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Reply

## Properly pragmatic: A response to Corns and Campbell <sup>☆</sup>

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I want to express my gratitude to the two commentators on this paper, Jennifer Corns and John Campbell, who both seem to take time with the arguments that I present, giving fair renditions of them at the start of their commentaries that reveal careful consideration. I take it that they both found fault with the central two claims of the paper: (1) pragmatic evidence is required to question inductive moves from tested to untested tokens in the special sciences and (2) we don't have pragmatic evidence against the Necessity Position. Concerning the first, Corns asks me to elaborate on the division between logical and pragmatic evidence, finding the definitions I give insufficient, whereas Campbell gives reason to suspect the necessity of pragmatic evidence in certain cases. Concerning the second, Corns suggests that, depending on my answer to the first, I may have left out pragmatic evidence offered by Mole and Block, whereas Campbell offers his own pragmatic evidence. I will start by elaborating and defending the first claim and then address the specific evidence raised by Campbell against the second.

As to elaborating the first claim, that pragmatic evidence is required to question inductive moves from tested to untested tokens in the special sciences, I say in the paper that pragmatic evidence is "positive [conceptual or empirical] evidence that distinguishes the untested from the tested tokens" and that is "relevant to the extension of the property in question." I take it that my understanding of what counts as positive evidence will be similar to that of most people: universal or near universal introspective findings, empirical findings, or coherence with other relatively established findings. Whereas I doubt Mole's assertion and quick survey of commonsense intuition fits into the category of positive evidence by almost anyone's standards, I think the problem with Block's evidence, although positive, is that it could support either of the two positions at stake. Thus, I should add to the above that the use of pragmatic evidence against such an inductive move will only work if that evidence uniquely favors the parsimonious position over the induction. To restate my position in the paper, I am claiming only that the available evidence *collapses* to logical parsimony (not that it is intended as logical parsimony) and that what is left after the collapse is not enough to cast doubt on the Necessity Position.

Moving to Campbell's emerald examples, Campbell asserts that two candidate conditions of observation for emeralds (illumination and having-been-observed) are obviously not properties of emeralds and so one can reject the extension of those properties to all emeralds without pragmatic evidence. Specifically,

One doesn't need to establish positively that there are emeralds in darkness in order to be skeptical about the first inductive argument above. And one doesn't need to establish positively that there are emeralds that have not been observed in order to be skeptical about the second inductive argument above.

I agree that one need not "positively establish" that there are unobserved emeralds to question the induction, but not that one need not have pragmatic evidence to question the induction. My stance on this is consistent, I think, because I do not hold that pragmatic evidence is limited to direct evidence of untested tokens that lack the property in question (as discussed briefly above). Furthermore, reason to think that pragmatic evidence is required to question these inductions is that pragmatic evidence can make even these far-fetched inductions safe from criticism: if emeralds were like quantum particle-states the assumption that illumination is merely a condition of observation would no longer be safe, and if we were additionally in a grue/bleen-type world (where all emeralds change to sapphires, say, after a particular date) the assumption that

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having-been-observed is not intrinsic to emeralds would no longer be safe. Thus, in questioning Campbell's emerald inductions we are relying on assumptions about what we take to be natural law, ultimately basing our criticisms on pragmatic evidence.

On Campbell's audiophile example: Campbell finds that the ability to reasonably argue as to whether a phenomenon is due to experience or to the conditions of observation for experience (evinced in the audiophile case) together with evidence that attention provides for the latter should convince us that there is conscious experience free from attention. However, the fact that we can attribute a phenomenon as largely due to experience, on the one hand, or to the conditions of observation for experience, on the other, does not mean that these are fully separable or that they are different in kind. These levels of experience may be ends of a common spectrum, where the conditions of observation are always mixed in with experience and where attentional processing provides for the entire spectrum in providing for the conditions of observation inherent in each experience. Furthermore, once we understand the two levels of experience as different in kind it becomes difficult to understand how the level that is inherently unobservable (or inaccessible) can be detected at all, which is brought out in the discussion on Block's work.

Finally, Campbell suggests that we may already have evidence that the Sperling subjects experience all twelve letters distinctly, and this evidence is provided by the fact that they can identify any four cued letters with accuracy similar to that of any four they choose. Against this reading, the subjects may merely have unconscious information on all twelve letters for some brief period of time (what Sperling calls "iconic memory") and be able to retrieve any four letters until that memory fades, but nonetheless not be conscious of four particular letters prior to that retrieval, but only the gist, say, of twelve indistinct letters.