to calculate the simulated vote for a candidate given equal turnout, we multiply the proportion of a group that votes for the candidate in the actual election by that group’s proportion of the voting age citizen population. We then simply add up the numbers for each of the racial groups in the city to see what percentage of the total vote the candidate would have received given equal turnout. This calculation assumes that the voting preferences of each racial and ethnic group would not change if a larger (or smaller) proportion of each group actually turned out. There are three reasons why we believe that this is a reasonable assumption. First, we compared the policy preferences of local voters and local nonvoters using both the 1990 General Social Survey and the 1989 American Citizen Participation Study and found almost no substantial differences between the views of local voters and the views of local nonvoters within each racial group [analysis not shown]. Second, Hajnal and Baldassare (2001) found only small differences between the preferences of voters and unregistered residents of the same race on a range of measures in direct democracy.

In the second half of the paper, we attempt to determine what effect expanded turnout might have on racial and ethnic representation on city councils nationwide. Here we examine the link between aggregate voter turnout and racial and ethnic representation on city councils utilizing data from the 1986 International City/County Manager’s Association survey (ICMA) which was mailed to city clerks in every city in the United States with over 2,500 residents. Although there are more recent ICMA surveys, the 1986 survey is the only ICMA survey that asks specifically about local voter turnout. The 1986 ICMA survey reports figures for registration and turnout in the most recent city council election, the number of city council members who are white, African American, Latino, and Asian American, and the institutional and electoral structure of the city. We then merged data on various city level demographic measures from the 1990 Census with the ICMA data. Using the ICMA data and Census data, we can determine the relative effects of voter turnout, the institutional structure of a city, and city demographics on racial and ethnic minority representation on city councils.

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7 Ecological inference provides a measure of the uncertainty surrounding the estimate of the voting preferences for each racial/ethnic group. Similarly, we can incorporate uncertainty into the exit poll data using the sampling margin of error for each racial/ethnic group.

8 The ICMA survey has a response rate of 65.6%. The population of the cities who responded is fairly representative of the national urban population in terms of socioeconomic status and other demographic characteristics. Descriptive statistics for all independent and dependent variables for the city council regressions are available from the authors.
Outcomes in Individual Mayoral Elections: Simulating Equal Turnout

Does uneven turnout matter in local elections? In Table 1 we begin to answer this question by assessing the effects of uneven turnout across racial and ethnic groups in recent mayoral contests in the nation’s 10 largest cities. In each case, we look to see what would have happened if whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans had voted at the same rate. Would the winner have changed? Did any group lose out because they vote less regularly than white Americans? For each election we simulate equal turnout of the citizen voting age population. For each election we also indicate whether the winner would have changed under conditions of even turnout.

At the outset it is important to note that these 10 cases are not a random or representative set of cities. In particular, racial and ethnic minorities make up roughly twice as large a proportion of the population in these cities than they do in the national population. This means that the candidates and issues in these cities may be very different from the political choices offered to voters in other cities. It also means that uneven turnout across race/ethnicity may matter more here than in smaller or less urban cities. At the same time we think it is important to note that these are certainly not the only cities with large minority populations. In fact, the last census reported that non-Hispanic whites were less than half of the population in 61% of all cities across the United States with popula-

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Table 1: Actual vs Projected Outcomes in Mayoral Elections: Simulating Equal Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Actual Winner</th>
<th>Simulated Winner</th>
<th>Winner’s Actual Vote Share</th>
<th>Simulated Change in Winner’s Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Daley</td>
<td>Daley</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>Miller</td>
<td>Miller</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>−1.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>Kilpatrick</td>
<td>Kilpatrick</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>−.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>Sanchez</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>−5.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Hahn</td>
<td>Sanchez</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>−3.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>−3.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>Rimsza</td>
<td>Rimsza</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>Garza</td>
<td>Garza</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16.8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>Murphy</td>
<td>Roberts</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>−9.7*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* change in vote significant at $p < .05$, # no estimate of significance available.


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9 African Americans make up 25%, Latinos 31%, and Asian Americans 7% of the population in these cities.
tions over 100,000 (Census 2002a). Thus, there are many local arenas where blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans do form a large portion of the population and could potentially sway the outcome of the vote if they voted.

The simulations of mayoral elections in the 10 largest cities are telling. Table 1 indicates that three out of the 10 elections would have had different outcomes if all racial and ethnic groups had voted at the same rate. In Houston, Orlando Sanchez, a fiscally conservative Latino would have defeated Lee Brown, the incumbent African-American mayor, in their nonpartisan contest. In New York, Mark Green, an avowed progressive Democrat, would have won his contest over Michael Bloomberg, a moderate Republican, in a partisan contest involving two white candidates. Finally, in San Diego, Ron Roberts, a moderate conservative, would have beaten Dick Murphy, a clear conservative, in a nonpartisan contest also involving two white candidates.

Turnout also mattered in terms of vote share. Moving to equal turnout would have altered the winner’s share of the vote by an average of 4.3% (either up or down). Since the losing candidate gained by almost exactly the same amount in these predominantly two candidate contests, uneven turnout led to almost a 7-point swing in the vote in the average election in these cities. In some cases such as San Antonio, the simulated vote change far surpassed that figure. Ed Garza’s margin of victory over Tim Bannwolf, a more conservative white candidate, would have increased by 30 percentage points had turnout been even.

At the same time, it is clear that turnout did not always have an important effect. In a little less than half of the cases simulating equal turnout had a marginal effect on the outcome of the contest. For example, by our calculations Kwame Kilpatrick’s 8-point margin of victory over fellow African American Gill Hill in Detroit would have been reduced by only 1.2 percentage points given equal turnout of the citizen voting age population. Nevertheless, in almost all of the cases, simulating equal turnout produced statistically significant changes in the vote outcome.

A lot of election-specific factors likely helped to determine how much turnout mattered in each case. The nature of the candidates, the number of candidates, the issues being addressed, and recent electoral history all likely helped to shape the vote in these cities, but a brief examination of the ten elections suggests that the biggest factor determining how much turnout mattered was the size of the Latino population. The predicted change in the vote was four times greater in cities with larger than average Latino populations than in other cities. In terms of whether or not the winner changed in the simulations, one other obviously important factor was the original margin of victory. Election timing, whether the city has a strong mayor or council manager form of government, and whether

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10 A reversal also required at least some division in candidate preferences by race/ethnicity. In general, there were fairly substantially racial divides. The white vote for the winner differed from the black vote by 39 percentage points on average. The figures for the black-Latino and white-Latino divides are 36 and 20 points, respectively.
or not elections were partisan had no clear effect on how much turnout mattered (data on institutional structure are available from the authors).

When turnout did matter, Latinos gained the most. First, in all three cities where a different mayor would have been elected, the majority of Latino voters opposed the original winner and supported the new winner. Second, across all of the cities, all but one of candidates backed by a majority of Latino voters would have increased their vote share. On average the gain would have been 4.9 percentage points. By contrast, even turnout would have done little to help white, African-American, and or Asian-American voters.

And it is not just Latino voters who would have gained. Latino candidates fared well in the simulations. The three Latino candidates running in these ten elections, Sanchez, Villaraigosa, and Garza, would have garnered, on average, an additional 7.8% of the vote had turnout not been skewed by race. By contrast, the five black candidates and the 13 white candidates came out roughly even after the simulations. In short, existing voter turnout patterns significantly affect the chances of Latino voters to influence outcomes and the chances of Latino candidates to get elected. Because a limited number of Latino adults vote, Latinos are less regularly able to translate their preferences into electoral victories.

Given the exceptionally low turnout of Asian Americans, one might expect that they would gain at least as much by simulating equal turnout. This does not occur because Asian Americans make up a smaller share of the population than Latinos (7% vs. 31% of the population of these cities), because there are no Asian-American candidates in these contests, and because Asian Americans tend not to vote as a bloc in these elections. The favored Asian-American candidate garnered an average of only 56% of the Asian-American vote. By contrast, 70% of Latino voters, 74% of African-American voters, and 66% of white voters ended up voting with their group’s majority-preferred candidate across the ten cities. Thus, even turnout helped Latinos more than Asian Americans in this particular set of elections because only Latinos were populous enough and united enough to make increased turnout effective.

To try to see if the effects of turnout occur more broadly, we expanded the data set to include all primary and general elections over the past 10 years in the nation’s largest 20 cities. Unfortunately, only about half of these contests have sufficient data to obtain reliable estimates of the vote by race/ethnicity. Since there is a concern that results from this larger data set might not be representative, we focus primarily on the smaller data set of ten cities and only briefly note some of the results from this larger data set. Details on the specifics of each contest in this larger data set and the outcomes of the simulations are available from the authors.

The main conclusion from this larger data set is that turnout is equally important for this broader set of elections. In particular, had turnout of the population been even, the average change in the winner’s vote share would have been 4.3%—almost exactly what we found in the most recent elections in the ten largest cities.
In addition, roughly 15% of the elections (seven of 45) would have had a different winner. In short, turnout matters in more than a handful of cases.

Ultimately, we cannot know how the world of local mayoral elections will change if there are dramatic changes in the turnout of particular racial and ethnic groups. One would expect that potential candidates and future election campaigns would respond in important ways to a growing minority vote that would in turn affect the kinds of options available to each group. Certainly more research across a larger number and wider array of cities needs to be done before we have a good estimate of the magnitude of the problem nationwide. Nevertheless, it seems clear that if minorities and Latinos in particular were substantially more active in the local political arena, outcomes would more closely mirror their preferences.

### Minority Representation on City Councils

To help ensure that the effects that we see in mayoral elections are not an anomaly, we look more broadly and systematically at minority representation on city councils across the spectrum of American cities. Since it would be nearly impossible to acquire racial and ethnic candidate preferences or even voter turnout rates by race for all of the nation’s cities, we instead examine the link between aggregate voter turnout and racial and ethnic representation. The logic here is fairly straightforward. As turnout declines across cities, we expect that racial and ethnic minorities are less likely to vote and less likely to get their candidates elected. This is akin to arguing that turnout will be more skewed as turnout declines, a relationship that Hill and Leighley (1992) have demonstrated at the state level.

Table 2 presents the basic results of this city-level analysis. The table reports the results of four separate OLS regressions with the proportion of city councils that are white, African American, Latino, and Asian American respectively as the dependent variables. The key independent variable is the percent of registered voters that turned out in the city’s most recent election. Since a long line of research has shown that minority representation is also related to the institutional structure of local elections, we control for five potentially relevant features of local government: (1) at-large vs. district elections, (2) nonpartisan vs. partisan elections, (3) the presence of term limits, and (4) the size of the city council (Alozie 1992; Engstrom and McDonald 1982; Grofman and Davidson 1994; Welch 1990). We also include measures of educational attainment (percent college graduates), income (median household income), and region, because willingness to vote for minority candidates has at times been linked to socioeconomic

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11 The other reversals are Los Angeles (1993 run-off), Houston (1997 primary), and San Francisco (1991 general election, 1991 runoff).

12 Several cities had some combination of at-large and single-member districts. Alternate tests indicate that these mixed systems were no more or less likely to produce minority representation than district or at-large cities.
status and education as well as region (Handley and Grofman 1994; Sears and Kinder 1971; Williams 1990). Finally, we include controls for the racial and ethnic makeup of the population and the percentage of noncitizens in each city. Like previous research on minority representation, we restrict our analysis to cities where the group being assessed makes up at least 5% of the city population and thus has at least a nominal chance of winning a seat on the council.

The results of the analysis are clear. As can be seen in the first row of Table 2, higher turnout in local elections leads to significantly greater numbers of Latinos and Asian Americans on city councils. For whites, higher turnout appears to reduce representation on city councils, although the relationship is not quite statistically significant. For African Americans, on the other hand, there is no clear relationship between aggregate turnout and council representation. In other words, the more people who vote, the better Latinos and Asian Americans fare and the worse off whites are. And as we will see shortly, these effects can be substantial.

The pattern in Table 2 fits well with what we might have expected had we simply compared the turnout rates of different racial and ethnic groups. Since African Americans vote at rates just below whites, one would not expect them to

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Asian Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>-.04 (.02)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-.00 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Elections</td>
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<td>-.03 (.01)*</td>
<td>.05 (.02)*</td>
<td>.05 (.02)*</td>
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<td>Concurrent Elections</td>
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<td>-.03 (.01)*</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-.02 (.02)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
<td>-.00 (.02)</td>
<td>-.04 (.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor (vs city Manager)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.02 (.01)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Size</td>
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<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
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<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>-.00 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Poor</td>
<td>-.33 (.08)*</td>
<td>.38 (.12)*</td>
<td>.16 (.12)</td>
<td>-.01 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
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<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent College Grads</td>
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<td>.15 (.08)</td>
<td>.22 (.07)*</td>
<td>.05 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Latino</td>
<td>-.78 (.06)*</td>
<td>.31 (.09)*</td>
<td>.79 (.05)*</td>
<td>.20 (.08)*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Percent Asian</td>
<td>-.54 (.10)*</td>
<td>.10 (.15)</td>
<td>.06 (.08)</td>
<td>.60 (.06)*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Percent Black</td>
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<td>.58 (.04)*</td>
<td>-.02 (.04)</td>
<td>.13 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Non-citizen</td>
<td>.81 (.10)*</td>
<td>-.37 (.15)*</td>
<td>-.58 (.08)*</td>
<td>-.39 (.11)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.02 (.01)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
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<td>-.00 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.29</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.40</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>1,695</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>223</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


*p < .05.
substantially lose or gain from an increase or decrease in turnout. Instead, the two
groups likely to gain the most from expanded turnout are the two groups that nor-
mally vote the least—Latinos and Asian Americans.

Why do Asian Americans gain here and not in our earlier analysis of mayoral
elections? The big difference between the two data sets is that the current analy-
sis focuses directly on the success rates of Asian-American candidates, while the
ten mayoral elections included no Asian-American candidates. If Asian-Ameri-
can voters are much less divided when they have a chance to elect an Asian-
American candidate, then Asian-American turnout should matter more when
Asian-American candidates are present.\textsuperscript{13}

Table 2 also shows that changes in local institutional structures, an oft-cited
alternative avenue to expanding minority representation, would only help one of
the three minority groups: African Americans. Specifically, the coefficients in
Table 2 indicate that moving from at-large to district elections and changing the
dates of local elections to coincide with the dates of national elections would
increase the proportion of blacks on city councils by a little over 6%, all else
equal.\textsuperscript{14} Given that most cities still retain at-large elections and off-cycle elec-
tions, these two institutional changes could greatly influence black representation
nationwide. None of the other proposed institutional solutions such as term limits,
partisan elections, or the mayor-council form of government is significantly
related to African-American city council representation.

For Latinos and Asian Americans, these institutional changes seem to offer
much less hope in addressing inequalities in electoral outcomes.\textsuperscript{15} The absence
of a clear link between institutional structures and Latino and Asian-American
representation fits well with recent studies which have found little connection
between local institutional structure and Asian-American and Latino representa-
tion (Alozie 1992; Bullock and MacManus 1990). We suspect that lower levels
of segregation and less racially polarized voting are two of the primary reasons
why these institutions matter less for Latinos and Asian Americans than for
African Americans.

One other important finding that emerges from Table 2 concerns the role of
citizenship.\textsuperscript{16} Across all four models, increases in the size of the noncitizen com-

\textsuperscript{13} For example, Michael Woo would, by our simulations, have won his contest over Richard Riordan
had turnout been even across race and ethnicity in their contest in Los Angeles in 1993.

\textsuperscript{14} This simulation and others in the rest of the paper were calculated using Clarify holding all other
independent variables at their mean or modal value.

\textsuperscript{15} Several of these institutional levers have at least an indirect effect on racial/ethnic representation
on city councils. If registered voter turnout is substituted as the dependent variable, all of these insti-
tutions (except term limits) do affect voter turnout indicating that they may help minorities by offer-
ing an avenue to expand turnout (see also Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002 for an account of how local
institutions affect turnout).

\textsuperscript{16} Another interesting point regarding Table 2 concerns the degree to which different minority
groups appear to cooperate with each other in local elections (see also McClain and Tauber 1998).
The results in Table 2 indicate that black and Asian-American representation tends to increase as the
size of the Hispanic population increases. This could indicate that African Americans and Asian Ameri-
community are associated with the decreased representation of racial/ethnic minorities and increased representation of whites. In short, citizenship is an important barrier that affects representation at the local level.

To help ensure that these results do in fact measure the underlying relationship between turnout and representation, we undertook a series of additional tests (analysis available from the authors). First, we reran the analysis using turnout of the eligible population rather than turnout of registered voters. All of the significant relationships remained intact. Second, we included all cities in the analysis rather than just cities where the target racial/ethnic group was over 5% of the population. This reduced the magnitude of the effects in most cases but the overall conclusions were the same. Increased turnout substantially increased Latino and Asian-American representation and reform of electoral institutions significantly increased black representation.

**Equity in Representation**

To better gauge the substantive effects of turnout on racial/ethnic representation on city councils Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between turnout and proportional representation on city councils for each of the four racial/ethnic groups. To create Figure 1 we reran the analysis in Table 2 substituting a measure of the over/underrepresentation of each group (the percentage of a given racial/ethnic group on the council minus the percentage of that racial/ethnic group in the city’s voting age population) as the dependent variable and then calculated predicted representation rates at a given turnout level for each group. The regression results, which essentially repeat Table 2, are available from the authors. For comparison purposes each of the four graphs has a dotted line indicating the mean level of over/underrepresentation for each racial/ethnic group and a dashed line indicating parity or equity in representation.

Before turning to Figure 1 it is worth noting that nonwhites are greatly underrepresented on city councils nationwide. Latinos are the most underrepresented of any group. In cities where they represent 5% or more of the population, Latino representation averages 13% below parity. Thus, for example, if Latinos were 30% of the city population, one might expect Latinos to hold 17% of the city council seats. Asian Americans average 9 points below parity and African-American council representation averages 8 points below parity. Also, for Latinos and Asian Americans, underrepresentation greatly increases as the size of each group grows. In cities where they represent at least a quarter of the population, Latinos are 25 points below parity and Asian Americans are 22 points below parity.

The question then becomes: Can increased turnout substantially reduce minority underrepresentation? As can be seen in the figure, the answer is a qualified
Increased turnout does not bring Latinos, Asian Americans, or African Americans to equity in representation on city councils, but for Latinos and Asian Americans it has the potential to reduce underrepresentation considerably. For Latinos, moving from a city where 10% of registered voters turn out (the 10th percentile in terms of turnout) to a city where 69% of registered voters turn out (the 90th percentile) would decrease Latino underrepresentation on city councils by 3.2 percentage points, roughly eliminating one quarter of the 13-point underrepresentation of Latinos.\textsuperscript{17} A similar increase in turnout could reduce Asian-American underrepresentation by 2.8 percentage points, roughly accounting for a third.

\textsuperscript{17}It is not unreasonable to expect large changes in turnout at the city level. Existing research suggests that simply changing the timing of local elections to coincide with national elections increases registered voter turnout by 36 percentage points (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002).
of the 9-point average underrepresentation of Asian Americans in these cities. Likewise for whites, a similarly large increase in turnout would eliminate roughly a quarter of white overrepresentation on city councils. In short, we seek to expand minority descriptive representation.\footnote{Descriptive representation and proportional representation obviously have both merits and shortcomings that are discussed in some detail in Guinier (1992), Thernstrom (1987), and Tate (2003). Judging by minority voting preferences in our mayoral contests and other past research, minority voters generally prefer minority candidates (Hajnal n.d.; Hero and Beatty 1989; McCrary 1990).}

At the same time, Figure 1 tells us that turnout can rectify only part of the problem of minority underrepresentation. Clearly, there are other barriers to minority representation like citizenship, local electoral institutions, the costs of running a campaign, finding candidates with the requisite political experience, and internal group divisions that also need to be considered.

To test the robustness of these findings, we reran the analysis using two different measures of representational equity. In one sets of tests, rather than look at small changes in representation, we calculated and used as the dependent variable the number of council seats that a given group was below racial parity. Given that it is impossible to win a proportion of a council seat, simply counting up the number of additional council seats that a group should have to achieve proportion representation in some ways more meaningfully captures the nature of electoral competition in cities. In another set of tests we reran the analysis with a logged representation ratio measure developed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995; see pages 571–77 for a description and explication of the measure). Although the logged representation ratio is harder to interpret, it has the advantage of being unaffected by the size of the group. Both alternate dependent variables led to similar conclusions about the effect of turnout on equity in council representation (analysis available from the authors).

\textbf{The Contingent Effects of Turnout}

One of the main goals of this research has been to show that the effects of turnout are more pronounced at the local level than they are at the national level. But this is, in many ways, only part of the story. There are also different contexts at the local level in which we would expect turnout to matter more than in other contexts. Obviously, one of the biggest determinants of how much turnout matters for any given group is how large that group is.\footnote{A second set of factors that could mediate the effects of turnout are the electoral institutions of a city (Trounstine 2004). To see if institutions mediated the effects of turnout, we repeated the analysis in Table 2 adding interaction terms for turnout and each of the electoral institutions (district vs. at-large elections, term limits, partisan vs. nonpartisan elections, concurrent vs. nonconcurrent election timing, and mayor-council vs. city manager form of government). The results indicate that turnout effects are not significantly contingent on the type of electoral system (analysis not shown).} Put very simply, one would expect increases (or decreases) in turnout to affect minority representation more in cities where the minority in question makes up a larger share of the population. If Asian Americans, for example, make up only a tiny fraction of the population in a given city, it doesn’t really matter whether they turn out at a rate of 100% or 10%. Thus,
in Table 3, we attempted to determine how the effects of turnout on representation vary by the size of the minority population. To do so we repeated the analysis in Table 2 adding interaction terms for turnout and the size of the relevant minority population.

The results are clear. For all groups except African Americans the interaction terms are positive and significant indicating that the effects of turnout on representation increase significantly as the group’s proportion of the population of a city increases. In short, expanded turnout matters much more to Asian Americans, Latinos, and whites when they are large enough to substantially affect the outcome of the vote.

**Conclusion**

Our analysis of electoral outcomes in the local political arena has two important conclusions. First, in contrast to much of the recent research on the elec-

**TABLE 3**

**Turnout Matters More When Groups Are Larger**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Asians</th>
</tr>
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<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-.01 (.00)*</td>
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<td>-.04 (.07)</td>
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<td>% latino*turnout</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.29 (.07)*</td>
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<td>% asian*turnout</td>
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<td>—</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.50 (.05)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Non-citizen</td>
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<td>-.51 (.04)*</td>
<td>-.39 (.11)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Midwest</td>
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<td>.02 (.01)*</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
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<td>Adj. R2</td>
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torate in national elections, we find that turnout does matter. The less regular voting participation of groups like Latinos and Asian Americans leads to their systematic underrepresentation on local governing bodies. Because turnout is that much lower, and because Latinos and Asian Americans represent large shares of the population in many local contests, turnout regularly affects who wins and loses. Second, in line with past studies we find that local institutions matter for African-American representation. Moving from at-large to district elections and moving the dates of local elections to coincide with national contests could substantially reduce black underrepresentation at the local level.

The minority candidates and minority voters regularly fail to win because turnout has important implications for democracy. Given that past studies have shown that minority representation has consequences not only for improving racial and ethnic relations but also for the distribution of public goods in cities, there is a real possibility that minorities are losing out due to low voter turnout (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Eisinger 1983; Hajnal 2001). In an era of policy devolution, as more and more policies are both initiated and implemented at the local level and as the problems of many urban areas become more acute, the decisions that local voters make are taking on growing importance (Sellers 2001). While presidential and Congressional elections get much of our attention, they are only one element of American democracy. The vast majority of elected officials emerge from local contests and more votes are cast in the multitude of local elections than in national contests. In short, it matters who wins and who loses in a political arena that touches regularly on the lives of residents.

Furthermore, we have probably exposed only a small fraction of the problem. Voting is the least skewed aspect of formal political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). More severe imbalances in participation for other political acts such as campaign contributions or letter writing probably lead to even greater inequalities in political representation. It is also possible that the most important decisions city leaders make occur outside the realm of electoral politics and thus may be outside of the grasp of racial and ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups no matter how actively they mobilize (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Gaventa 1980).

There is also the possibility that things will get worse before they get better. As Latinos and Asian Americans become ever larger portions of the urban electorate their potential influence will increase but so will the odds that they regularly lose out due to lower turnout. Latino and Asian American nonvoting may be only symbolically important in places where Latinos and Asian Americans make up a tiny fraction of the electorate but it is likely to be critical to the outcomes of elections and the distribution of public goods as these two groups begin to make up larger shares of the electorate.

Lastly, the results suggest that we may want to reexamine the effects of turnout beyond local politics. Minority turnout is not going to matter in all states, Congressional districts, or state legislative districts, but for the many states and dis-
tricts where minorities make up a sizeable proportion of the electorate, whether minorities turn out or not could have wide-ranging effects.

Unfortunately, identifying the problem is likely to be easier than solving the problem. Advocates of a streamlined citizenship process, funds to contact and mobilize racial and ethnic minorities, changes in the institutional structure of cities, proportional representation, cumulative voting, universal registration, and a host of other proposed solutions all believe that their proposed policies will help to address declining and uneven turnout (Guinier 1992; Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000). But just how much each of these proposed solutions could ultimately rectify the underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged demographic groups remains to be determined. Given the critical role that turnout plays in local elections, this is clearly an important area for future research.

Regardless of the outcome of future research, one of the clearest implications of our current research is that it is important not to limit the study of voter turnout to national elections. Given sharp contrasts between the implications of uneven voter participation at the city level and uneven voter participation at the national level, broad conclusions about the merits or shortcomings of American democracy based exclusively on assessments of national politics are likely to be misleading.

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