

Online Appendix for “Constrained Concessions: Dictatorial Responses to the Domestic Opposition”

Original Empirical Results

My theory yielded several hypotheses. First, I hypothesized that dictators would be unlikely to respond to potential opposition beneficently, that they would respond to party (as compared to potential and legislative) opposition with higher rights concessions, and that they would respond to legislative (as compared to potential and party) opposition with higher material concessions. I also predicted that dictators facing party opposition would increase rights concessions as inflation increases and that dictators facing legislative opposition would decrease their provision of material concessions in the face of increasing inflation.

Table 1 below presents my originally reported empirical results using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression model (p. 21 of the original manuscript). Potential opposition is the base category. I include these results here for easy comparison to the robustness checks described below.

Table 1 here.

Dropping Independent Variables

Some of my independent variables (i.e., *Mineral Resources*, *Civilian*, *Military*) are determinants of institutionalization (Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008). Table 2 shows that my main results do not change when I drop *Mineral Resources*, *Civilian*, and *Military* from my empirical model. The sign and the statistical significance of each of my main independent variables remains the same when I drop the potentially endogenous control variables. *Legislative Opposition* is positive and significant in the material concessions model, whereas *Party Opposition* is insignificant. Like the results in Table 1, dictators respond to both legislative and party opposition with significant increases in empowerment rights (as compared to potential opposition) when inflation is held constant at zero. Importantly, however, the coefficient on *Party Opposition* is significantly larger in magnitude. The interaction terms are all signed in the correct direction as well, indicating that 1) the positive effect of legislative opposition on material concessions decreases as inflation increases, and 2) the positive effect of party opposition on rights concessions increases over the range of inflation. These results are nearly identical to those presented in the original manuscript prior to dropping *Mineral Resources*, *Civilian*, and *Military* from the model.

Table 2 here.

Demographic Concerns

On average, younger populations may be more likely to require more calories than older populations. As a result, I have rerun the model presented in Table 1 above, including controls for the age distribution in a country. Although the inclusion of country fixed effects would also alleviate the concern that younger populations require more calories than older populations, I do not include them here because several of my other independent variables have limited temporal variation. Table 3 below includes two additional covariates to account for this possibility: *% Population (Age 0 to 14)* and *% Population (Age 15 to 64)*. Neither young nor older populations receive significantly different material concessions (i.e., amount of food per capita) in my empirical model. More importantly for my own purposes, however, the results on each of my main independent variables remain the same with the inclusion of controls variables to account for demographic concerns.

Table 3 here.

Alternative Measures of Financial Constraint

Models using two alternative measures of financial constraint are presented below in Tables 5 and 4. Following Vreeland (2003), Referee 1 suggested using a more innovative measure of financial constraint: the implementation of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs. The argument here is that IMF programs, like inflation, constrains a government's ability to offer financially costly concessions to the opposition.

In Table 4 below, I measure financial constraints using *IMF Structural Adjustment Implementation*, which comes from Abdouharb and Cingranelli (2006). It is coded "1" in years in which a country receives a structural adjustment package from the IMF. It is also coded "1" for the the following four consecutive years after receipt of the package, assuming that the country must implement the terms of the agreement during that time. *IMF Structural Adjustment Implementation* is coded "0" in years when a country is not implementing an IMF structural adjustment package.

Table 4 shows that dictators respond to legislative opposition (not party opposition) with significantly higher material concessions than potential opposition. In line with both my results on inflation and my theoretical expectations, dictators provide fewer material concessions to legislative opposition during IMF structural adjustment implementation. As above, dictators provide significantly more rights concessions to legislative and party opposition as compared to potential opposition. However, the level of rights concessions is nonetheless higher to party opposition than legislative opposition. Dictators *decrease* the level of rights concessions to legislative opposition under the conditions of IMF structural adjustment implementation and *increase* rights concessions to party opposition.

Table 4 here.

In Table 5, I created *Negative GDP Growth*, a dichotomous measure of financial constraint, using data from the World Development Indicators (WDI). It is coded “1” in country-years when a county has experienced negative growth in its gross domestic product (GDP) and “0” otherwise.

Although the main results are similar to those presented in the original manuscript, there are several points to note. First, negative GDP growth, unlike inflation and IMF structural adjustment, has a negative and significant effect on material concessions even when dictators face potential opposition. This is an interesting result suggesting that negative GDP growth is even more problematic than inflation, but it is not contrary to my theory. Second, dictators respond to legislative opposition (not party opposition) with significantly higher material concessions than potential opposition. Third, although dictators provide significantly more rights concessions to legislative and party opposition as compared to potential opposition, the level of rights concessions is nonetheless higher to party opposition. Finally, negative GDP growth *increases* rights concessions to party opposition and *decreases* them to legislative opposition. This result is consistent with my original results using inflation as a measure of financial constraint.

Table 5 here.

Alternative Measures of Material Benefits

In the original manuscript, I discuss two alternative measures of material benefits—government educational expenditures and health expenditures. Because of the high amounts of missing data in these variables over my temporal domain, I chose to measure Material Benefits using data on per capita food supply. Aside from the rationale provided in the original manuscript, I made this decision for several reasons. Data on government health expenditures is not available from either the World Health Organization (WHO) or the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) from 1980 to 1996.¹

WDI has released data on Educational Expenditures and Social Spending that is available during my temporal domain. If the missing data on Educational Expenditures or Social Spending were randomly distributed (i.e., missing at random or MAR), it would then be possible to use multiple imputation to “fill in” the missing data (Rubin, 1996; King, 2002). Unfortunately, this is not the case. In fact, it is likely that economic data is less likely to be systematically collected in non-democratic counties and poorer countries (Ross, 2006). Table 6 provides additional evidence that the data is indeed not randomly distributed. As a result,

¹WHO did not begin publishing its statistical country reports until 1995.

the use of either multiple imputation or listwise deletion would likely generate biased results. The table shows the effect of listwise deletion resulting from the use of data on Educational Expenditures and Social Spending on the mean values of key dependent and independent variables in my data. For example, the mean value of my measure of Rights Concessions—CIRI’s *empinx* variable—is 3.396 based on 1244 observations. When Education Expenditures is used as a dependent variable in my 3SLS model, listwise deletion because of the missing data results in a mean of value of 4.027 on Rights Concession based on a reduced number of 975 observations. The difference between these two means is also significant. The result is similar when Social Spending is used as a dependent variable. In this case, listwise deletion drives the sample size to less than 400. The story is much the same for the other measures listed in Table 6, especially when using the measure of Social Spending.

Table 6 here.

As an alternative to per capita food supply, educational expenditures, or health expenditures, Referee 1 suggested using a measure of total government consumption expenditures to capture Material Concessions. I have done so and report the results in Table 7 below. The data on total government consumption expenditures as a percent of GDP comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and has far less missingness than data on government education expenditures, health expenditures, or more general social spending. The results in Table 7 are consistent with my theoretical expectations, as well as the results presented in the original manuscript and in Table 1 above.

Table 7 here.

Below are the results when controlling for the size of the winning coalition (W), the size of the selectorate (S), and the size of the loyalty norm (W/S), as described in (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Table 8 provides results controlling for only W and S , whereas Table 9 controls for W , S , and W/S . These tables demonstrate that my results are robust to the inclusion of the covariates suggested by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).

References

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Table 1: Effect of Legislative and Party Opposition & Inflation on Material Concessions, Rights Concessions, & Repression

Regressor	Material	Rights	Repression
<i>Inflation_t</i>	0.186 (0.176)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
<i>Legislative Opposition_t</i>	30.150*** (9.748)	0.856*** (0.151)	0.232* (0.157)
<i>Inflation * Legislative Opposition_t</i>	-0.188 (0.176)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
<i>Party Opposition_t</i>	-12.923 (19.451)	1.131*** (0.312)	0.694** (0.306)
<i>Inflation * Party Opposition_t</i>	-0.0108 (0.527)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)
<i>Dependent Variable_{t-1}</i>	0.948*** (0.011)	0.730*** (0.026)	-0.629*** (0.031)
<i>Country Wealth (In Billions)</i>	1.19e-10 (8.79e-11)	2.78e-12 (1.46e-12)	4.09e-12*** (1.39e-12)
<i>Population (In Millions)</i>	1.02e-08 (4.43e-08)	-1.76e-09** (7.21e-10)	-8.82e-10 (7.12e-10)
<i>Mineral Resources</i>	20.273** (8.598)	-0.131 (0.143)	0.027 (0.141)
<i>Foreign Aid</i>	-78.818** (34.779)	0.824 (0.582)	-0.146 (0.570)
<i>Military Leader</i>	-27.823*** (10.943)	0.093 (0.183)	0.207 (0.178)
<i>Civilian Leader</i>	-41.918*** (11.932)	0.357* (0.197)	0.196 (0.195)
<i>Conflict</i>	—	—	0.622*** (0.175)
<i>Material Concessions</i>	—	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
<i>Rights Concessions</i>	0.795 (2.131)	—	-0.050* (0.034)
<i>Repression</i>	1.421 (2.707)	-0.119*** (0.043)	—
<i>Constant</i>	135.404*** (34.806)	2.416*** (0.574)	6.913*** (0.512)
<i>N</i>	710	710	710

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Panel corrected standard errors (clustered on country) from 3SLS are given in parentheses. Sample size: 116 dictatorial countries from 1980 to 1996. Results on opposition are as compared to a base category of potential opposition.

Table 2: Effect of Legislative and Party Opposition & Inflation on Material Concessions, Rights Concessions, & Repression (Dropping Endogenous Controls)

Regressor	Material	Rights	Repression
<i>Inflation_t</i>	0.123 (0.177)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
<i>Legislative Opposition_t</i>	22.690** (9.714)	0.927*** (0.145)	0.256* (0.153)
<i>Inflation * Legislative Opposition_t</i>	-0.126 (0.178)	-0.004* (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
<i>Party Opposition_t</i>	-6.056 (19.169)	1.038*** (0.308)	0.739*** (0.299)
<i>Inflation * Party Opposition_t</i>	-0.145 (0.533)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)
<i>Dependent Variable_{t-1}</i>	0.960*** (0.011)	0.752*** (0.024)	-0.632*** (0.031)
<i>Country Wealth (In Billions)</i>	1.05e-10 (8.87e-11)	3.14e-12** (1.45e-12)	4.13e-12*** (1.39e-12)
<i>Population (In Millions)</i>	-1.50e-08 (4.42e-08)	-1.63e-09** (7.20e-10)	-8.37e-10 (7.06e-10)
<i>Foreign Aid</i>	-85.676*** (34.907)	0.824 (0.581)	-0.132 (0.567)
<i>Conflict</i>	—	—	0.618*** (0.172)
<i>Material Concessions</i>	—	-0.0007*** (0.0002)	-0.0003** (0.0002)
<i>Rights Concessions</i>	-2.252 (1.953)	—	-0.046* (0.031)
<i>Repression</i>	0.032 (2.697)	-0.112*** (0.043)	—
<i>Constant</i>	105.265*** (33.572)	2.686*** (0.532)	7.182*** (0.455)
<i>N</i>	710	710	710

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Panel corrected standard errors (clustered on country) from 3SLS are given in parentheses. Sample size: 116 dictatorial countries from 1980 to 1996. Results on opposition are as compared to a base category of potential opposition.

Table 3: Effect of Legislative and Party Opposition & Inflation on Material Concessions, Rights Concessions, & Repression (Controlling for Demographic Concerns)

Regressor	Material	Rights	Repression
<i>Inflation_t</i>	0.172 (0.176)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
<i>Legislative Opposition_t</i>	23.352** (10.135)	0.909*** (0.152)	0.229 (0.161)
<i>Inflation * Legislative Opposition_t</i>	-0.176 (0.177)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
<i>Party Opposition_t</i>	-16.166 (19.552)	1.121*** (0.312)	0.700** (0.308)
<i>Inflation * Party Opposition_t</i>	-0.166 (0.534)	0.008 (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)
<i>Dependent Variable_{t-1}</i>	0.939*** (0.012)	0.711*** (0.027)	-0.629*** (0.032)
<i>Country Wealth (In Billions)</i>	9.14e-11 (9.11e-11)	2.12e-12 (1.49e-12)	4.26e-12*** (1.42e-12)
<i>Population (In Millions)</i>	-6.75e-09 (4.49e-08)	-1.65e-09** (7.23e-10)	-9.24e-10 (7.16e-10)
<i>Mineral Resources</i>	20.247** (8.878)	-0.192 (0.144)	0.038 (0.144)
<i>Foreign Aid</i>	-63.095* (35.209)	0.820 (0.582)	-0.175 (0.573)
<i>Military Leader</i>	-26.667** (11.680)	0.177 (0.185)	0.183 (0.183)
<i>Civilian Leader</i>	-39.427*** (12.773)	0.425** (0.198)	0.183 (0.199)
<i>% Population (0 to 14)</i>	-0.385 (2.970)	—	—
<i>% Population (15 to 64)</i>	2.345 (3.509)	—	—
<i>Conflict</i>	—	—	0.578*** (0.182)
<i>Material Concessions</i>	—	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.0004* (0.0002)
<i>Rights Concessions</i>	1.080 (2.260)	—	-0.048 (0.036)
<i>Repression</i>	2.419 (2.804)	-0.112*** (0.045)	—
<i>Constant</i>	42.827 (322.978)	2.158*** (0.595)	7.032*** (0.522)
<i>N</i>	694	694	694

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Panel corrected standard errors (clustered on country) from 3SLS are given in parentheses. Sample size: 116 dictatorial countries from 1980 to 1996. Results on opposition are as compared to a base category of potential opposition.

Table 4: Effect of Legislative and Party Opposition & IMF Structural Adjustment Implementation on Material Concessions, Rights Concessions, & Repression

Regressor	Material	Rights	Repression
<i>IMF Structural Adjustment_t</i>	3.108 (9.344)	0.039 (0.153)	0.104 (0.149)
<i>Legislative Opposition_t</i>	30.043*** (10.069)	0.708*** (0.159)	0.220 (0.160)
<i>IMF Structural Adjustment * Legislative Opposition_t</i>	-12.187 (13.088)	-0.004 (0.214)	0.065 (0.208)
<i>Party Opposition_t</i>	-23.774 (20.670)	0.769** (0.333)	0.088 (0.328)
<i>IMF Structural Adjustment * Party Opposition_t</i>	26.318 (27.942)	0.655 (0.456)	0.581 (0.442)
<i>Dependent Variable_{t-1}</i>	0.941*** (0.010)	0.742*** (0.024)	-0.635*** (0.028)
<i>Country Wealth (In Billions)</i>	1.45e-10* (8.04e-11)	2.98e-12** (1.31e-12)	3.63e-12*** (1.25e-12)
<i>Population (In Millions)</i>	1.59e-08 (3.62e-08)	-1.79e-09*** (5.77e-10)	-7.11e-10 (5.70e-10)
<i>Mineral Resources</i>	14.098* (8.181)	-0.184 (0.133)	-0.046 (0.130)
<i>Foreign Aid</i>	-74.742** (30.781)	1.071** (0.503)	-0.354 (0.493)
<i>Military Leader</i>	-24.216** (10.881)	0.135 (0.178)	0.254* (0.173)
<i>Civilian Leader</i>	-42.908*** (11.524)	0.322* (0.188)	0.269* (0.183)
<i>Conflict</i>	—	—	0.538*** (0.155)
<i>Material Concessions</i>	—	-0.0005*** (0.00018)	-0.00037** (0.00017)
<i>Rights Concessions</i>	0.402 (1.963)	—	-0.062** (0.030)
<i>Repression</i>	-0.074 (2.535)	-0.106*** (0.040)	—
<i>Constant</i>	160.429*** (32.369)	2.051*** (0.534)	7.108*** (0.468)
<i>N</i>	847	847	847

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Panel corrected standard errors (clustered on country) from 3SLS are given in parentheses. Sample size: 116 dictatorial countries from 1980 to 1996. Results on opposition are as compared to a base category of potential opposition.

Table 5: Effect of Legislative and Party Opposition & Negative GDP Growth on Material Concessions, Rights Concessions, & Repression

Regressor	Material	Rights	Repression
<i>Negative GDP Growth_t</i>	-43.281*** (8.1708)	0.176 (0.137)	0.093 (0.134)
<i>Legislative Opposition_t</i>	17.570* (9.792)	0.902*** (0.153)	0.311** (0.157)
<i>Negative GDP Growth * Legislative Opposition_t</i>	8.285 (12.168)	-0.438** (0.203)	-0.059 (0.199)
<i>Party Opposition_t</i>	7.553 (20.852)	1.011*** (0.343)	0.408** (0.338)
<i>Negative GDP Growth * Party Opposition_t</i>	-22.835 (26.416)	0.203 (0.443)	0.018 (0.432)
<i>Dependent Variable_{t-1}</i>	0.944*** (0.010)	0.741*** (0.024)	-0.641*** (0.028)
<i>Country Wealth (In Billions)</i>	1.16e-10* (7.79e-11)	2.72e-12** (1.30e-12)	3.76e-12*** (1.24e-12)
<i>Population (In Millions)</i>	3.87e-09 (3.52e-08)	-1.63e-09*** (5.78e-10)	-6.84e-10 (5.72e-10)
<i>Mineral Resources</i>	19.026** (7.857)	-0.168 (0.131)	-0.024 (0.129)
<i>Foreign Aid</i>	-74.335*** (29.250)	1.150** (0.489)	-0.188 (0.482)
<i>Military Leader</i>	-19.514* (10.355)	0.128 (0.174)	0.246* (0.169)
<i>Civilian Leader</i>	-36.649*** (10.959)	0.339* (0.183)	0.263* (0.180)
<i>Conflict</i>	—	—	0.497*** (0.154)
<i>Material Concessions</i>	—	-0.0005*** (0.0002)	-0.00039** (0.00017)
<i>Rights Concessions</i>	0.458 (1.914)	—	-0.062** (0.030)
<i>Repression</i>	0.180 (2.447)	-0.105*** (0.039)	—
<i>Constant</i>	168.036*** (31.49)	1.959*** (0.535)	7.153*** (0.468)
<i>N</i>	847	847	847

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Panel corrected standard errors (clustered on country) from 3SLS are given in parentheses. Sample size: 116 dictatorial countries from 1980 to 1996. Results on opposition are as compared to a base category of potential opposition.

Table 6: Effect of Missing Data on Mean Values of Key Dependent and Independent Variables

Measure	Observations	Mean	Diff. of Means
<i>Rights Concessions</i>	1244	3.696	
<i>Rights Concessions (DV – Education Expenditures)</i>	975	4.027	p=0.004
<i>Rights Concessions (DV – Social Spending)</i>	387	3.990	p=0.050
<i>Inflation</i>	1058	73.098	
<i>Inflation (DV – Education Expenditures)</i>	885	82.543	p=0.805
<i>Inflation (DV – Social Spending)</i>	384	12.642	p=0.042
<i>Legislative Opposition</i>	1645	0.348	
<i>Legislative Opposition (DV – Education Expenditures)</i>	1145	0.371	p=0.222
<i>Legislative Opposition (DV – Social Spending)</i>	465	0.432	p=0.001
<i>Party Opposition</i>	1645	0.052	
<i>Party Opposition (DV – Education Expenditures)</i>	1146	0.056	p=0.681
<i>Party Opposition (DV – Social Spending)</i>	465	0.049	p=0.809
<i>Latent Opposition</i>	1645	0.588	
<i>Latent Opposition (DV – Education Expenditures)</i>	1146	0.570	p=0.326
<i>Latent Opposition (DV – Social Spending)</i>	465	0.518	p=0.007

Table 7: Effect of Legislative and Party Opposition & Inflation on Material Concessions, Rights Concessions, & Repression

Regressor	Material	Rights	Repression
<i>Inflation_t</i>	0.004 (0.013)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
<i>Legislative Opposition_t</i>	1.447** (0.710)	0.794*** (0.148)	0.158 (0.158)
<i>Inflation * Legislative Opposition_t</i>	-0.004 (0.113)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
<i>Party Opposition_t</i>	-0.141 (1.443)	1.048*** (0.314)	0.501* (0.314)
<i>Inflation * Party Opposition_t</i>	-0.019 (0.040)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)
<i>Dependent Variable_{t-1}</i>	0.822*** (0.018)	0.723*** (0.026)	-0.640*** (0.031)
<i>Country Wealth (In Billions)</i>	-8.34e-12 (5.82e-12)	-3.79e-14 (1.31e-12)	3.15e-12*** (1.27e-12)
<i>Population (In Millions)</i>	-8.00e-10 (3.13e-09)	-8.06e-10 (6.96e-10)	-3.45e-10 (6.90e-10)
<i>Mineral Resources</i>	-1.639** (0.669)	-0.153 (0.151)	0.119 (0.150)
<i>Foreign Aid</i>	11.360*** (2.680)	1.076* (0.622)	-0.295 (0.615)
<i>Military Leader</i>	1.137* (0.749)	0.294* (0.166)	0.234 (0.164)
<i>Civilian Leader</i>	-0.148 (0.803)	0.527** (0.174)	0.241 (0.176)
<i>Conflict</i>	—	—	0.635*** (0.185)
<i>Material Concessions</i>	—	0.004 (0.005)	0.009** (0.005)
<i>Rights Concessions</i>	0.080 (0.161)	—	-0.037 (0.035)
<i>Repression</i>	0.287* (0.190)	-0.071* (0.042)	—
<i>Constant</i>	13.412*** (1.652)	0.348 (0.421)	5.409*** (0.480)
<i>N</i>	708	708	708

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Panel corrected standard errors (clustered on country) from 3SLS are given in parentheses. Sample size: 116 dictatorial countries from 1980 to 1996. Results on opposition are as compared to a base category of potential opposition.

Table 8: Effect of Legislative and Party Opposition & Inflation on Material Concessions, Rights Concessions, & Repression (Controlling for W and S)

Regressor	Material	Rights	Repression
<i>Inflation_t</i>	0.188 (0.176)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
<i>Legislative Opposition_t</i>	31.769*** (10.458)	0.823*** (0.163)	0.356** (0.165)
<i>Inflation * Legislative Opposition_t</i>	-0.190 (0.177)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
<i>Party Opposition_t</i>	-22.839 (19.906)	1.021*** (0.322)	0.714** (0.314)
<i>Inflation * Party Opposition_t</i>	-0.099 (0.527)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.017** (0.009)
<i>Dependent Variable_{t-1}</i>	0.947*** (0.011)	0.725*** (0.026)	-0.613*** (0.032)
<i>Country Wealth (In Billions)</i>	1.15e-10 (8.76e-11)	2.72e-12* (1.45e-12)	3.95e-12*** (1.39e-12)
<i>Population (In Millions)</i>	1.37e-08 (4.42e-08)	-1.73e-09** (7.21e-10)	-8.14e-10 (7.10e-10)
<i>Mineral Resources</i>	18.011** (8.675)	-0.163 (0.144)	0.036 (0.142)
<i>Foreign Aid</i>	-81.912** (34.721)	0.740 (0.582)	-0.025 (0.568)
<i>Military Leader</i>	-24.680** (11.034)	0.150 (0.184)	0.141 (0.180)
<i>Civilian Leader</i>	-40.563*** (12.526)	0.340* (0.207)	0.326* (0.203)
<i>W</i>	25.305 (18.091)	0.519* (0.302)	-0.837*** (0.288)
<i>S</i>	-22.157** (10.698)	-0.235 (0.177)	0.059 (0.174)
<i>Conflict</i>	—	—	0.625*** (0.174)
<i>Material Concessions</i>	—	-0.0006*** (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0002)
<i>Rights Concessions</i>	0.433 (2.158)	—	-0.050* (0.034)
<i>Repression</i>	1.235 (2.821)	-0.114*** (0.045)	—
<i>Constant</i>	145.229*** (35.392)	2.493*** (0.583)	6.804*** (0.515)
<i>N</i>	709	709	709

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Panel corrected standard errors (clustered on country) from 3SLS are given in parentheses. Sample size: 116 dictatorial countries from 1980 to 1996. Results on opposition are as compared to a base category of potential opposition.

Table 9: Effect of Legislative and Party Opposition & Inflation on Material Concessions, Rights Concessions, & Repression (Controlling for W, S, and W/S)

Regressor	Material	Rights	Repression
<i>Inflation_t</i>	0.168 (0.177)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.002)
<i>Legislative Opposition_t</i>	31.117*** (10.464)	0.812*** (0.164)	0.360** (0.165)
<i>Inflation * Legislative Opposition_t</i>	-0.168 (0.178)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
<i>Party Opposition_t</i>	-19.150 (20.206)	1.069*** (0.326)	0.695** (0.319)
<i>Inflation * Party Opposition_t</i>	-0.083 (0.526)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.017** (0.009)
<i>Dependent Variable_{t-1}</i>	0.947*** (0.011)	0.724*** (0.026)	-0.614*** (0.032)
<i>Country Wealth (In Billions)</i>	1.21e-10 (8.77e-11)	2.79e-12* (1.46e-12)	3.92e-12*** (1.39e-12)
<i>Population (In Millions)</i>	1.11e-08 (4.42e-08)	-1.76e-09*** (7.21e-10)	-8.00e-10 (7.11e-10)
<i>Mineral Resources</i>	19.866** (8.836)	-0.137 (0.147)	0.026 (0.144)
<i>Foreign Aid</i>	-81.222** (34.698)	0.747 (0.582)	-0.028 (0.568)
<i>Military Leader</i>	-27.263** (11.289)	0.114 (0.189)	0.154 (0.183)
<i>Civilian Leader</i>	-43.970*** (12.913)	0.292 (0.215)	0.344 (0.209)
<i>W</i>	223.499*** (189.841)	3.202 (3.157)	-1.901 (3.086)
<i>S</i>	-29.674** (12.880)	-0.336* (0.231)	0.100 (0.210)
<i>W/S</i>	-188.455 (179.608)	-2.552 (2.988)	1.011 (2.920)
<i>Conflict</i>	—	—	0.624*** (0.174)
<i>Material Concessions</i>	—	-0.0006*** (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0002)
<i>Rights Concessions</i>	0.250 (2.166)	—	-0.049 (0.034)
<i>Repression</i>	1.173 (2.819)	-0.115*** (0.045)	—
<i>Constant</i>	152.554*** (36.061)	2.587*** (0.593)	6.767*** (0.528)
<i>N</i>	709	709	709

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Panel corrected standard errors (clustered on country) from 3SLS are given in parentheses. Sample size: 116 dictatorial countries from 1980 to 1996. Results on opposition are as compared to a base category of potential opposition.