Research for this paper was funded by a grant from the Research Grants Committee at the University of Alabama and research funds from the University of Texas.

International criminal tribunals cannot capture their own suspects, and states are often hesitant to put forth effort to capture suspects on their territory. However, many suspects have appeared before international courts, sometimes after capture but also after surrender, and in some cases states have worked hard to capture them in order to reap political rewards promised by interested third parties. How does the combination of domestic politics and potential international rewards affect this basic problem of capture? Drawing insight from interviews conducted at international criminal tribunals in the Hague, we present a game-theoretic model of the interactions between a suspect, the state in which he resides, and an interested state or international institution and derive predictions over when and how suspects are likely to surrender or be captured. We then test these implications against a newly collected dataset of all individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, January 12-14, 2012. To be presented at the 2014 Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, March 26-29, 2014.

Warrant Enforcement and the Efficacy of International Criminal Courts

with Scott Wolford,

University of Texas

photo: ICTY suspect Ratko Mladic in custody in Belgrade. Source: Time Magazine,29307,2074376_2278694,00.html