

Online Appendix for Manuscript “Divergent Incentives for Dictators: Domestic Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture”

Sample

I use a minimalist, binary measure of political regime described by Alvarez et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). The measure classifies countries as democracies or dictatorships based primarily on whether or not they hold free executive and legislative elections. In order for a country to be coded as a democracy, (1) the chief executive and the legislature must be selected through popular election, (2) there must be ex ante uncertainty about who will win the election, (3) the electoral winner must take office following the election, and (4) elections must occur at regular intervals. Any state that does not meet these criteria is classified as a dictatorship by Alvarez et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) and is included in my sample.¹

Unlike substantive measures of democracy (e.g., Polity IV and Freedom House), the binary conceptualization of democracy most recently described by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) focuses on one institution—elections—to distinguish between dictatorships and democracies. Using a minimalist measure of democracy rather than a substantive one better allows for the isolation of causal mechanisms (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, 73) linking regime type to human rights outcomes. Because I am interested in the effect of parties and judicial institutions on commitment to the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and torture, I cannot distinguish between democracies and dictatorships using a measure of democracy that bases its coding on either of these institutions.²

The decision to use the sample of dictatorships from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) is also consistent with other work on domestic institutions in dictatorships including Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi (2008). Most importantly, Vreeland (2008) uses this sample of dictatorships, and I intend my manuscript to speak heavily to that work. Although the temporal domain of my sample is shorter than that of previous work because the CAT was not open for signatories until 1984, the countries included in my sample are the same as those included in Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), Gandhi (2008), and Vreeland (2008).³ Countries

¹This includes military dictatorships, civilian dictatorships, and monarchs (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010).

²Aside from using a minimalist measure of democracy to draw better causal inference, Freedom House measures are often criticized for their lack of replicability because they are coded at least in part based on interpretation of civil liberties and political rights (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). Similarly, Treier and Jackman (2008) question the “arbitrary” manner in which Polity IV data is aggregated, while Gleditsch and Ward (1997) argue that Polity regime data is not continuous or ordered, but instead categorical.

³Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) include in their analyses four additional countries as dictatorships that are not included in my sample. These countries are dropped from my analyses because of missing data on other variables. They are Somaliland (1991-1996), Taiwan (1984-1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991-1995), and Serbia & Montenegro (1991-1996).

that transition to democracy as coded by Alvarez et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) fall out of my sample of dictatorships; democracies that fail to hold competitive elections as coded by Alvarez et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) reenter the data set.

Table 1 below shows the 116 countries included in my sample based on regime data from Alvarez et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).

Table 1 about here.

Measure of CAT Commitment and Temporal Dependence

In the manuscript, I code CAT commitment as “1” in the year in which a dictatorship ratifies or accedes to the Convention and “1” every year thereafter unless a state removes itself as a party to the CAT. I am not interested in CAT Ratification; instead, I am interested in states being party to the treaty, whether in the first year or in any year thereafter. In this way, my work differs slightly from work seeking to determine the factors that affect initial CAT Ratification. The decision to use a measure in which CAT Commitment is a repeated event also allows me to use a bivariate probit model (BVP) without dropping observations on torture in the years following CAT ratification. But participation in the CAT, following the initial ratification decision, is not independent of participation the previous year. Importantly, Table 2 below shows that my main results for CAT ratification and torture still hold in both the BVP and the independent probit models even after observations of CAT participation after initial ratification decision are dropped. By allowing states to exit the sample when they ratify the CAT, both the BVP and the individual probit model for CAT Commitment take on the characteristics of a hazard or survival model (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).

Table 2 about here.

Although I controlled for temporal dependence using a third order polynomial time counter (Carter and Signorino, 2010), this only addresses the temporal dependence the strings of 0s (i.e., no CAT Commitment) and not the strings of 1s (i.e., since initial CAT Commitment) in my model. As shown in Table 2 above, my results are robust to dropping observations of subsequent CAT participation. Furthermore, if I use my original measure of CAT Commitment (i.e., where subsequent observations of CAT commitment are coded “1” rather than dropped from the sample) and include a third order polynomial time counter for the strings of 1s rather than for the strings of 0s, my results hold. The first column of Table 3 below shows the results reported in my manuscript (i.e., those that address the temporal dependence of the 0s). The second column of Table 3 shows that these results are robust to the

inclusion of a third order polynomial time counter to address the temporal dependence of the 1s.

Table 3 about here.

Table 4 below shows the years in which dictatorships in my sample first ratified the CAT.

Table 4 about here.

Measure of Torture

There are several reasons why I dichotomize the trichotomous Cingranelli and Richards (2004) measure of Torture. When possible, CIRI coders are instructed to derive categorical codes for each country-year based upon observed events (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010; Wood and Gibney, 2010). As a result, CIRI's trichotomous measure of torture is coded "2" in years in which there are no torture allegations against the state, coded "1" in years in which there are 1-49 torture allegations against the state, and coded "0" in years in which there 50 or more allegations of torture against the state. Importantly for my research purposes, CIRI's variable is coded a "1" if there is even a single incident of abuse in a given country-year. For example, if a rogue cop hits a criminal suspect *once*, it is coded as a "1" for that country-year in CIRI's torture data. Because I do not wish to draw inferences about that type of abuse, I chose to look only at abuse in which there were unquestionably more than 50 torture allegations in a given country-year.

There is also a debate in the literature about whether the decision to commit to an international human rights treaty is related to the decision to engage in human rights violations. Using the dichotomous measure of Systemic Torture allows me to run a bivariate probit model following Powell and Staton (2009), one of the main pieces of work to which I wish my manuscript to speak.

All ordinal scales, including CIRI's measure of torture, suffer from truncation (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). Fortunately, however, truncation in the dependent variable biases inferences toward null findings (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 130). Consequently, the results presented using my dichotomous measure of Systemic Torture instead of the Cingranelli and Richards (2004) trichotomous measure of Torture results in a more conservative estimate of my results. Although I cannot test the robustness of my results to CIRI's trichotomous measure of Torture using a bivariate probit model, Table 5 shows that my results are robust to using the trichotomous measure in an individual ordered probit model.

Table 5 about here.

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Table 1: Sample of Dictatorships

Country	Years	Country	Years
Afghanistan	1984-1996	Sao Tome & Principe	1984-1990
Albania	1984-1991	Saudi Arabia	1984-1996
Algeria	1984-1996	Senegal	1984-1996
Angola	1984-1996	Seychelles	1984-1996
Azerbaijan	1991-1996	Sierra Leone	1984-1995
Bahrain	1984-1996	Singapore	1984-1996
Bangladesh	1984-1989	Somalia	1984-1996
Belarus	1991-1996	South Africa	1984-1993
Benin	1984-1990	Sri Lanka	1984-1988
Bhutan	1984-1996	Sudan	1984-1985, 1989-1996
Botswana	1984-1996	Suriname	1984-1987, 1990
Brunei Darussalam	1984-1996	Swaziland	1984-1996
Bulgaria	1984-1989	Syrian Arab Republic	1984-1996
Burkina Faso	1984-1996	Tajikistan	1991-1996
Burundi	1984-1992, 1996	Tanzania	1984-1996
Cambodia	1984-1996	Thailand	1991
Cameroon	1984-1996	Togo	1984-1996
Cape Verde	1984-1990	Tonga	1984-1996
Central African Republic	1984-1992	Tunisia	1984-1996
Chad	1984-1996	Turkmenistan	1991-1996
Chile	1984-1989	U.S.S.R.	1984-1990
China	1984-1996	Uganda	1985-1996
Comoros	1984-1988, 1995-1996	United Arab Emirates	1984-1996
Congo (Republic of)	1984-1991	Uruguay	1984
Cuba	1984-1996	Uzbekistan	1991-1996
Czechoslovakia	1984-1988	Vietnam	1984-1996
Djibouti	1984-1996	Western Samoa	1984-1996
Egypt	1984-1996	Yemen Arab Republic (North, Sana)	1984-1989
Equatorial Guinea	1984-1996	Yemen PDR (South, Aden)	1984-1989
Eritrea	1993-1996	Yugoslavia	1984-1990
Ethiopia	1984-1996	Zaire	1984-1996
Fiji	1984-1996	Zambia	1984-1990
Gabon	1984-1996	Zimbabwe	1984-1996
Gambia	1984-1996		
Georgia	1991-1996		
Ghana	1984-1992		
Guatemala	1984-1985		
Guinea	1984-1996		
Guinea-Bissau	1984-1996		
Guyana	1984-1991		
Haiti	1984-1993		
Hungary	1984-1989		
Indonesia	1984-1996		
Iran	1984-1996		
Iraq	1984-1996		
Ivory Coast	1984-1996		
Jordan	1984-1996		
Kazakhstan	1991-1996		
Kenya	1984-1996		
Korea (North)	1984-1996		
Korea (South)	1984-1987		
Kuwait	1984-1996		
Kyrgyz Republic	1991-1996		
Laos PDR	1984-1996		
Lesotho	1984-1992		
Liberia	1984-1996		
Libya	1984-1996		
Madagascar	1984-1992		
Malawi	1984-1993		
Malaysia	1984-1996		
Maldives	1984-1996		
Mali	1984-1991		
Mauritania	1984-1996		
Mexico	1984-1996		
Moldova	1991-1995		
Mongolia	1984-1991		
Morocco	1984-1996		
Mozambique	1984-1996		
Myanmar	1984-1996		
Nepal	1984-1990		
Niger	1984-1992, 1996		
Nigeria	1984-1996		
Oman	1984-1996		
Pakistan	1984-1987		
Panama	1984-1988		
Paraguay	1984-1996		
Peru	1990-1996		
Philippines	1984-1985		
Poland	1984-1988		
Qatar	1984-1996		
Republic of Yemen	1990-1996		
Romania	1984-1989		
Rwanda	1984-1996		

Table 2: CAT Commitment & Torture (Survival Model of Commitment)

Dependent Variable: CAT Commitment	SUR BVP	Individual Probit
<i>Party_t</i>	1.797** (0.777)	1.776** (0.807)
<i>CIM_t</i>	0.572 (0.655)	0.470 (0.701)
<i>Party_t * CIM_t</i>	-1.997** (1.042)	-1.928* (1.084)
<i>Systemic Torture_{t-1}</i>	0.005 (0.231)	-0.007 (0.235)
<i>Communist_t</i>	0.299 (0.512)	0.303 (0.512)
<i>Muslim_t</i>	0.126 (0.317)	0.113 (0.323)
<i>Population_t</i>	0.005 (0.008)	0.000 (0.001)
<i>GDP/Capita_t</i>	0.018 (0.027)	0.024 (0.078)
<i>Trade/GDP_t</i>	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
<i>Log - pseudo likelihood</i>	↓	-74.098
<i>N</i>		478

Dependent Variable: Systemic Torture	SUR BVP	Individual Probit
<i>Party_t</i>	1.477** (0.614)	1.271** (0.594)
<i>CIM_t</i>	0.657 (0.613)	0.575 (0.610)
<i>Party_t * CIM_t</i>	-1.780** (0.838)	-1.490* (0.810)
<i>CAT Commitment_{t-1}</i>	-0.369 (0.326)	-0.369 (0.326)
<i>Communist_t</i>	-0.585** (0.346)	-0.647* (0.350)
<i>Economic Growth_t</i>	0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)
<i>Civil War_t</i>	0.511*** (0.073)	0.442*** (0.171)
<i>Population_t</i>	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
<i>GDP/Capita_t</i>	0.023 (0.018)	0.025 (0.018)
<i>Trade/GDP_t</i>	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)
<i>ρ</i>	0.278** (0.116)	-
<i>Log - pseudo likelihood</i>	-348.726	-228.591
<i>N</i>	478	501

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$; (two-tailed). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients on third order polynomial time counters and constants not reported. Sample size: 116 dictatorships from 1984 to 1996.

Table 3: CAT Commitment & Torture (Controlling for Temporal Dependence of 0s & 1s)

Dependent Variable: CAT Commitment	SUR BVP	SUR BVP
<i>Party_t</i>	2.215*** (0.873)	1.692** (0.790)
<i>CIM_t</i>	0.836 (0.833)	0.539 (0.663)
<i>Party_t * CIM_t</i>	-2.387** (1.112)	-1.940* (1.068)
<i>Systemic Torture_{t-1}</i>	0.085 (0.188)	-0.011 (0.223)
<i>Communist_t</i>	0.215 (0.626)	0.311 (0.508)
<i>Muslim_t</i>	0.124 (0.236)	0.092 (0.318)
<i>Population_t</i>	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
<i>GDP/Capita_t</i>	0.017 (0.026)	0.025 (0.027)
<i>Trade/GDP_t</i>	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
<i>t¹Ratification_a</i>	-1.963*** (0.214)	-
<i>t²Ratification_a</i>	0.322*** (0.047)	-
<i>t³Ratification_a</i>	-0.015*** (0.003)	-
<i>t¹Ratification_b</i>	-	11.016*** (0.193)
<i>t²Ratification_b</i>	-	-2.466*** (0.612)
<i>t³Ratification_b</i>	-	0.153*** (0.005)
<i>Log - pseudo likelihood</i>	↓	↓
<i>N</i>		

Dependent Variable: Systemic Torture		
<i>Party_t</i>	1.081** (0.546)	1.029* (0.552)
<i>CIM_t</i>	0.569 (0.612)	0.537 (0.617)
<i>Party_t * CIM_t</i>	-1.173* (0.745)	-1.128* (0.755)
<i>CAT Commitment_{t-1}</i>	0.293** (0.150)	0.331** (0.153)
<i>Communist_t</i>	-0.694** (0.337)	-0.661* (0.345)
<i>Economic Growth_t</i>	-0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
<i>Civil Wart</i>	0.409*** (0.153)	0.411*** (0.159)
<i>Population_t</i>	0.001** (0.001)	0.002** (0.002)
<i>GDP/Capita_t</i>	0.028* (0.018)	0.027* (0.017)
<i>Trade/GDP_t</i>	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
<i>t¹HighTorture_a</i>	-0.489** (0.122)	-
<i>t²HighTorture_a</i>	0.083** (0.035)	-
<i>t³HighTorture_a</i>	-0.004* (0.003)	-
<i>t¹HighTorture_b</i>	-	0.535*** (0.150)
<i>t²HighTorture_b</i>	-	-0.066 (0.055)
<i>t³HighTorture_b</i>	-	0.001 (0.005)
<i>ρ</i>	0.346*** (0.103)	0.251* (0.126)
<i>Log - pseudo likelihood</i>	-445.214	-400.786
<i>N</i>	591	591

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$; (two-tailed). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients on constants not reported. Sample size: 116 dictatorships from 1984 to 1996.

Table 4: CAT Ratification in Dictatorships, 1984-1996

Country	Year
Afghanistan	1987
Algeria	1989
Azerbaijan	1996
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1993
Bulgaria	1986
Burundi	1993
Cambodia	1992
Cameroon	1986
Chad	1995
Chile	1988
China	1988
Cuba	1995
Egypt	1986
Ethiopia	1994
Georgia	1994
Germany, East	1987
Guinea	1989
Guyana	1988
Hungary	1987
Ivory Coast	1995
Jordan	1991
Kuwait	1996
Libya	1989
Mexico	1986
Moldova	1995
Morocco	1993
Panama	1987
Paraguay	1990
Peru	1988
Senegal	1986
Seychelles	1992
Somalia	1990
Tajikistan	1995
Togo	1987
Tunisia	1988
U.S.S.R.	1987
Uganda	1986
Uzbekistan	1995
Yemen, Republic of	1991
Zaire	1996

Table 5: Determinants of Torture (Ordered Probit)

<i>Party_t</i>	0.896** (0.435)
<i>CIM_t</i>	0.161 (0.411)
<i>Party_t * CIM_t</i>	-1.007* (0.587)
<i>CAT Commitment_{t-1}</i>	0.599*** (0.181)
<i>Communist_t</i>	-0.719*** (0.277)
<i>Economic Growth_t</i>	0.003 (0.005)
<i>Civil War_t</i>	0.615*** (0.137)
<i>Population_t</i>	0.002*** (0.001)
<i>GDP/Capita_t</i>	0.021 (0.017)
<i>Trade/GDP_t</i>	-0.006*** (0.001)
<i>Cut 1</i>	-1.299*** (0.317)
<i>Cut 2</i>	0.298 (0.311)
<i>Log - pseudo likelihood</i>	-501.057
<i>N</i>	604

NOTES: * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$; (two-tailed). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients on third order polynomial time counters and constants not reported. Sample size: 116 dictatorships from 1984 to 1996.